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Regulatory takings law is by most accounts a “muddle.”1 
Despite a series of high-profile decisions over the last three 
decades, the Supreme Court has failed to solve the riddle it 
posed for itself in the seminal case of the modern regulatory 
takings era, Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New 
York:2 When does a regulation burdening property rise to the 
level of a compensable “taking”?3 
Although current regulatory takings jurisprudence lacks 
theoretical coherence, the elements of the doctrine are easily 
enough stated. Regulations that result in permanent physical 
occupation4 or deprivation of all economically viable use of 
land5 are per se takings—except when they’re not.6 Exactions—
conditioning land development approvals upon the surrender of 
a valuable property right—are subject to the Nollan “essential 
nexus”7 and Dolan “rough proportionality”8 tests, designed to 
 
 1. See John D. Echeverria & Sharon Dennis, The Takings Issue and the 
Due Process Clause: A Way Out of a Doctrinal Confusion, 17 VT. L. REV. 695, 
696 (1993) (labeling takings jurisprudence a “confused body of law”); Carol M. 
Rose, Mahon Reconstructed: Why the Takings Issue is Still a Muddle, 57 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 561, 561–63 (1984) (describing takings law as riddled with “con-
fusion”). But cf. Stewart E. Sterk, The Federalist Dimension of Regulatory 
Takings Jurisprudence, 114 YALE L.J. 203, 205–06 (2004) (arguing that the 
takings doctrine reasonably accommodates federalism and the limits of the 
Court’s institutional role). 
 2. 438 U.S. 104 (1978). 
 3. The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment provides: “[N]or shall 
private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.” U.S. 
CONST. amend. V. 
 4. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 426 
(1982) (holding that “a permanent physical occupation authorized by govern-
ment is a taking without regard to the public interests that it may serve”). 
 5. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1004, 1028–31 (1992) 
(holding that regulations that “eliminate all economically beneficial use” of 
land are per se takings). The Lucas “total taking” test is limited to property in 
land. See id. at 1027–28 (distinguishing Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 66–67 
(1979), which upheld a regulation destroying the economic value of personal 
property). 
 6. See id. at 1028–29 (stating that a regulation reflecting a “limitation” 
that “inhere[s] in the title itself, in the restrictions that background principles 
of the State’s law of property and nuisance already place upon land owner-
ship” is noncompensable). 
 7. See Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 836–37 (1987) (hold-
ing that if permit approval is conditioned on surrender of a property right, the 
condition must have an “essential nexus” to the purpose of the regulation). 
 8. See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 391 (1994) (holding that the 
government “must make some sort of individualized determination that the 
required dedication is related both in nature and extent to the impact of the 
proposed development”). 
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prevent “extortion.”9 All other regulatory takings claims are de-
cided under the Penn Central balancing test, requiring a case-
specific weighing of the character of the government’s action 
against the loss incurred by the property owner, taking into ac-
count “distinct investment-backed expectations.”10 
Because balancing incommensurables under the Penn Cen-
tral test is difficult, courts often resorted to a more manageable 
short-form alternative set out in Agins v. City of Tiburon, re-
quiring only two threshold determinations: a regulation is a 
compensable taking if it “does not substantially advance le-
gitimate state interests . . . or denies an owner economically vi-
able use of his land.” 11 Recently, however, Lingle v. Chevron 
U.S.A., Inc.12 expressly repudiated the Agins “substantially ad-
vances” formula, stating that it “prescribes an inquiry in the 
nature of a due process, not a takings, test,” was “derived from 
due process, not takings, precedents,” and “has no proper place 
in our takings jurisprudence.”13 
Lingle is an important clarification, pruning errant lan-
guage in Agins that imported Lochner-style heightened sub-
stantive due process14 review into modern takings law. The 
Lingle opinion is, moreover, a remarkably candid admission 
that the Court had lost its way in the takings thicket. But the 
conflation of takings law with substantive due process runs 
deeper than Agins,15 and Lingle is an inadequate corrective. 
This Article traces the roots of the doctrinal muddle to the 
Court’s anachronistic misreading, from Penn Central forward, 
 
 9. See id. at 386–91 (quoting with approval the “extortion” language from 
Nollan and extending the test for exactions to include “rough proportionality”); 
Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837 (stating that if the permit condition does not serve the 
same governmental purpose as the development ban, the building restriction 
“is not a valid regulation of land use, but ‘an out-and-out plan of extortion’”) 
(quoting J.E.D. Assocs., Inc. v. Atkinson, 432 A.2d 12, 14–15 (N.H. 1981))). 
 10. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 
(1978) (identifying as factors of “particular significance” the “economic impact 
. . . on the claimant,” the “extent to which the regulation has interfered with 
distinct investment-backed expectations,” and “the character of the govern-
mental action”). 
 11. 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980). 
 12. 125 S. Ct. 2074, 2082 (2005). 
 13. Id. at 2082–83, 2087. 
 14. The Fourteenth Amendment provides, inter alia: “[N]or shall any 
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of 
law.” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 15. See Echeverria & Dennis, supra note 1, at 698 (“[A]s takings doctrine 
has evolved . . . the distinctive character of the due process and takings inquir-
ies has become obscured.”). 
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of late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century Fourteenth 
Amendment substantive due process cases as Fifth Amend-
ment Takings Clause precedents—the same error Lingle dis-
cerned in Agins. The most important of these misplaced prece-
dents are Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Co. v. City of 
Chicago16 (Chicago B & Q)—said to have incorporated the Fifth 
Amendment Takings Clause against the states17—and Penn-
sylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon18—said to have established that a 
regulation that “goes too far” is a compensable Fifth Amend-
ment taking.19 Understood in proper historical context, how-
ever, neither Chicago B & Q nor Mahon said anything about 
the Fifth Amendment or its Takings Clause, which at the time 
applied only to the federal government.20 Both cases were de-
cided on Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process 
grounds. 
Chicago B & Q did hold that due process requires states to 
pay “just compensation” when taking property by eminent do-
main,21 and subsequent Courts noted parallels between that 
holding and the Fifth Amendment prohibition on uncompen-
sated “takings.”22 But that did not mean that the Fifth 
Amendment Takings Clause applied to the states. For nine-
teenth- and early twentieth-century courts, the Takings Clause 
had a straightforward textual basis in an amendment that ap-
plied exclusively to the federal government,23 while the just 
 
 16. 166 U.S. 226 (1897). 
 17. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 428 U.S. 104, 122 
(1978) (citing Chicago B & Q for the proposition that the Takings Clause “is 
made applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment”). 
 18. 260 U.S. 393 (1922). 
 19. See, e.g., Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Plan-
ning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 325 (2002) (stating that Mahon “gave birth to our 
regulatory takings jurisprudence”). 
 20. See Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 250–51 (1833) (holding 
that the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause applies only to the federal govern-
ment). As Part II.C. shows, Barron remained good law until the 1950s. 
 21. See Chi., Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co., 166 U.S. at 236 (“Due process 
of law as applied to judicial proceedings instituted for the taking of private 
property for public use means . . . such process as recognizes the right of the 
owner to be compensated if his property be wrested from him and transferred 
to the public.”). 
 22. See infra Part II.B. 
 23. See Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312, 325 
(1893) (stating that in takings claims against the United States “we need not 
have recourse to . . . natural equity . . . for, in this Fifth Amendment, there is 
stated the exact limitation on the power of the government to take private 
property for public uses”). 
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compensation principle that Chicago B & Q found in Four-
teenth Amendment due process was derived from “universal 
law” and “natural equity.”24 Mahon was part of that same cen-
tury-long line of Fourteenth Amendment substantive due proc-
ess jurisprudence.25 
During this period, the due process-based doctrine applica-
ble to states and the Takings Clause applicable to the federal 
government were seen as parallel and independent, not identi-
cal, doctrines. The major difference reflected a fundamental 
point of federalism. State law was understood to be the princi-
pal source of property law, defining the nature and limits of the 
property rights held by the claimant. In Fifth Amendment tak-
ings cases, the federal government had to take state property 
law more or less as given, the outcome turning on whether the 
federal action so abridged state-recognized property rights as to 
constitute a “taking” of property.26 
Due process-based claims against states played out differ-
ently. Because state law determined the scope of property 
rights, a claim that a state had deprived the claimant of prop-
erty invited the defense that the claimant’s property rights 
simply did not extend so far as claimed, so that no property had 
been “taken.”27 All states asserted as a foundational element of 
their property law that all property was qualified by, and held 
subject to, the state’s reserved police power to regulate to pro-
tect the public health, safety, morals, and general welfare. The 
police power thus operated as an inherent limitation on prop-
erty rights, part of the state-law definition of property itself. 
 
 24. See Chi., Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co., 166 U.S. at 236–37; see also 
Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 99 (1908) (stating that states must pay 
just compensation in eminent domain because that principle is “included in 
the conception of due process of law” and “not because those rights are enu-
merated in the first eight Amendments”), overruled by Malloy v. Hogan, 378 
U.S. 1 (1964). 
 25. See Robert Brauneis, “The Foundation of Our ‘Regulatory Takings’ Ju-
risprudence”: The Myth and Meaning of Justice Holmes’s Opinion in Pennsyl-
vania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 106 YALE L.J. 613 (1996); William Michael Treanor, 
Jam for Justice Holmes: Reassessing the Significance of Mahon, 86 GEO. L.J. 
813 (1998); see also infra Part II.E. 
 26. See infra Part II.D. 
 27. “Taking” was used interchangeably with “deprivation of property” in 
both Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process cases in the 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, contributing to the modern confu-
sion. See, e.g., Heiner v. Donnan, 285 U.S. 312, 330 (1932) (holding federal es-
tate tax provision “so arbitrary and capricious as to cause it to fall within the 
ban of the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment”). Nothing turns on this 
shorthand use of the term. 
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Because all property was subject to this indefinite limitation, 
property rights were also indefinite at the boundaries, and var-
ied over time and across jurisdictions. 
Regulatory takings claims against states under the Due 
Process Clause turned centrally on whether the challenged 
regulation fell within the legitimate bounds of the police 
power.28 If the action was a valid police power exercise, that 
was dispositive: no deprivation of property had occurred. Be-
cause there was no federal analog to the states’ police power, 
these arguments had no place in Fifth Amendment Takings 
Clause doctrine.29 Genetically, analytically, and operationally, 
the two doctrines were distinct. 
Penn Central changed all that, holding that the Fifth 
Amendment Takings Clause applies directly to the states, cit-
ing a single precedent, Chicago B & Q, which in fact said no 
such thing. From there, the Penn Central Court attempted to 
weave a unified takings doctrine out of a pastiche of Fourteenth 
Amendment substantive due process and Fifth Amendment 
Takings Clause precedents. The ensuing doctrinal merger effec-
tively eliminated Fourteenth Amendment due process as a dis-
tinctive category of inquiry in takings law and eviscerated the 
states’ police power defense. Elimination of that defense, in 
turn, diminished the role of state property law in defining the 
content and limits of property entitlements against which a 
“taking” would be measured, and sowed confusion as to what 
counts as “property” for purposes of takings analysis.30 With 
state law deprived of its historic role, we are left with no prin-
cipled way to determine the baseline of property rights to which 
a claimant is legitimately entitled.31 
 
 28. See infra Part II.A. 
 29. The federal government has general police power over the District of 
Columbia and federal territories. See, e.g., Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135, 156 
(1921) (upholding wartime rent controls in the District of Columbia as a le-
gitimate police power measure). Congress’s plenary power over public lands is 
also “analogous to” the states’ police power. Camfield v. United States, 167 
U.S. 518, 525–26 (1897). 
 30. See Frank I. Michelman, Property, Federalism, and Jurisprudence: A 
Comment on Lucas and Judicial Conservatism, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 301, 
318–20 (1993) (arguing that in recent takings cases it is not clear whether the 
Supreme Court is relying on a “legal-positivist” conception of property, general 
federal common law, or on a constitutional definition of property grounded in 
natural law). 
 31. See id. at 327 (warning that contemporary takings law threatens to 
make “the Federal Constitution, specifically the Taking[s] Clause, dictate to 
the States the jurisprudential spirit in which their general laws of property 
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Conflation of the two doctrines also introduced confusion 
about what counts as precedent in takings adjudication, and 
led to “reverse incorporation” of substantive due process con-
cepts and principles into Fifth Amendment takings law—the 
problem that Lingle discerned in Agins, but that pervades con-
temporary takings jurisprudence.32 
The conundrum is of the Court’s own making. Its solution 
does not lie in further judicial parsing of the verb “to take” or 
its derivative noun form “taking,”33 nor does it lie in meta-
physical inquiry into the essential attributes of property in 
general. Instead, the solution must come from an inquiry into 
the nature and limits of private property rights in a democratic 
society, and the nature and limits of the states’ concomitant 
power, on behalf of the demos, to define and adjust the legal 
boundaries determining the specific content of those rights. 
That discussion, predicated upon the understanding that the 
law of property—like any foundational social institution—must 
be dynamic and malleable to adapt to changing social needs, is 
one in which substantive-due-process-era courts and commen-
tators constructively engaged through their discourse on the 
police power and its limits. It is a discourse that in the post-
Penn Central era we have abandoned, to the impoverishment of 
property jurisprudence. 
This Article is structured as follows: Part I offers a general 
introduction to the federalism principles that historically un-
dergirded our constitutional law of property. Part II introduces 
the police power and its historic role as an inherent limitation 
on property rights, describes the distinguishing characteristics 
of the due process and Takings Clause branches of just com-
pensation law, and places Chicago B & Q and Mahon in proper 
historical context as substantive due process, not Takings 
Clause, cases. Part III discusses how Penn Central miscon-
strued Chicago B & Q ’s due process holding as a Fifth Amend-
ment Takings Clause precedent, and suggests that the rising 
tide of selective incorporation rhetoric in the years before Penn 
Central may have contributed to the confusion. Part III also 
unpacks the elements of the doctrinal muddle that followed  
 
 
and nuisance are to be read and construed, whether contained in legislative 
enactments or judicial decisions”). 
 32. See infra Part III.C. 
 33. See Rose, supra note 1, at 562 (describing takings law as an effort to 
plumb the “elusive[] . . . meaning of ‘taking’ in our law”). 
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conflation of substantive due process and the Takings Clause. 
Part IV discusses the rise and fall of the police power, and the 
conceptual gap its demise has left in our constitutional law of 
property. Part V concludes with a proposal to rehistoricize 
property jurisprudence by restoring the police power to its 
rightful place as a “background principle” of state property law. 
I.  PROPERTY FEDERALISM 
In our post-Erie v. Tompkins34 world, the ordinary legal 
presumption is that property law—like the law of tort and con-
tract—is principally a matter of state law.35 Indeed, even in the 
Swift v. Tyson36 era of general federal common law, courts rou-
tinely invoked state law rather than general federal common 
law to determine the extent of claimants’ property rights in 
federal constitutional adjudication.37 As the Supreme Court ex-
plained in 1907 in Sauer v. City of New York, “this court has 
neither the right nor the duty . . . to reduce the [property] law 
of the various States to a uniform rule which it shall announce 
and impose.”38 This basic federalism principle followed from 
Swift itself, which said that “local law” should govern matters 
of a “strictly local” nature, including “rights and titles to things 
having a permanent locality, such as the rights and titles to 
real estate,” while “questions of a more general nature” like  
 
 
 34. 304 U.S. 64, 78–80 (1938). The Court held that a federal court in di-
versity jurisdiction should apply state law and not general federal common 
law. Id. at 78. 
 35. See Thomas W. Merrill, The Landscape of Constitutional Property, 86 
VA. L. REV. 885, 943–44 & n.224 (2000) (tracing the roots of “the understand-
ing that property is a positive right largely (if not exclusively) defined by state 
law”). 
 36. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1, 18–19 (1842) (holding that section 34 of the Judici-
ary Act of 1789, providing that state laws “shall be regarded as rules of deci-
sion” in federal courts, did not apply to commercial law or other “questions of a 
more general nature”), overruled by Erie v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
 37. See Merrill, supra note 35, at 943–44 n.224 and cases cited therein. 
E.g., Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Chi., Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. Co., 175 U.S. 91, 
100–01 (1899) (holding that a dispute concerning damage to property from 
railroad operations is to be decided by state law and not general federal com-
mon law); Smith Middlings Purifier Co. v. McGroarty, 136 U.S. 237, 241 
(1890) (holding that a diversity case concerning mortgage rights is to be de-
cided by Ohio state law). 
 38. 206 U.S. 536, 548 (1907) (rejecting a due process property deprivation 
claim because “under the law of New York, as determined by its highest court, 
the plaintiff never owned the easements which he claimed, and . . . therefore 
there was no property taken”). 
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contract interpretation and commercial law were subject to 
“general law.”39 
For most purposes we still adhere to the view that state 
law, not federal law, is the primary source and determinant of 
the scope and limits of property, and that view is only 
strengthened by the Erie doctrine. Bolstering this understand-
ing is the Positivist- and Realist-inspired insight that property 
law, and a fortiori the scope of property entitlements, are 
grounded in neither universal principles of natural right40 nor 
timeless common law precepts,41 but instead grew out of judge-
made common law as modified by subsequent case law and leg-
islative enactments.42 An owner’s property rights thus ordinar-
ily extend only as far as state property law says they do, and 
under federalism principles, states have considerable discretion 
not only to determine the primary rules of property in the first 
instance, but also to make necessary adjustments over time 
through legislative enactments and evolving judicial doctrines, 
just as they adjust their laws of tort or contract.43 
 
 39. Swift, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 18–19. 
 40. See Eric T. Freyfogle, Private Land Made (Too) Simple, 33 ENVTL. L. 
REP. 10,155, 10,160 (2003) (stating that “natural-rights justifications” for 
property law “were wisely cast aside . . . and do not withstand scrutiny to-
day”); Michelman, supra note 30, at 305 (“By an argument that reaches back 
at least to Bentham, property’s scope and content—property’s existence, 
even—are completely dependent upon standing law. . . . [Consequently,] the 
term ‘property’ in the Fourteenth Amendment denotes nothing except what 
some corpus of extant positive law happens to make into property.”). For a 
contrary view, see Eric R. Claeys, Takings, Regulations, and Natural Property 
Rights, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 1549 (2003) (attempting to derive a theory of 
property from universal principles of natural right). 
 41. See Margaret Jane Radin & R. Polk Wagner, The Myth of Private Or-
dering: Rediscovering Legal Realism in Cyberspace, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 
1295, 1295 (1998) (“The legal realists of the 1920s and ‘30s demonstrated that 
all law is ‘public’—that is, dependent upon the state.”); Joseph William Singer, 
Legal Realism Now, 76 CAL. L. REV. 465, 491 (1988) (“The realists argued that 
the concept of private property . . . encompassed competing values and princi-
ples. . . . [Courts] therefore could not deduce specific legal rules from the ab-
stract concept of property.”). 
 42. See, e.g., Roderick E. Walston, The Constitution and Property: Due 
Process, Regulatory Takings, and Judicial Takings, 2001 UTAH L. REV. 379, 
402–04 (2001) (describing property as the product of dynamic interplay be-
tween common law and legislation). 
 43. See Joseph L. Sax, Property Rights and the Economy of Nature: Un-
derstanding Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1433, 
1446 (1993) (“Historically, property definitions have continuously adjusted to 
reflect new economic and social structures, often to the disadvantage of exist-
ing owners.”); id. at 1448 (citing major changes in property including abolition 
of feudal tenures and entails; changes in dower and curtesy; abolition of ripar-
KARKKAINEN_3FMT 04/20/2006 10:15:59 AM 
2006] THE POLICE POWER REVISITED 835 
 
With that background understanding, we should expect 
property rights in our federal system to be both dynamic and 
divergent, as state legislatures and courts create new property 
rules or extend, trim, or modify old ones. Thus property law in 
Louisiana, rooted in French and Spanish civil law traditions,44 
differs from property law in New York, which grafted English 
common law onto an earlier Dutch legal system45 and was later 
modified by legislatures and judges.46 Property law in Virginia 
also diverges from New York’s, having developed on a unique 
evolutionary trajectory.47 
On this federalist understanding, we might further expect 
that federal constitutional property guarantees like the Due 
Process and Takings Clauses must take state property law 
more or less as given. As the Supreme Court said in a leading 
procedural due process case: “Property interests . . . are not cre-
ated by the Constitution. Rather, they are created and their 
dimensions are defined by existing rules or understandings 
that stem from an independent source such as state law . . . .”48 
This division of legal labor is foundational to the architecture of 
our federalist system. 
Curiously, however, despite property federalism’s promi-
nence elsewhere,49 it often gets short shrift in contemporary 
 
ian water rights in the West; and the rise of married women’s property rights). 
 44. See, e.g., Eldridge v. Trezevant, 160 U.S. 452, 463 (1896) (holding that 
construction of a levee on private waterfront land did not deprive owner of 
property because under Louisiana law derived from the Code Napoleon, lands 
abutting waterways are subject to a public servitude for levees). 
 45. See Joseph A. Ranney, Anglicans, Merchants, and Feminists: A Com-
parative Study of the Evolution of Married Women’s Rights in Virginia, New 
York, and Wisconsin, 6 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 493, 503 (2000) (stating 
that early New York property law retained important strains of a community 
property system derived from Dutch law, later supplanted by English law). 
 46. See id. at 506–12 (tracing expansion of married women’s property 
rights in New York through legislation, constitutional amendments, and case 
law). 
 47. See id. at 516–25 (describing divergent paths of New York and Vir-
ginia in recognizing married women’s property rights). 
 48. Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972); see also Davies Ware-
house Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 144, 155 (1944) (“The great body of law in this 
country which controls acquisition, transmission, and transfer of property, and 
defines the rights of its owners in relation to the state or to private parties, is 
found in the statutes and decisions of the state.”). 
 49. See Michelman, supra note 30, at 321 (describing the apparent “devia-
tion” of some of the Court’s takings rhetoric from its “standard legal-positivist 
mantra” that property rights are not created by the Constitution but by state 
law); see also, e.g., Am. Mfr. Mut. Ins. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 60–61 (1999) 
(rejecting procedural due process claim because plaintiff had no property in-
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takings cases.50 The Court faithfully recites that there is no 
federal constitutional definition of property, but seldom relies 
upon state law to inform its inquiry into the existence, nature, 
and limits of the property entitlement allegedly taken.51 In-
deed, on at least one occasion the Court expressly repudiated a 
takings claim based on the idiosyncrasies of state property law, 
dismissing such arguments as mere “legalistic distinctions.”52 
More recently, in Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, the Court straight-
jacketed states’ latitude to redefine property rights, rejecting 
Rhode Island’s argument that its authority to “shape and de-
fine property rights” through regulation necessarily must in-
form what counts as a “reasonable investment-backed expecta-
tion” so that (on the state’s theory) if the challenged regulation 
was already in effect when the property was acquired, a tak-
ings claim should not be available.53 
In principle, the state’s law of property ought to matter for 
purposes of regulatory takings analysis. If what counts as 
“property” is determined by state law, then a claim that prop-
erty was “taken” by government action should depend in part 
on the logically antecedent inquiry whether the claimant’s 
property rights under state law actually extend as far as the 
claimant alleges—that is, whether a constitutionally protect-
able property interest is implicated.54 
 
terest under state law); Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 
538 (1985) (“Respondents’ federal constitutional claim depends on their having 
had a property right [under state law].”). 
 50. See Michelman, supra note 30, at 303 (describing a “bad fit” between 
the “market conservative” project of contemporary regulatory takings doctrine 
and the “legal conservative” project of federalism which recognizes property 
rights are principally defined by state law). But cf. Sterk, supra note 1 (argu-
ing that modern takings doctrine accommodates federalism). 
 51. But cf. Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1003–04 (1984) 
(holding that the Takings Clause protects health, safety, and environmental 
data recognized as a “trade-secret property right” under state law). 
 52. See Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 
500 (1987) (stating that although Pennsylvania law recognizes the “support 
estate” as a separate interest in land, “our takings jurisprudence forecloses 
reliance on such legalistic distinctions”); id. at 518–20 (Rehnquist, J., dissent-
ing) (chiding the Court for failing to credit state law in determining claimants’ 
property rights). Keystone Bituminous upheld a statute requiring coal opera-
tors to provide subjacent support to surface property. Id. at 506. Pennsylvania 
Coal Co. v. Mahon relied upon the same “legalistic distinction” to hold a simi-
lar statute invalid. See Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 414 (1922) (stat-
ing that the statute “purports to abolish what is recognized in Pennsylvania as 
an estate in land”). 
 53. 533 U.S. 606, 626–27 (2001). 
 54. Cf. Eric T. Freyfogle, Regulatory Takings, Methodically, 31 ENVTL. L. 
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The Court seemed to acknowledge as much in Lucas v. 
South Carolina Coastal Council55 when it stated that property 
rights may be subject to “limitations” that “inhere in the title 
itself, in the restrictions that background principles of the 
State’s law of property and nuisance already place upon land 
ownership.”56 But having gotten that far, the Lucas Court lost 
its conceptual grip. What are these “inherent limitations” in 
“background principles of the state’s law of property”? Without 
explicitly so holding, Lucas strongly implied that “inherent 
limitations” are confined to longstanding general common law 
principles of private and public nuisance.57 But why should 
that be? After all, the common law no longer holds a privileged 
place in our legal order; in most circumstances it can be 
trumped by ordinary legislative enactments.58 There is no obvi-
ous reason why property law should be any different in that re-
gard.59 
Lucas warned that legislative enactments cannot them-
selves become instant “background principles” at their enact-
ment.60 That seems reasonable enough. Perhaps new law 
 
REP. 10,313, 10,314 (2001) (“A court in a takings case faces two, sequential 
questions. First, what are the plaintiff ’s property rights, under the various 
valid laws . . . [and second] has that property been taken?”); Sterk, supra note 
1, at 222 (“[W]ithin our federal system, definition of property rights has gen-
erally been left to the states, [and] if state law did not create property in the 
first instance, then subsequent state action cannot take property.”). 
 55. 505 U.S. 1003, 1029 (1992). 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. (stating that regulation denying economically viable use of land 
must “do no more than duplicate the result that could have been achieved in 
the courts . . . under the State’s law of private nuisance, or by the State under 
its complementary power to abate nuisances that affect the public generally, 
or otherwise”); id. n.16 (“The principal ‘otherwise’ that we have in mind is liti-
gation absolving the State (or private parties) of liability for the destruction of 
‘real and personal property . . . to prevent . . . fire’ or to forestall other grave 
threats to the lives and property of others.”). 
 58. See Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Federal Rules of Statutory Interpre-
tation, 115 HARV. L. REV. 2085, 2107 (2002) (describing the “accepted hierar-
chy” that “the Constitution always trumps statutes, but statutes always trump 
the common law”); Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner’s Legacy, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 
873, 904 (1987) (“The common law is not prepolitical. . . . [E]fforts to change 
the common law framework are not by virtue of the fact constitutionally sus-
pect . . . .”). 
 59. See Freyfogle, supra note 54, at 10,314 (arguing that takings analysis 
must consider the “rights crafted by the interaction” of “all laws, in all forms, 
from all levels of government,” which determine “what the law generally, and 
hence the Constitution, deems property”). 
 60. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1029 (stating that “confiscatory” regulations 
“cannot be newly legislated or decreed (without compensation)” but “must in-
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should never pass instantly into background. It is more diffi-
cult, however, to see why legislative enactments might not be-
come “background principles” with the passage of time—a pos-
sibility the Court came close to ruling out in Palazzolo.61 
Moreover, despite the Lucas Court’s rhetorical nod to the 
role of background principles of state law, the Lucas opinion 
trod perilously close to imposing a general federal common law 
baseline definition of property for purposes of takings analysis, 
pontificating at length on the generalities of public and private 
nuisance doctrine without tethering that discussion to South 
Carolina statutes, common law, or case law.62 
II.  THE POLICE POWER IN SUBSTANTIVE  
DUE PROCESS JURISPRUDENCE 
A. THE POLICE POWER AS “BACKGROUND PRINCIPLE” AND 
“INHERENT LIMITATION” 
Suppose a state were to claim that its longstanding “back-
ground principles of property law” include the following: “All 
property is held subject to, and inherently limited by, the 
state’s reserved power to enact regulations to protect the 
health, safety, morals, and general welfare of its citizens.” 
 
here in the title itself” through “background principles” and “do no more than 
duplicate the result that could have been achieved in the courts” under private 
or public nuisance or “otherwise”). 
 61. Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 627 (2001) (holding that 
“[f]uture generations, too, have a right to challenge unreasonable limitations 
on the use and value of land” even if those restrictions pre-date their acquisi-
tion of the property). This was the dispute between Justices O’Connor and 
Scalia in their dueling concurrences in Palazzolo. Justice O’Connor empha-
sized that the existence of a regulation at the time property is acquired might 
serve as one factor in determining the landowner’s “reasonable investment-
backed expectations” under a Penn Central analysis. See id. at 633–36 
(O’Connor, J., concurring). In Justice Scalia’s view, the fact that a regulation 
existed at the time of acquisition “should have no bearing” on whether it con-
stitutes a taking. See id. at 636–37 (Scalia, J., concurring). Since that principle 
would apply to each successive owner in a potentially infinite chain, it is diffi-
cult to see how a legislative enactment could ever pass into “background prin-
ciple.” 
 62. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1030–31 (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts 
for relevant common law nuisance principles before conceding that the “ques-
tion . . . is one of state law to be dealt with on remand”); see also Michelman, 
supra note 30, at 319 (stating that Justice Scalia wrote parts of Lucas “as if 
there is just one American background law of property and nuisance—
supportive, as it happens, of Lucas’ claim—that is common to the national ju-
risdiction and all the state jurisdictions”). 
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Thus, the state might argue, whenever a new regulation 
falling within the scope of this reserved power is enacted, it is 
not the new regulation that becomes a “background principle.” 
Instead, the relevant background principle is that property is 
held, and always has been held, subject to the state’s reserved 
power to make certain kinds of regulatory adjustments over 
time, as the need arises; and that limitation “inheres in the ti-
tle” to all property. Under that background principle, a subse-
quent regulatory enactment falling within the scope of the 
state’s reserved power could never result in a compensable 
“taking” or deprivation of property, for the scope of the claim-
ant’s property entitlement itself is—and always has been—
limited by the possibility that a regulation of that kind might 
be enacted. 
Such a broad and open-ended assertion of “inherent limita-
tion” on property rights might sound odd, even radical, after 
three decades of post-Penn Central regulatory takings juris-
prudence, especially in light of Lucas’s crabbed interpretation 
of “background principles” and “inherent limitations.”63 But it 
would not have sounded odd to nineteenth- and early twenti-
eth-century courts and legislatures,64 for this is precisely the 
claim that all states historically made in the name of the “po-
lice power”—the states’ reserved power to regulate to protect 
the public health, safety, morals, and general welfare.65 As 
 
 63. See James Burling, The Latest Take on Background Principles and the 
States’ Law of Property After Lucas and Palazzolo, 24 U. HAW. L. REV. 497, 
499 (2002) (“[T]he notion that a government can avoid the reach of the Tak-
ings and Just Compensation clauses by merely invoking a harm-preventing 
police power rationale were [sic] put to rest in Lucas.”). 
 64. Two mid-twentieth century commentators stated the thesis concisely: 
Property values are enjoyed under an implied limitation imposed by 
the police power. This implied limitation reduces the aggregate of 
property rights which the landowner can assert against the govern-
ment, and only those remaining constitute the “legally protected in-
terests” which are his property as against the government. Accord-
ingly, the assertion by the government of any of its powers within the 
area of this implied limitation is not a taking of property without 
compensation in derogation of the Fourteenth Amendment because 
property as against the government is not thereby affected. 
Robert Kratovil & Frank J. Harrison, Jr., Eminent Domain—Policy and Con-
cept, 42 CAL. L. REV. 596, 610–11 (1954) (quotations omitted). 
 65. See, e.g., Fed. Land Bank of New Orleans v. John D. Nix, Jr., Enters., 
117 So. 720, 723 (La. 1928) (“Every one holds his property, under the Consti-
tution, subject to a legitimate exercise of the police power.”); Appeal of White, 
134 A. 409, 411 (Pa. 1926) (“No matter how seemingly complete our scheme of 
private ownership may be under our system of government, all property is 
held in subordination to the right of its reasonable regulation by the govern-
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Chief Justice Lemuel Shaw of the Massachusetts Supreme Ju-
dicial Court explained in an early and influential case, Com-
monwealth v. Alger: 
We think it is a settled principle, growing out of the nature of well or-
dered civil society, that every holder of property, however absolute 
and unqualified may be his title, holds it under the implied liability 
that his use of it may be so regulated, that it shall not be injurious to 
the equal enjoyment of others having an equal right to the enjoyment 
of their property, nor injurious to the rights of the community. All 
property in this commonwealth . . . is . . . held subject to those general 
regulations, which are necessary to the common good and general 
welfare.66 
As a corollary, it followed that the exact scope, content, and 
limits of a property owner’s rights could never be fully and pre-
cisely delineated, because they remained subject to the state’s 
reserved power to adjust their outer boundaries through police 
power enactments. 
Adoption of the Reconstruction Amendments did not alter 
this background understanding of the inherent limits and mu-
tability of property rights. The Supreme Court explained in 
Barbier v. Connolly: 
[N]either the [Fourteenth] amendment—broad and comprehensive as 
it is—nor any other amendment, was designed to interfere with the 
power of the State, sometimes termed its police power, to prescribe 
regulations to promote the health, peace, morals, education, and good 
order of the people, and to legislate so as to increase the industries of 
the State, develop its resources, and add to its wealth and prosper-
ity.67 
 
 
ment clearly necessary to preserve the health, safety, or morals of the peo-
ple.”); Schiller Piano Co. v. Ill. N. Utils. Co., 123 N.E. 631, 632 (Ill. 1919) (“All 
property in a state is held on the implied condition or obligation that the 
owner will so use it as not to interfere with the rights of others and subject to 
such reasonable regulations as the Legislature may impose [under the police 
power].”); Schmitt v. F.W. Cook Brewing Co., 120 N.E. 19, 21 (Ind. 1918) 
(“[T]here can be no property rights which are not subject to this [police] 
power.”); Ex parte Kelso, 82 P. 241, 242 (Cal. 1905) (“[T]he property owner . . . 
holds his property subject to the proper exercise of the police power . . . .”); Ei-
chenlaub v. City of St. Joseph, 21 S.W. 8, 10 (Mo. 1893) (“[E]very citizen holds 
his property subject to [the police] powers. [S]uch . . . regulations . . . do not 
amount to the taking of private property . . . .”); People v. Gillson, 17 N.E. 343, 
345 (N.Y. 1888) (“[A]ll property is held subject to the general police power of 
the state to so regulate and control its use, in a proper case, as to secure the 
general safety and the public welfare.”); Pool v. Trexler, 76 N.C. 297, 297 (N.C. 
1877) (“Every citizen holds his land subservient to such ‘police regulations’ as 
the General Assembly may in its wisdom enact . . . .”). 
 66. 61 Mass. (7 Cush.) 53, 84–85 (1851). 
 67. 113 U.S. 27, 31 (1884). 
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If an action fell outside the legitimate bounds of the state’s 
police power, however, it implicated due process. The Court 
stated in Mugler v. Kansas: 
Nor can [police power] legislation . . . come within the Fourteenth 
Amendment, in any case, unless it is apparent that its real object is 
not to protect the community, or to promote the general well-being, 
but, under the guise of police regulation, to deprive the owner of his 
liberty and property, without due process of law. The power which the 
States have of prohibiting such use by individuals of their property as 
will be prejudicial to the health, the morals, or the safety of the pub-
lic, is not—and, consistently with the existence and safety of organ-
ized society, cannot be—burdened with the condition that the State 
must compensate such individual owners for pecuniary losses they 
may sustain, by reason of their not being permitted, by a noxious use 
of their property, to inflict injury upon the community.68 
Thus a legitimate exercise of the police power could never 
give rise to a compensable taking,69 but that did not mean that 
states had license to run roughshod over property rights. Some 
actions ostensibly taken pursuant to the police power might not 
be legitimate exercises of that power. Such actions might be 
deemed implied exercises of the state’s complementary power of 
eminent domain, compensable under established due process 
principles;70 or they might lie beyond any legitimate power of 
the state, and be held invalid.71 
Under substantive due process review, then, the first and 
most important question for a court adjudicating a claim of un-
 
 68. 123 U.S. 623, 669 (1887). 
 69. See Chi. & Alton R.R. Co. v. Tranbarger, 238 U.S. 67, 78 (1915) (“[I]t is 
well settled that the enforcement of uncompensated obedience to a legitimate 
regulation established under the police power is not a taking of property with-
out compensation, or without due process of law, in the sense of the Four-
teenth Amendment.”). 
 70. See, e.g., City of Belleville v. St. Clair Co. Tpk. County, 84 N.E. 1049, 
1053 (Ill. 1908) (stating that a use restriction to prevent harm or advance the 
general welfare is “a regulation and not a taking, an exercise of the police 
power and not of eminent domain” but “the moment the Legislature passes 
beyond mere regulation, and attempts to deprive the individual of his prop-
erty, or of some substantial interest therein, under the pretense of regulation, 
then the act becomes one of eminent domain”). 
 71. The Takings Clause contains an express “public use” limitation, and 
states were similarly bound by Fourteenth Amendment due process. See Fall-
brook Irrigation Dist. v. Bradley, 164 U.S. 112, 158 (1896) (holding that Four-
teenth Amendment due process requires that a state “taking” be for “public 
use”). Regulations falling outside the police power and failing the “public use” 
test were void. See, e.g., Mo. Pac. Ry. Co. v. Nebraska, 164 U.S. 403, 403 (1896) 
(Missouri Pac. I ) (invalidating an order authorizing private grain elevator on 
railroad right-of-way as a “taking” of private property for private use, violating 
due process). 
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constitutional deprivation of property by a state was: “Is this 
action a legitimate exercise of the state’s police power?” An af-
firmative answer precluded a judgment that compensation was 
due, for it meant there had been no interference with the 
claimant’s property rights. 
Federal regulations affecting property were subject to a 
very different analysis. Under most circumstances, the federal 
government does not have power to determine in the first in-
stance what is, and what is not, “property.” That, the Court in-
sisted, is a matter of state law.72 Nor does the federal govern-
ment possess a general police power to regulate property in the 
interest of harm-prevention or promotion of the general wel-
fare.73 Unlike the states’ police power, federal powers did not 
generally operate as an inherent limitation on property, nor 
was the inquiry into the validity of the assertion of federal 
power logically antecedent to, or dispositive of, the determina-
tion of the scope of claimant’s property rights. Instead, all fed-
eral powers were said to be held “subject to” the constraints of 
 
 72. See, e.g., Demorest v. City Bank Farmers Trust Co., 321 U.S. 36, 41–
42 (1944) (finding that the rights of a mortgagee are a matter of state law and 
because state courts concluded that appellants “have never possessed under 
New York law such a property right as they claim has been taken from them[,] 
. . . appellants have no question for us under the Due Process Clause”); Fox 
River Paper Co. v. R.R. Comm’n, 274 U.S. 651, 655 (1927) (holding that the 
rights of riparian landowners to river beds and use of navigable waterways is 
a matter of state property law “to be determined by the statutes and judicial 
decisions of the state”); Waggoner Estate v. Wichita County, 273 U.S. 113, 117 
(1927) (stating that whether property is classified as realty or personalty “is a 
question of local law upon which the local decisions and statutes control”); 
Edward Hines Yellow Pine Trs. v. Martin, 268 U.S. 458, 463 (1925) (finding 
that federal courts will follow decisions of state courts in interpreting state 
statutes or property rules affecting title to real estate); Sauer v. City of New 
York, 206 U.S. 536, 548 (1907) (holding that the existence and scope of ease-
ments are matters of state property law, and “this court has neither the right 
nor the duty . . . to reduce the law of the various States to a uniform rule”). 
 73. See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 618 (2000) (invali-
dating the federal Violence Against Women Act, and stating that “we can 
think of no better example of the police power, which the Founders denied the 
National Government and reposed in the States, than the suppression of vio-
lent crime”); Hamilton v. Ky. Distilleries & Warehouse Co., 251 U.S. 146, 156 
(1919) (“That the United States lacks the police power, and that this was re-
served to the States by the Tenth Amendment, is true.”); Brown v. Maryland, 
12 Wheat. 419, 443 (1827) (stating that the police power “unquestionably re-
mains, and ought to remain, with the States”); McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 
Wheat. 316, 405 (1819) (“Th[e] [federal] government is acknowledged by all, to 
be one of enumerated powers. The principle, that it can exercise only the pow-
ers granted to it . . . is now universally admitted.”). 
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the Fifth Amendment.74 Thus, in a Fifth Amendment Takings 
Clause case, the court had to look first to state law to define the 
relevant property rights, and then determine whether the chal-
lenged federal action so truncated those state-defined property 
rights that it would constitute a compensable “taking” of claim-
ant’s property.75 The federalist division of labor in the realm of 
property law, then, implied that different standards and modes 
of analysis would be used to determine whether a compensable 
“taking” or “deprivation” of property had occurred. 
Courts continued to recognize this underlying federalist 
dualism in property law through all of the late nineteenth and 
most of the twentieth centuries in such celebrated cases as Chi-
cago B & Q,76 Reinman v. City of Little Rock,77 Hadacheck v. 
Sebastian,78 Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,79 Village of 
Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.,80 Miller v. Schoene,81 and Gold-
 
 74. See, e.g., Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555, 
589 & n.19 (1935) (“The bankruptcy power, like the other great substantive 
powers of Congress, is subject to the Fifth Amendment.”); Monogahela Naviga-
tion Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312, 336 (1893) (“[L]ike the other powers 
granted to the Congress by the Constitution, the power to regulate commerce 
is subject to all the limitations imposed by such instrument, and among them 
is that of the Fifth Amendment . . . . If, in exercising that supreme control, it 
deems it necessary to take private property, then it . . . can take only on pay-
ment of just compensation.”). 
 75. See Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank, 295 U.S. at 590 (“In order to 
determine whether [property rights] have been taken, we must ascertain what 
[the plaintiff ’s] rights were before the passage of the Act. [For that, we] turn 
. . . first to the law of the State.”); see also United States ex rel. Tenn. Valley 
Auth. v. Powelson, 319 U.S. 266, 279 (1943) (“Though the meaning of ‘prop-
erty’ as used in . . . the Fifth Amendment is a federal question, it will normally 
obtain its content by reference to local law.”). 
 76. 166 U.S. 226, 236 (1897) (holding that due process requires payment 
of just compensation in eminent domain); id. at 252 (holding safety measures 
not compensable because “[t]he requirement that compensation be made for 
private property taken for public use imposes no restriction upon the inherent 
power of the state by reasonable regulations to protect the lives and secure the 
safety of the people”). 
 77. 237 U.S. 171, 176–77 (1915) (upholding an ordinance restricting the 
location of livery stables as a legitimate police power exercise compatible with 
due process). 
 78. 239 U.S. 394, 410–11 (1915) (upholding an ordinance prohibiting brick 
making in designated zones as a valid police power regulation). 
 79. 260 U.S. 393, 414 (1922) (invalidating a statute requiring mine opera-
tors to provide subjacent support to surface owners because it “cannot be sus-
tained as an exercise of the police power”). 
 80. 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926) (upholding a zoning ordinance as a valid po-
lice power regulation). 
 81. 276 U.S. 272, 279–80 (1928) (upholding a statute providing for de-
struction of infected trees as a valid police power measure). 
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blatt v. Hempstead.82 Indeed, it remained a foundational ele-
ment in constitutional takings jurisprudence right up until the 
Supreme Court’s crucial 1978 decision in Penn Central Trans-
portation Co. v. City of New York,83 which retroactively rewrote 
a century of jurisprudential history. 
B. CHICAGO B & Q IN HISTORICAL CONTEXT 
It is now widely assumed that the Fifth Amendment Tak-
ings Clause was incorporated against the states in 1897 in Chi-
cago B & Q.84 Challenging conventional wisdom, this Part ar-
gues that it was not until 1978 in Penn Central Transportation 
Co v. New York85 that the Supreme Court first explicitly held 
the Takings Clause applicable to the states. Penn Central 
treated the incorporation question as so obviously settled that 
it did not merit discussion or analysis, offhandedly stating the 
question before the Court to be “whether the restrictions im-
posed by New York City’s law . . . effect a ‘taking’ of appellants’ 
property for a public use within the meaning of the Fifth 
Amendment, which of course is made applicable to the States 
through the Fourteenth Amendment.”86 The Court cited a single 
precedent for that holding: Chicago B & Q.87 
In fact, Chicago B & Q had nowhere mentioned the Fifth 
Amendment or its Takings Clause.88 Instead, Chicago B & Q 
was argued and decided on Fourteenth Amendment due proc-
ess grounds.89 
 
 82. 369 U.S. 590, 596 (1962) (upholding an ordinance prohibiting sand 
and gravel mining below the water table as “a valid police [power] regulation” 
and not a due process violation). 
 83. 438 U.S. 104, 138 (1978) (upholding New York City’s landmarks ordi-
nance against what it deemed a Fifth Amendment Takings Clause claim). 
 84. See, e.g., Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 383 (1994) (citing Chi-
cago B & Q for the proposition that “[t]he Takings Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment . . . [was] made applicable to the States through the Fourteenth 
Amendment”). 
 85. 438 U.S. 104.  
 86. Id. at 122 (emphasis added). 
 87. Id. 
 88. See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 405 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (stating that Chi-
cago B & Q “contains no mention of either the Takings Clause or the Fifth 
Amendment”). 
 89. See Chi., Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 
226, 235 (1897) (stating the question before the Court as “whether the due 
process of law enjoined by the fourteenth amendment requires compensation 
to be made . . . to the owner of private property taken for public use under au-
thority of a State”); see also Martin S. Flaherty, History “Lite” in Modern 
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Prior to the Reconstruction Amendments, the Takings 
Clause—like the rest of the Bill of Rights—had been held to 
apply only to the federal government, and not to the states.90 
Indeed, the Takings Clause was probably originally understood 
as a federalism amendment, to safeguard against overreaching 
by a distant central government that might be tempted to seize 
land and slaves from wealthy Southern planters91 or to con-
script military supplies in the high-handed manner of its impe-
rial predecessor, the English crown.92 This account accords 
with legislative history: the Bill of Rights emerged during the 
ratification debates in response to Anti-Federalist anxieties 
about concentrated, centralized power.93 
Unlike the First Amendment,94 however, the Fifth is not 
textually limited to the federal government,95 leaving its scope 
of application initially uncertain. That issue was squarely re-
solved in Barron v. Baltimore when the Supreme Court dis-
missed a Fifth Amendment Takings Clause claim against the 
mayor and city council of Baltimore, reasoning that because the 
Takings Clause was added to the Constitution in response to 
 
American Constitutionalism, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 523, 560–61 n.167 (1995) 
(stating that Chicago B & Q did not rely on incorporation but instead “charac-
terizes the right not to be deprived of property for public use without just com-
pensation as inhering in the concept of due process,” based on “principles of 
republican institutions, the common law, natural equity, universal law as well 
as case law, and treatises relying on these sources”). 
 90. See AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECON-
STRUCTION 79 (1998). 
 91. See William Michael Treanor, The Original Understanding of the Tak-
ings Clause and the Political Process, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 782, 837–39 (1995) 
(arguing that Madison favored a Takings Clause to protect against seizures of 
land and chattels, including slaves); id. at 850–53 (stating that Madison re-
garded land and slaves as the property most vulnerable to majoritarian over-
reaching). 
 92. See AMAR, supra note 90, at 79–80 (stating that the Takings Clause 
was intended to safeguard states and their citizens against “impressment” of 
property for military use); Michael W. McConnell, Contract Rights and Prop-
erty Rights: A Case Study in the Relationship Between Individual Liberties 
and Constitutional Structure, 76 CAL. L. REV. 267, 292 (1988) (arguing the 
Takings Clause was intended to keep a remote central government from ag-
grandizing itself by confiscating property). 
 93. See Akhil Reed Amar, 2000 Daniel J. Meador Lecture: Hugo Black and 
the Hall of Fame, 53 ALA. L. REV. 1221, 1223–24 (2002) (describing the Bill of 
Rights as a response to “anxieties of Anti-Federalists” in “the shadow of a 
Revolutionary War waged by local governments against an imperial center”). 
 94. U.S. CONST., amend. I. 
 95. “No person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without 
due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without 
just compensation.” U.S. CONST., amend. V. 
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fears of abuse by the federal government, it should not be con-
strued to reach the states.96 
Barron later came to stand for the proposition that the en-
tire Bill of Rights applied only to the federal government.97 Its 
core holding, however—the only legal issue strictly necessary to 
its outcome—was that the Takings Clause did not apply to 
states or their political subdivisions.98 
That understanding persisted after ratification of the Four-
teenth Amendment. In the 1871 case Pumpelly v. Green Bay 
Co.,99 the Court noted that the federal Takings Clause does not 
apply to the states,100 and instead applied a similar “takings” 
provision in the Wisconsin constitution, emphasizing its duty to 
defer to Wisconsin Supreme Court interpretations of that pro-
vision.101 In Nashville, Chattanooga & St. Louis Railway Co. v. 
Alabama, the Court again cited Barron for the proposition that 
the Fifth Amendment “only applies a limit to Federal authority, 
not restricting the powers of the State,” and elected to construe 
the railroad’s challenge to allegedly confiscatory state regula-
tions as stating a Fourteenth Amendment due process and not 
a Fifth Amendment takings claim.102 
That understanding was reaffirmed in Fallbrook Irrigation 
District v. Bradley,103 decided just a few months before Chicago 
 
 96. Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 250–51 (1833). 
 97. See, e.g., Spies v. Illinois, 123 U.S. 131, 166 (1887) (“[T]he first 10 Ar-
ticles of Amendment were not intended to limit the powers of the state gov-
ernments in respect to their own people, but to operate on the National Gov-
ernment alone.” (citing Barron, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) at 247)). 
 98. Barron, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) at 250–51 (“[T]he provision in the fifth 
amendment to the constitution, declaring that private property shall not be 
taken for public use, without just compensation, is intended solely as a limita-
tion on the exercise of power by the government of the United States, and is 
not applicable to the legislation of the states.”). 
 99. 80 U.S. 166 (13 Wall.) (1871) (holding that a statutorily authorized 
mill dam flooding plaintiff ’s land was a compensable taking under the Wiscon-
sin constitution). 
 100. Id. at 176–77 (“[T]hough the Constitution of the United States pro-
vides that private property shall not be taken for public use without just com-
pensation, it is well settled that this is a limitation on the power of the Federal 
government, and not on the States.”). 
 101. Id. at 180 (“As it is the constitution of that State that we are called on 
to construe, these decisions of her Supreme Court, that overflowing land by 
means of a dam across a stream is taking private property, within the mean-
ing of that instrument, are of special weight if not conclusive on us.”). 
 102. 128 U.S. 96, 101 (1888) (citing Barron, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 243). 
 103. 164 U.S. 112 (1896). Fallbrook was decided on November 16, 1896, 
three and one-half months before the Chicago B & Q decision on March 1, 
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B & Q. Bradley, a California rancher, claimed that an irriga-
tion district assessment had improperly taken her property, not 
for a “public use” but for the private benefit of other ranch-
ers.104 Fallbrook held that “[t]he Fifth Amendment, which pro-
vides, among other things, that . . . property shall not be taken 
for public use without just compensation, applies only to the 
Federal government . . . .”105 The Court added, however, that 
Fourteenth Amendment due process placed states under a 
similar constraint.106 Finding that irrigation could be a valid 
“public use” in an arid state like California, the Court affirmed 
the validity of the assessment on due process grounds.107 
The language and structure of the Fallbrook opinion make 
it clear that the Court regarded the Fifth Amendment “public 
use” and the Fourteenth Amendment due process-based “public 
use” requirements as independent and parallel, not interde-
pendent or identical requirements. Fallbrook not only reaf-
firmed Barron in unambiguous terms, but it also intimated 
that the precise contours of “public use” varied from state to 
state,108 suggesting that the due process-based “public use” 
limitation had to embrace federalism principles—the Court 
would not impose identical constraints everywhere, nor would 
it equate the state and federal “public use” requirements. 
Thus matters stood when the Court decided Chicago 
B & Q. The issue before the Chicago B & Q Court was whether 
Fourteenth Amendment due process was satisfied when a jury 
awarded one dollar in compensation for an easement the city 
had taken by eminent domain for a street crossing over the 
railroad’s right-of-way.109 The Court said that “[i]n determining 
 
1897. 
 104. See id. at 156. 
 105. Id. at 158. 
 106. Id. (stating that as a matter of due process “the question whether pri-
vate property has been taken for any other than a public use becomes material 
in this court, even where the taking is under the authority of the State instead 
of the Federal Government”). 
 107. Id. at 164. 
 108. Id. at 159–60 (stating that “what is a public use frequently and largely 
depends upon the facts and circumstances,” and although “the irrigation of 
lands in States where there is no color of necessity therefor” might not be 
valid, “in a State like California, which confessedly embraces millions of acres 
of arid lands, an act of the legislature providing for their irrigation might well 
be regarded as an act devoting the water to a public use, and therefore as a 
valid exercise of the legislative power”). 
 109. Chi., Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 
230, 232 (1896). 
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what is due process of law regard must be had to substance, not 
to form.”110 In eminent domain cases, the Court held, “[d]ue 
process of law . . . means such process as recognizes the right of 
the owner to be compensated if his property be wrested from 
him and transferred to the public.”111 The Court nonetheless 
upheld the compensation award, reasoning that the trial court 
had properly instructed the jury to base compensation on the 
reduction in fair market value of the railroad’s property, and 
the Court would not disturb the jury’s factual finding that the 
actual loss was trivial.112 
The Chicago B & Q opinion cited no controlling precedent 
holding that Fourteenth Amendment due process required 
payment of just compensation,113 but the decision broke no new 
conceptual ground. The Court had long insisted on that point in 
prior due process adjudication. In 1876, the Court said in Munn 
v. Illinois that the “power of the State over the property of the 
citizen” under Fourteenth Amendment due process “is well de-
fined. The State may take his property for public uses, upon just 
compensation being made therefore,” or it may tax or “control 
the use and possession of his property, so far as may be neces-
sary for the protection of the rights of others, and to secure to 
them the equal use and enjoyment of their property.”114 The 
Munn case turned on other issues, however; the “just compen-
sation” language was pure dictum. 
A decade later in Stone v. Farmer’s Loan & Trust Co., the 
Court reiterated that under Fourteenth Amendment due proc-
ess, “the State cannot . . . do that which in law amounts to a 
taking of private property for public use without just compen-
sation, or without due process of law.”115 In Mugler v. Kansas, 
the Court opined that under the states’ power of eminent do-
main, “property may not be taken for public use without com-
pensation.”116 In Georgia Railroad & Banking Co. v. Smith, the 
Court explained that states could regulate intrastate railroad 
rates, “subject to the limitation that the carriage is not required 
 
 110. Id. at 235. 
 111. Id. at 236. 
 112. See id. at 255–56. 
 113. Id. at 237–38 (citing state and lower federal court cases holding that 
due process requires just compensation, and dicta in previous Supreme Court 
cases citing that doctrine with approval). 
 114. 94 U.S. 113, 145 (1876) (emphasis added). 
 115. 116 U.S. 307, 331 (1886). 
 116. 123 U.S. 623, 668 (1887). 
KARKKAINEN_3FMT 04/20/2006 10:15:59 AM 
2006] THE POLICE POWER REVISITED 849 
 
without reward, or upon conditions amounting to the taking of 
property for public use without just compensation.”117 Two 
years later in Searl v. School District No. 2, the Court empha-
sized that a state’s eminent domain power “cannot be exercised 
except upon condition that just compensation shall be made to 
the owner.”118 Sweet v. Rechel reaffirmed this principle, assert-
ing that when “the legislature provides for the actual taking 
and appropriation of private property for public uses, its au-
thority to enact such a regulation rests upon its right of emi-
nent domain” and “it is a condition precedent to the exercise of 
such power that the statute make provision for reasonable 
compensation to the owner.”119 
Beyond these utterances, which were mainly dicta, the 
Court had heard and decided several cases predicated upon the 
legal theory that the Fourteenth Amendment required compen-
sation when a state “took” property by regulation. In Powell v. 
Pennsylvania, the Court rejected a manufacturer’s claim that a 
statutory prohibition on oleomargarine took its property with-
out compensation, finding the regulation a legitimate police 
power measure, not a property deprivation.120 In Yesler v. 
Washington Harbor Line Commissioners, the Court said that 
Fourteenth Amendment due process “undoubtedly forbids any 
arbitrary deprivation of life, liberty or property,” and “assum[ed 
it had] jurisdiction to revise the judgment of a State tribunal 
upholding a law authorizing the taking of private property 
without compensation.”121 The Yesler Court, however, found 
that no property had been taken by the drawing of harbor lines, 
despite impairment to the value of claimant’s wharf.122 Similar 
is Kaukauna Water Power Co. v. Green Bay & Mississippi Ca-
nal Co.123 
 
 117. 128 U.S. 174, 179 (1888). 
 118. 133 U.S. 553, 562 (1890). 
 119. 159 U.S. 380, 399 (1895). 
 120. 127 U.S. 678, 686–687 (1888) (holding “without merit” the claim that 
the statute “is in conflict with the Fourteenth Amendment in that it deprives 
the defendant of his property without that compensation required by law” (cit-
ing Mugler, 123 U.S. 623)). 
 121. 146 U.S. 646, 655–56 (1892). 
 122. Id. at 656–57. 
 123. 142 U.S. 254, 269 (1891) (stating that although the state court had not 
explicitly addressed the federal constitutional question, it “could not have 
reached a conclusion . . . without holding, either that none of [defendant’s] 
property had been taken, or that it was not entitled to compensation therefor, 
which is equivalent to saying that it had not been deprived of its property 
without due process of law”). The Kaukauna Court concluded, however, that 
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Clearly, then, the Court had understood throughout the 
entire course of its Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence that 
due process required payment of just compensation when a 
state took property by eminent domain or otherwise. The sig-
nificance of the Chicago B & Q holding was that it securely an-
chored that well-established conception of due process in bind-
ing Fourteenth Amendment legal precedent. 
The Chicago B & Q case also required the Court to decide a 
second issue, implicating an equally important strand of due 
process doctrine. The railroad argued that in addition to com-
pensation for the easement, it was entitled to compensation for 
the gates, operating tower, planking and fill, and additional op-
erating costs necessitated by the grade crossing.124 The Court 
rejected this claim, citing Mugler and other due process prece-
dents,125 and held that compensation was not required for 
losses incurred in consequence of a valid police power exer-
cise,126 because “all property . . . is held subject to the authority 
of the State to regulate its use in such manner as not to unnec-
essarily endanger the lives and the personal safety of the peo-
ple,” and any property damaged or diminished in value by such 
regulations “is not, within the meaning of the Constitution, 
taken for public use, nor is the owner deprived of it without due 
process of law.”127 
Chicago B & Q thus perfectly mirrored the well-established 
nineteenth-century understanding that the state’s powers, as 
constrained by due process, were bifurcated. When it exercised 
the eminent domain power, it owed just compensation. When it 
enacted a valid police power regulation, however, there was by 
definition no deprivation of property because all property rights 
were held subject to the inherent police power limitation, and 
no compensation was owed. In subsequent years, Chicago 
B & Q would be cited as frequently for this latter proposition as 
for the companion holding that due process did require com-
pensation in cases of eminent domain.128 
 
there “was no taking of the property.” Id. at 282. 
 124. 166 U.S. 226, 251–52 (1896). 
 125. Id. at 252–55. 
 126. Id. at 252 (“The requirement that compensation be made for private 
property taken for public use imposes no restriction upon the inherent power 
of the State by reasonable regulations to protect the lives and secure the 
safety of the people.”). 
 127. Id. 
 128. See, e.g., W. Chi. St. R.R. Co. v. Illinois ex rel. Chicago, 201 U.S. 506, 
526 (1906) (holding that costs of removing obstructions to navigation “cannot 
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To reach its just compensation holding, the Chicago B & Q 
Court did not find it necessary to extend the Fifth Amendment 
Takings Clause to the states, nor did it cite to any Takings 
Clause precedent. Instead, the Court found that the just com-
pensation principle was an “essential element of” the due proc-
ess guarantee itself,129 citing its own dicta in prior due process 
cases,130 lower court due process holdings,131 and Thomas Coo-
ley’s treatises as general “authority” for the proposition that 
“natural equity” and “universal law” so required.132 
The Chicago B & Q Court also argued by analogy from 
precedents holding that due process barred a state from taking 
property without a “public use.”133 In all jurisdictions, the pub-
lic use and just compensation requirements worked in tandem 
to constrain eminent domain, and since due process already re-
quired one, the reasonable inference was that it also required 
the other. 
Nowhere did Chicago B & Q explicitly or implicitly equate 
the scope and contours of the Fourteenth Amendment due 
process just compensation requirement with that of the Fifth 
Amendment Takings Clause; such a holding was unnecessary 
to the outcome. 
 
be deemed a taking of private property for public use” but are “only the result 
of the lawful exercise of a governmental power for the common good”); Fla. E. 
Coast Ry. Co. v. Martin County, 171 So. 2d 873, 876–77 (Fla. 1965) (holding 
that costs of safety measures are “the result of the exercise of the police pow-
ers of the state” and not compensable); accord Pa.-Reading Seashore Lines v. 
Bd. of Pub. Util. Comm’rs, 81 A.2d 28, 31 (N.J. App. Div. 1951), aff ’d, 83 A.2d 
774 (N.J. 1951); Houston & T.C. Ry. Co. v. City of Houston, 41 S.W.2d 352, 
354–55 (Tex. Civ. App. 1931). 
 129. Chicago B & Q, 166 U.S. at 235. 
 130. See id. at 238 (citing Sweet v. Rechel, 159 U.S. 380, 398 (1895), and 
Searl v. Sch. Dist. No. 2, 133 U.S. 553, 562 (1890)). 
 131. See Chicago B & Q, 166 U.S. at 238–39 (citing state and lower federal 
court cases holding that due process required just compensation in eminent 
domain, including Baker v. Vill. of Norwood, 74 F. 997 (S.D. Ohio 1896), aff ’d, 
172 U.S. 269 (1898); Mount Hope Cemetery v. Boston, 158 Mass. 509, 519 
(Mass. 1893); Scott v. Toledo, 36 F. 385, 395–96 (N.D. Ohio 1888); Henderson 
v. Cent. Passenger Ry. Co., 21 F. 358 (D. Ky. 1884), appeal dismissed, 140 U.S. 
633 (1891)). 
 132. See Chicago B & Q, 166 U.S. at 236, 240–41. 
 133. See id. at 235–36 (citing Missouri Pac. I, 164 U.S. 403, 417 (1896) 
(“The taking by a state of the private property of one person or corporation, 
without the owner's consent, for the private use of another, is not due process 
of law . . . .”); Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U.S. 97, 102 (1877) (“[A] statute 
which declares . . . that the full and exclusive title of a described piece of land, 
which is now in A., shall be and is hereby vested in B., would . . . deprive A. of 
his property without due process of law . . . .”)). 
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C. THE PUZZLING PERSISTENCE OF BARRON 
The Chicago B & Q opinion did not overrule—or even men-
tion—Barron v. Baltimore,134 the well-known and widely cited 
precedent that had expressly limited the Takings Clause to the 
federal government. Nor did Chicago B & Q make any refer-
ence to Fallbrook Irrigation District v. Bradley,135 which 
months earlier had reaffirmed Barron’s core holding.136 The 
only reasonable inference is that the Chicago B & Q Court 
thought the scope of the Fifth Amendment was well settled and 
undisturbed by its own holding. 
In the decades that followed, courts would continue to cite 
Fallbrook for the proposition that the Takings Clause did not 
apply to states.137 
More importantly, courts also continued to cite Barron as 
good law, relying on it to limit the Takings Clause and other 
Bill of Rights provisions to the federal government, without ac-
knowledging Chicago B & Q as having limited or disturbed its 
central holding. Two years after Chicago B & Q, the Supreme 
Court cited Barron for the proposition that “[t]he first ten 
amendments to the Federal Constitution contain no restrictions 
on the powers of the States,” without mentioning Chicago B & 
Q.138 The Court continued to cite Barron as good law until 
1958, usually for the broad proposition that the entire Bill of 
Rights applied only to the federal government.139 Remarkably, 
 
 134. 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833). 
 135. 164 U.S. 112 (1896). 
 136. See supra note 105 and accompanying text. 
 137. See, e.g., Luedtke v. County of Milwaukee, 521 F.2d 387, 389 (7th Cir. 
1975) (holding that the Takings Clause “applies only to a taking by the federal 
Government, and not to actions by state agencies” (citing Fallbrook, 164 U.S. 
at 158)); accord Riley v. Atkinson, 413 F. Supp. 413, 415 (N.D. Miss. 1975); 
City of Boston v. Mass. Port Auth., 320 F. Supp. 1317, 1319 (D. Mass. 1971); 
Elkins-Swyers Office Equip. Co. v. Moniteau County, 209 S.W.2d 127, 130 
(Mo. 1948); Demeter Land Co. v. Fla. Pub. Serv. Co., 128 So. 402, 405–06 (Fla. 
1930); Bemis v. Guirl Drainage Co., 105 N.E. 496, 499 (Ind. 1914). 
 138. Brown v. New Jersey, 175 U.S. 172, 174 (1899). 
 139. See Knapp v. Schweitzer, 357 U.S. 371, 376 & n.2 (1958) (holding that 
the first ten amendments “are not restrictions upon the vast domain of the 
criminal law that belongs exclusively to the States” (citing Barron, 32 U.S. (7 
Pet.) at 250)); Dice v. Akron, Canton & Youngstown R.R. Co., 342 U.S. 359, 
366 (1952) (holding that “the first ten Amendments . . . . are not concerned 
with state action and deal only with Federal action” (citing Barron, 32 U.S. (7 
Pet.) at 243)); Feldman v. United States, 322 U.S. 487, 490 (1944) (“[E]ver 
since Barron v. Baltimore, one of the settled principles of our Constitution has 
been that these [Bill of Rights] Amendments protect only against invasion of 
civil liberties by the [federal] Government . . . .” (citation omitted)); United 
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Barron has never been expressly overruled to this day, al-
though it now seems incontrovertible that Penn Central abro-
gated it by implication.140 
Nor does the historical evidence support the thesis that 
Chicago B & Q had carved out an exception to Barron.141 Quite 
the contrary: on at least four occasions after Chicago B & Q, 
the Supreme Court summarily dismissed Takings Clause 
claims against states, citing Barron and derivative cases hold-
ing that the Fifth Amendment applied only to the federal gov-
ernment. In Capital City Dairy Co. v. Ohio, the Court dis-
missed a Takings Clause challenge to an Ohio statute, stating 
“it is elementary that [the Fifth] amendment operates solely on 
the National Government and not the States.”142 In Winous 
Point Shooting Club v. Caspersen, the Court dismissed another 
Takings Clause case against Ohio, asserting the familiar Bar-
ron rule that the Fifth Amendment “is a restriction on Federal 
power, and not on the power of the States.”143 In Thomas 
Cusack Co. v. City of Chicago, the Court refused to hear a Tak-
ings Clause claim against the city, citing Barron-derived prece-
dents, but did consider plaintiff ’s alternative Fourteenth 
Amendment due process claim.144 In Palmer v. Ohio, the Court 
summarily dismissed yet another Takings Clause claim against 
Ohio, labeling it “palpably groundless” under Barron.145 
The question of the Takings Clause’s applicability to states 
did not re-emerge in the Supreme Court for many years after 
 
States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377, 382 (1922) (holding that “[t]he Fifth Amend-
ment, like all the other guaranties in the first eight amendments, applies only 
to proceedings by the Federal Government” (citing Barron, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) at 
250)); Gasquet v. Lapeyre, 242 U.S. 367, 369 (1917) (holding that the Fifth 
Amendment “is not restrictive of state, but only of national, action” (citing 
Barron, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) at 250)). 
 140. Westlaw’s KeyCite service lists Barron as having “some negative his-
tory but not overruled,” citing only two lower court cases as “negative indirect 
history.” Search of WESTLAW, Keycite service (Jan. 25, 2006) (search for cases 
citing Barron). One of those, Silveira v. Lockyer, cited Barron as a “now-
rejected” precedent, without explanation. 312 F.3d 1052, 1067 n.17 (9th Cir. 
2002). Similarly, United States v. Emerson questioned the applicability of 
precedents based on Barron. 270 F.3d 203, 221 n.13 (5th Cir. 2001). 
 141. This would have been inconsistent with Barron’s central holding that 
the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause did not apply to the states. See supra 
notes 96–98 and accompanying text. 
 142. 183 U.S. 238, 245 (1902). 
 143. 193 U.S. 189, 191 (1904). 
 144. 242 U.S. 526, 528 (1917) (“Obviously, claims made under the Fifth 
Amendment need not be considered . . . .” (citations omitted)). 
 145. 248 U.S. 32, 34 (1918). 
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Palmer, but this likely reflects widespread acceptance of Bar-
ron and its progeny. The issue did periodically arise in state 
courts, however, which until the 1970s continued to hold that 
the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause applied only to the fed-
eral government.146 Lower federal courts concurred in this view 
until shortly before Penn Central was decided,147 as did leading 
commentators in the post-Chicago B & Q era.148 
 
 146. See, e.g., Citizens Util. Co. v. Metro. Sanitary Dist., 322 N.E.2d 857, 
860 n.4 (Ill. App. 1974) (holding that the Takings Clause “is a limitation only 
on the powers of the federal government”); Farmington River Co. v. Town Plan 
& Zoning Comm’n, 197 A.2d 653, 658 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1963) (stating that the 
Takings Clause “does not restrain a state in the exercise of its authority”); Wil-
liams v. State Highway Comm’n, 113 S.E.2d 263, 265 (N.C. 1960) (ruling that 
the Takings Clause “is a limitation upon the federal government, and not upon 
the states”); accord State v. Kansas City, 262 P. 1032, 1034 (Kan. 1928); Nec-
tow v. Cambridge, 157 N.E. 618, 620 (Mass. 1927); Camden Fire Ins. Ass’n v. 
Haston, 284 S.W. 905, 908 (Tenn. 1926); Smith v. Cameron, 210 P. 716, 718 
(Or. 1922); Banner Milling Co. v. State, 191 N.Y.S. 143, 150 (N.Y. Ct. Cl. 
1921); Wright v. House, 121 N.E. 433, 435 (Ind. 1919); Riley v. Charleston Un-
ion Station Co., 51 S.E. 485, 487 (S.C. 1905). 
 147. See, e.g., Gagliardi v. Flint, 564 F.2d 112, 122 n.6 (3d. Cir. 1977) (stat-
ing that in Chicago B & Q and other cases against municipalities “the prohibi-
tion against taking without just compensation . . . is derived directly from the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, without consideration of the 
applicability of the Fifth Amendment”); Oakland Club v. S.C. Pub. Serv. Auth., 
110 F.2d 84, 88 (4th Cir. 1940) (holding the Takings Clause inapplicable be-
cause “no restrictions upon the States are imposed by this amendment”); Gulf 
& S.I.R. Co. v. Ducksworth, 286 F. 645, 647 (5th Cir. 1923) (ruling that the 
Takings Clause “bears alone upon the exercise of power by the United States 
government and affords no ground for relief against the state”); accord Clark 
v. Russell, 97 F. 900, 902 (8th Cir. 1899); Riley v. Atkinson, 413 F. Supp. 413, 
415 (N.D. Miss. 1975); Wolfe v. Hurley, 46 F. 2d 515, 519 (W.D. La. 1930); Un-
ion Heat, Light & Power Co. v. R.R. Comm’n of Ky., 17 F.2d 143, 145 (E.D. Ky. 
1926); Quinby v. Cleveland, 191 F. 68, 75 (N.D. Ohio 1911); Am. Loan & Trust 
Co. v. Grand Rivers Co., 159 F. 775, 778 (W.D. Ky. 1908). 
 148. Ernst Freund wrote seven years after Chicago B & Q, that “the first 
ten amendments apply only to the federal government” while “[t]he fourteenth 
amendment and the commerce clause are at present chiefly relied upon as 
checks upon the police power of the states.” ERNST FREUND, THE POLICE 
POWER 65 (1904); see also JOHN LEWIS, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EMINENT 
DOMAIN IN THE UNITED STATES 23 (3d ed. 1909) (stating that the Takings 
Clause “applies only to the operations of the federal government and is not a 
limitation on the power of the States,” but the “correct view” is that an exer-
cise of eminent domain “without compensation . . . [is not] due process”); 
PHILIP NICHOLS, THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN 126 (2d ed. 1917) (stating the 
Takings Clause “is a limitation upon the power of the United States only and 
is not applicable to the states” (citing Winous Point Shooting Club v. Casper-
sen, 193 U.S. 189 (1904), and Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 
(1833))); C. Robert Beirne, Excess Condemnation, 6 U. CIN. L. REV. 196, 201–
02 (1932) (stating that “[t]he Fifth Amendment . . . is a limitation only on the 
federal government” and “throw[s] no light” on constitutional limits to the 
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The historical record is unambiguous: Chicago B & Q was 
not understood at the time it was decided, nor for many dec-
ades thereafter, to have extended the Fifth Amendment Tak-
ings Clause to the states. That interpretation of Chicago B & Q 
is a latter-day contrivance, at odds with historical understand-
ings. 
D. DOCTRINE WITH A DIFFERENCE: DUE PROCESS-BASED 
TAKINGS 
To be sure, Chicago B & Q did hold that Fourteenth 
Amendment due process requires just compensation when 
states take private property by eminent domain, a holding that 
bears a strong facial similarity to the Fifth Amendment Tak-
ings Clause. Does my argument, then, amount to empty formal-
ism or mere semantic quibble, a “distinction without a differ-
ence”? It does not. 
Courts and commentators certainly understood Chicago 
B & Q as an important due process precedent,149 but at no time 
prior to Penn Central did the Court hold that Fourteenth 
Amendment due process-based “takings” doctrine was identical 
to, or coextensive with, that of the Fifth Amendment Takings 
Clause.150 From Fallbrook and Chicago B & Q forward, the 
Fifth Amendment Takings Clause and Fourteenth Amendment 
due process-based “takings” doctrine operated as parallel and 
“similar,”151 but nonetheless distinct and independent strands 
of constitutional doctrine, stemming from separate sources in 
the constitutional text, each with its own canonical precedents. 
Prior to Penn Central, courts did not borrow freely from Tak-
 
state’s power of eminent domain); T.D. Havran, Eminent Domain and the Po-
lice Power, 5 NOTRE DAME LAW. 380, 381–82 (1930) (stating that the Takings 
Clause “is exclusively a restriction upon the powers of the federal government 
and not a restraint upon the states,” but “a taking of property for a private use 
or without just compensation is a deprivation of property without due process” 
under the Fourteenth Amendment). 
 149. See, e.g., FREUND, supra note 148, at 541–42 (stating that “the taking 
for public use without compensation has never in any civilised country been 
regarded as a legitimate exercise of state power, and the payment of compen-
sation is therefore correctly held to be a requirement of due process under the 
Fourteenth Amendment”). 
 150. The court did rule that the measure of compensation—“the market 
value of the property at the time of the taking”—is the same under both the 
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. Olson v. United States, 292 U.S. 246, 255 
(1934). That did not mean, however, that the doctrines were identical as to 
what counted as a “taking.” 
 151. See Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922). 
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ings Clause precedents to resolve Fourteenth Amendment due 
process-based claims, or vice versa.152 
In Wight v. Davidson, the Court expressed serious doubts 
that prior Fourteenth Amendment decisions could have any 
precedential value in a Fifth Amendment Takings Clause 
case.153 In Wight, a District of Columbia property owner chal-
lenged a special assessment for street improvements as a Fifth 
Amendment taking, citing as precedent Norwood v. Baker 
which on similar facts held an Ohio city had taken plaintiff ’s 
property without due process.154 The Wight Court questioned 
Norwood’s relevance, pointing out that the Fourteenth 
Amendment Due Process clause “in terms, operates only to con-
trol action of the States,” and “it by no means necessarily fol-
lows that a long and consistent construction put upon the Fifth 
Amendment, and maintaining the validity of the acts of Con-
gress . . . is to be deemed overruled by a decision concerning the 
operation of the Fourteenth Amendment as controlling state 
legislation.”155 
The Court’s insistence on the independence of the two pro-
visions drew a sharp rebuke from Justice Harlan, who wrote in 
dissent: 
It is inconceivable to me that the question whether a person has been 
deprived of his property without due process of law can be determined 
upon principles applicable under the Fourteenth Amendment but not 
applicable under the Fifth Amendment, or upon principles applicable  
 
 
 
 152. Compare Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962) (decid-
ing a Fourteenth Amendment due process case based on due process prece-
dents), with United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946) (deciding a Takings 
Clause case based on Fifth Amendment precedents). A singular exception is 
Griggs v. Allegheny County, 369 U.S. 84 (1962), where the Court relied on a 
federal Takings Clause case, United States v. Causby, to resolve a due process 
claim against a local government. Id. at 88–89. The legal question in both 
Griggs and Causby was whether government-authorized overflights at low al-
titudes had “taken” an easement on land near airports. Compare Griggs, 369 
U.S. at 84–85 (“The question is whether respondent has taken an air easement 
over petitioner's property for which it must pay just compensation as required 
by the Fourteenth Amendment.”), with Causby, 328 U.S. at 258 (“The problem 
presented is whether respondents’ property was taken, within the meaning of 
the Fifth Amendment, by frequent and regular flights of army and navy air-
craft over respondents’ land at low altitudes.”). Because Griggs turned on a 
physical invasion rather than the police power, it was atypical of Fourteenth 
Amendment just compensation cases of the pre-Penn Central era. 
 153. 181 U.S. 371, 384 (1901). 
 154. Norwood v. Baker, 172 U.S. 269, 294 (1898). 
 155. 181 U.S. at 384. 
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under the Fifth and not applicable under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.156 
Harlan’s was the minority view, however. Lower courts 
continued to cite Wight for the proposition that the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments were separate and independent con-
stitutional requirements in the decades that followed.157 Other 
cases expressed similar doubts about the relevance of Four-
teenth Amendment precedents to Fifth Amendment cases, or 
vice-versa.158 
The standard post-Chicago B & Q consensus was that 
states were obliged to pay just compensation when they took 
property by eminent domain not because the textual mandate 
of the Fifth Amendment applied to them, but rather because 
that obligation inhered in the nature of “due process” itself, as 
a matter of natural equity and universal practice.159 As the 
Court explained in Twining v. New Jersey: 
[I]t is possible that some of the personal rights safeguarded by the 
first eight Amendments against national action may also be safe-
guarded against state action, because a denial of them would be a de-
nial of due process of law. If this is so, it is not because those rights are 
enumerated in the first eight Amendments, but because they are of 
such a nature that they are included in the conception of due process 
of law.160 
Indeed, the Court had some difficulty explaining how Four-
teenth Amendment due process could require just compensa-
tion at all. The Fifth Amendment had both a due process guar-
antee and a separate Takings Clause. Reading just com-
pensation into “due process” threatened to render the Takings 
 
 156. Id. at 387 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
 157. See, e.g., Neild v. District of Columbia, 110 F.2d 246, 250 n.10 (D.C. 
Cir. 1940); Lappin v. District of Columbia, 22 App. D.C. 68 (D.C. Cir. 1903). 
 158. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Welch, 327 U.S. 
546, 552 (1946) (“[W]hatever may be the scope of judicial power to determine 
what is a ‘public use’ in Fourteenth Amendment controversies, this Court has 
said that when Congress has spoken on this subject, [i]ts decision is entitled to 
deference until it is shown to involve an impossibility.” (internal citation and 
quotation omitted)); People of Puerto Rico v. E. Sugar Assocs., 156 F.2d 316, 
322 (1st Cir. 1946) (arguing that “public use” requirements of the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments differ). 
 159. See Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366, 390–91 (1898) (“Recognizing the 
difficulty in defining, with exactness, the phrase ‘due process of law,’ it is cer-
tain that these words imply a conformity with natural and inherent principles 
of justice, and forbid that one man’s property, or right to property, shall be 
taken for the benefit of another, or for the benefit of the State, without com-
pensation.”). 
 160. 211 U.S. 78, 99 (emphasis added). 
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Clause superfluous.161 But it was equally problematic to say 
that “due process” carried different meanings in the Fourteenth 
Amendment and the Fifth: for why would the drafters employ a 
term already used in the constitutional text, but attach a dif-
ferent meaning?162 The Court attempted to resolve this di-
lemma—not entirely satisfactorily—by resorting to essential-
ism, explaining in Powell v. Alabama that the ordinary rule of 
interpretation “is not without exceptions” and is merely “an aid 
to construction” which “must yield to more compelling consid-
erations.”163 The scope of Fourteenth Amendment due process, 
Powell said, turned on whether “the right involved is of such a 
character that it cannot be denied without violating those ‘fun-
damental principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base 
of all our civil and political institutions.’”164 The right to com-
pensation in eminent domain was “of this fundamental charac-
ter.”165 
This understanding, however, only reinforced the concep-
tual wall separating the Bill of Rights from Fourteenth 
Amendment due process. The mandates of the first eight 
amendments were specific and detailed, sprang from a pre-
cisely located textual source, and did not control the meaning 
or content of the more generally phrased Fourteenth Amend-
ment due process guarantee,166 although the requirements at 
 
 161. The Court had used this argument in Hurtado v. California, rejecting 
the claim that due process required grand jury presentment or indictment in 
state criminal cases: 
According to a recognized canon of interpretation, especially applica-
ble to formal and solemn instruments of constitutional law, we are 
forbidden to assume, without clear reason to the contrary, that any 
part of this most important amendment is superfluous. The natural 
and obvious inference is, that in the sense of the Constitution, “due 
process of law” was not meant or intended to include . . . the institu-
tion and procedure of a grand jury in any case. 
110 U.S. 516, 534 (1884). 
 162. See id. at 535. (“[W]hen the same phrase was employed in the Four-
teenth Amendment to restrain the action of the States, it was used in the 
same sense and with no greater extent [than in the Fifth Amendment].”). 
 163. 287 U.S. 45, 67 (1932). 
 164. Id. (quoting Hebert v. Louisiana, 272 U.S. 312, 316 (1926)). 
 165. Id. 
 166. See Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 461–62 (1942) (“The due process 
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not incorporate, as such, the spe-
cific guarantees found in the Sixth Amendment . . . [but instead] formulates a 
concept less rigid and more fluid than those envisaged in other specific and 
particular provisions of the Bill of Rights. Its application is less a matter of 
rule.”), overruled by Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). 
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times might be parallel or overlapping.167 
Because a case would arise under one clause or the other, 
not both, the Court never had need to spell out exactly what the 
differences were, but examination of the doctrines reveals one 
overriding difference. That difference reflected the basic feder-
alist understanding discussed in Part II.A: throughout the pre-
Penn Central period, the Court adhered to the view expressed 
in Munn, Mugler, Chicago B & Q, and subsequent cases, that a 
valid exercise of the state’s police power could never amount to 
a compensable deprivation of property under Fourteenth 
Amendment due process, because the state’s reserved power to 
regulate in the interest of harm prevention and the public good 
operated as an inherent limitation on state-recognized property 
rights. In a due process-based challenge to a state or local regu-
lation, the first step in the court’s analysis was to ask: “Is this 
regulation a valid exercise of the police power?” An affirmative 
answer was dispositive: no property had been taken, due proc-
ess was satisfied, and no compensation was owed. 
In contrast, because property rights were defined by state 
and not federal law, federal regulations were not understood to 
operate as an inherent limitation on property rights, and could 
amount to a compensable “taking” under the Fifth Amendment 
even if otherwise valid as an exercise of federal power. As the 
Court explained in 1903 in United States v. Lynah: 
[L]ike the other powers granted to Congress by the Constitution, the 
power to regulate commerce is subject to all the limitations imposed 
by such instrument, and among them is that of the Fifth Amend-
ment . . . . Congress has supreme control over the regulation of com-
merce, but if, in exercising that supreme control it deems it necessary 
to take private property, then it must proceed subject to the limita-
tions imposed by this Fifth Amendment, and can take only on pay-
ment of just compensation.168 
 
 167. See id. at 462 (“[A] denial by a state of rights or privileges specifically 
embodied in . . . the first eight amendments may, in certain circumstances, or 
in connection with other elements, operate, in a given case, to deprive a liti-
gant of due process of law in violation of the Fourteenth.”); see also Gitlow v. 
New York, 268 U.S. 652, 672 (1925) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (“The general 
principle of free speech . . . must be taken to be included in the Fourteenth 
Amendment [but] with a somewhat larger latitude of interpretation than . . . 
that [which] governs or ought to govern the laws of the United States.”). 
 168. 188 U.S. 445, 471 (1903) (quoting Monongahela Navigation Co. v. 
United States, 148 U.S. 312, 336 (1893)), overruled in part by United States v. 
Chi., Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pac. R.R. Co., 312 U.S. 592 (1941); Scranton v. 
Wheeler, 179 U.S. 141, 153 (1900) (“[I]n its exercise of the power to regulate 
commerce, Congress may not override the provision that just compensation 
must be made when private property is taken for public use.”). 
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This led to major differences in how cases were argued and 
analyzed. Consider the different analyses accorded federal and 
state efforts to grant relief to debt-burdened farmers and 
homeowners during the Great Depression. When states enacted 
debt relief schemes, the police power was dispositive in deter-
mining whether a Fourteenth Amendment property deprivation 
had occurred. For example, the Court upheld a Minnesota stat-
ute providing for an equitable stay of home mortgage foreclo-
sures as a reasonable “emergency” exercise of the state’s police 
power under the economic exigencies of the time.169 But a more 
drastic Arkansas statute canceling the debts of defaulting 
mortgagors was overturned as beyond the reasonable bounds of 
the police power, the Court finding it “without moderation or 
reason” and “in a spirit of oppression” to mortgagees whose as-
sets were stripped of all value.170 
In contrast, when the federal government acted the police 
power played no role, nor did any other assertion of federal 
power operate as an inherent limitation on property rights. In 
Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, the Court held 
that a federal law creating a statutory five-year stay on farm 
mortgage foreclosures and limiting the mortgagor’s repayment 
obligation to the present fair market value of the property was 
a Fifth Amendment taking.171 The Court reasoned that al-
though the measure might be a valid exercise of Congress’s 
bankruptcy power, the “bankruptcy power, like the other great 
substantive powers of Congress, is subject to the Fifth Amend-
ment.”172 Because the mortgagee’s lien and right to take pos-
session in foreclosure were considered property rights under 
Kentucky law, the Court determined that the federal statute 
“tak[es] . . . substantive rights in specific property acquired by 
the Bank.”173 In short, state law set the baseline of property 
rights against which the Court would determine whether a fed-
eral regulation had taken property under the Fifth Amend-
ment, and neither the police power nor any enumerated federal 
power would insulate a challenged regulation from that Fifth 
Amendment inquiry. 
 
 
 169. Home Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 447–48 (1934) 
(upholding a Minnesota statute as a reasonable police power measure). 
 170. W.B. Worthen Co. v. Kavanaugh, 295 U.S. 56, 60 (1935). 
 171. 295 U.S. 555, 601–02 (1935). 
 172. Id. at 589. 
 173. Id. at 590. 
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This did not mean that states had carte blanche to rewrite 
property law at their whim, however. Courts insisted that some 
purported exercises of the police power might be pretextual or 
so unreasonable or arbitrary as to fall outside the legitimate 
bounds of that power. As the Court explained in Atlantic Coast 
Line Railroad. Co. v. Goldsboro: 
[I]f it appear that the regulation under criticism is not in any way de-
signed to promote the health, comfort, safety, or welfare of the com-
munity, or that the means employed have no real and substantial re-
lation to the avowed or ostensible purpose, or that there is wanton or 
arbitrary interference with private rights, the question arises 
whether the law-making body has exceeded the legitimate bounds of 
the police power.174 
This placed the judiciary in the delicate position of policing 
the rather indefinite boundary separating valid police power 
regulations from arbitrary or unreasonable regulations or dis-
guised exercises of the (compensable) power of eminent do-
main—the classic substantive due process inquiry.175 
So, for example, in Missouri Pacific Railway. Co. v. Ne-
braska (Missouri Pac II), the Court held that a state regulation 
requiring the railroad to construct, at its own expense, a side 
track to serve a grain elevator located adjacent to the railroad’s 
right-of-way “goes beyond the limit of the police power,” and 
therefore effected an unconstitutional deprivation or “taking” of 
property as a matter of Fourteenth Amendment due process.176 
Anticipating Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon by more than a 
decade, Justice Holmes for the Court wrote that while “the 
States have power to modify and cut down property rights to a 
certain limited extent without compensation, for public pur-
poses, as a necessary incident of government—the police 
power,” nonetheless “there are constitutional limits to what can 
be required of . . . owners under either the police power or any 
other ostensible justification for taking such property away.”177 
 
 174. 232 U.S. 548, 559 (1914); see also FREUND, supra note 148, at 124 
(“Under the Fourteenth Amendment the United States is competent to protect 
individual liberty and property against arbitrary or unequal state legislation 
enacted under color of protection of safety and health, but having in reality no 
such justification.”). 
 175. See, e.g., Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135, 156 (1921) (“For just as there 
comes a point at which the police power ceases and leaves only that of eminent 
domain, it may be conceded that regulations of the present sort pressed to a 
certain height might amount to a taking without due process of law.”). 
 176. 217 U.S. 196, 207 (1910). 
 177. Id. at 206. 
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E. MAHON IN THE MUDDLE 
Placed in its proper historical context as one of a long line 
of Fourteenth Amendment due process cases policing the 
boundary between the police power and eminent domain, Penn-
sylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon178 was unremarkable when it was 
decided and was uniformly recognized in the pre-Penn Central 
era as a rather ordinary substantive due process case.179 Mod-
ern myth notwithstanding, it was not the first case to invali-
date a regulatory enactment as an impermissible “taking” of 
property,180 and it had relatively little subsequent doctrinal 
 
 178. 260 U.S. 393 (1922). 
 179. A 1927 Harvard Law review article listed Mahon as one of twenty-
eight “police power cases” invalidating “substantive legislation of a social or 
economic character” on due process grounds. See Ray A. Brown, Due Process of 
Law, Police Power, and the Supreme Court, 40 HARV. L. REV. 943, 944 (1927); 
see also John J. Costonis, “Fair” Compensation and the Accommodation Power: 
Antidotes for the Taking Impasse in Land Use Controversies, 75 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1021, 1034 (1975) (stating that “all that Pennsylvania Coal actually de-
cided was that the statute challenged in that case was an invalid police power 
measure”); Thomas Reed Powell, The Supreme Court and State Police Power, 
1922–1930, 18 VA. L. REV. 1, 10 (1931) (stating that Mahon held the Kohler 
Act “to go beyond proper police power” because “the statute is not necessary 
for safety”). Courts concurred. See, e.g., Panhandle E. Pipe Line Co. v. State 
Highway Comm’n, 294 U.S. 613, 621 (1935) (stating that in Mahon “the court 
refused to sustain a Pennsylvania statute as an exercise of the police power”); 
Nashville, Chattanooga & St. Louis Ry. v. Walters, 294 U.S. 405, 415 n.7 
(1935) (citing Mahon for the proposition that “[t]he police power is subject to 
the constitutional limitation that it may not be exerted arbitrarily or unrea-
sonably”); Hulen v. City of Corsicana, 65 F.2d 969, 970 (5th Cir. 1933) (citing 
Mahon for the proposition that the limits of the police power are “shadowy, 
vague, and shifting” and “it is in the last analysis for the courts to say” 
whether “the power is being exercised reasonably”); Marblehead Land Co. v. 
City of Los Angeles, 47 F.2d 528, 532 (9th Cir. 1931) (stating that Mahon held 
the statute “so unreasonable an exercise of the police power that it was viola-
tive of the constitutional rights” of the coal company); Fred F. French Invest-
ing Co. v. City of New York, 385 N.Y.S.2d 5, 9 (N.Y. 1976) (stating that in 
Mahon “the gravamen of the constitutional challenge to the regulatory meas-
ure was that it was an invalid exercise of the police power under the due proc-
ess clause” and the case was “decided under that rubric”); McCarthy v. City of 
Manhattan Beach, 264 P.2d 932, 939 (Cal. 1954) (stating that Mahon held the 
statute “beyond the legitimate scope of the police power”). 
 180. See, e.g., Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312, 328 (1921) (overturning a 
statute prohibiting injunctions against labor picketing because it “deprives the 
owner of the business and the premises of his property without due process”); 
Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60, 82 (1917) (invalidating an ordinance barring 
the sale of property to persons of color as “state interference with property 
rights” without due process because it lacks a legitimate police power justifica-
tion); Chi., Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. Co. v. Polt, 232 U.S. 165 (1914) (invali-
dating a statute doubling a railroad’s liability as deprivation of property with-
out due process); Eubank v. City of Richmond, 226 U.S. 137, 144 (1912) 
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impact.181 Mahon was cited infrequently,182 and then usually to 
invoke familiar nostrums about the scope and limits of the po-
lice power, such as: “[w]hile [the] police power is broad, there 
are limitations to its exercise,”183 or “some values are enjoyed 
 
(invalidating an ordinance authorizing two-thirds of property owners to estab-
lish building setback requirements as “an unreasonable exercise of the police 
power” depriving owners of property without due process); St. Louis, Iron 
Mountain & S. Ry. Co. v. Wynne, 224 U.S. 354, 360–61 (1912) (invalidating as 
“wanting in due process and repugnant to the Fourteenth Amendment” a stat-
ute doubling a railroad’s liability for killing livestock, which “takes property 
from one and gives it to another”); Mo. Pac. Ry. Co. v. Nebraska (Missouri Pac. 
II ), 217 U.S. 196, 205 (1910) (invalidating an order compelling construction of 
sidetracks to serve private grain elevators because it “take[s]” the railroad’s 
property without compensation); Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. Cent. Stock 
Yards Co., 212 U.S. 132, 143–44 (1909) (invalidating a statute requiring a 
railroad to deliver cars to another line as an “unlawful taking of its property” 
violating due process); Dobbins v. Los Angeles, 195 U.S. 223, 241 (1904) (in-
validating an ordinance stringently regulating gas works as an “arbitrary and 
discriminatory exercise of the police power which amounts to a taking of prop-
erty without due process of law”); Lake Shore & Mich. S. Ry. Co. v. Smith, 173 
U.S. 684, 699 (1899) (invalidating a statute fixing preferential railroad rates 
as beyond the police power and a “taking of property without due process of 
law”); Missouri Pac. I, 164 U.S. 403, 417 (1896) (invalidating an order author-
izing construction of a private grain elevator on a railroad right-of-way as “a 
taking of private property of the railroad corporation, for the private use of the 
petitioners” and “not due process of law”). In the Fifth Amendment Takings 
Clause context, see, e.g., Richards v. Washington Terminal Co., 233 U.S. 546 
(1914) (finding that the Takings Clause bars Congress from immunizing a 
railroad against private nuisance actions, which would be a “taking” of an ad-
jacent landowner’s property). 
 181. See Brauneis, supra note 25, at 665 (stating that Mahon was initially 
cited with moderate frequency but then “all but disappeared from the United 
States Reports for over two decades” from 1936 to 1957). But cf. Treanor, su-
pra note 25, at 861–64 (stating that Mahon was neither a “minor case” nor 
“forgotten,” receiving scholarly attention when decided and later becoming 
part of Holmes’s widely cited “canon”). Treanor admits, however, that Mahon 
did not significantly influence the course of substantive due process jurispru-
dence, and that its pre-Penn Central prominence owed much to Holmes’s stat-
ure, the opinion’s epigramatic quality, and its apparent inconsistency with 
Holmes’s generally deferential stance in substantive process cases. See id. at 
862. 
 182. As of January 23, 2006, Westlaw’s KeyCite service listed 1174 judicial 
citations to Mahon by federal and state courts. See Search of WESTLAW, Key-
Cite Service (Jan. 23, 2006) (search for court cases citing Mahon before and 
after 1978). In the 56 years before Penn Central, Mahon was cited 395 times, 
about seven citations per year. Id. In the 27 years after Penn Central, Mahon 
was cited 779 times, roughly 28 citations per year. Id. 
 183. Women’s Kan. City St. Andrew Soc’y v. Kansas City, 58 F.2d 593, 598 
(8th Cir. 1932); see also W. Int’l Hotels v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 387 F. 
Supp. 429, 434–35 (D. Nev. 1975) (citing Mahon for the proposition that “po-
lice power regulation had its limits,” an idea that “antedates even Holmes”); 
Appeal of Key Realty Co., 182 A.2d 187, 191 (Pa. 1962) (citing Mahon for the 
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under an implied limitation and must yield to the police 
power.”184 Rarely did Mahon supply the controlling legal prin-
ciple in due process-based “takings” challenges to state185 or 
federal regulation.186 Nor did Mahon play a decisive role in any 
 
proposition that police power regulations are valid if “necessary for the preser-
vation of public health, safety, morals or general welfare, and not unjustly dis-
criminatory, or arbitrary, or unreasonable, or confiscatory”); Creasy v. Ste-
vens, 160 F. Supp. 404, 410 (N.D. Pa. 1958) (citing Mahon for the proposition 
that “[t]he ultimate decision as to proper exercise of the police power rests 
with the courts, and, if the exercise goes too far, there is a judicial duty to in-
vestigate and declare the exercise of the police power invalid”), rev’d by Martin 
v. Creasy, 360 U.S. 219 (1959). 
 184. E.g., Brecciaroli v. Conn. Commr. of Envtl. Prot., 362 A.2d 948, 951 
(Conn. 1975). 
 185. Mahon was mentioned prominently in Panhandle Eastern Pipeline Co. 
v. State Highway Commission, but that case turned on the lack of a public 
safety rationale. See 294 U.S. 613, 621–23 (1935) (holding regulation requiring 
alterations in gas transmission lines “arbitrary and unreasonable,” depriving 
the plaintiff of property without due process). Mahon was not mentioned in 
other prominent due process “property deprivation” cases like Williams v. 
Standard Oil Co. of Louisiana, 278 U.S. 235 (1929) (overturning a state’s 
regulation of gasoline prices); Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Baldridge, 278 U.S. 105 
(1928) (overturning a state ban on ownership of drug stores by non-
pharmacists); Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928) (holding that a 
municipal zoning scheme as applied deprived the plaintiff of property without 
due process); and Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926) 
(upholding a municipal zoning scheme against facial challenge). When Mahon 
was cited, it was seldom controlling. See, e.g., Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 
502, 552 (1934) (citing Mahon for the proposition that the wartime rent control 
cases “involved peculiar facts and must be strictly limited”); accord Home 
Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 479 (1934); Tyson & Bro.-United 
Theatre Ticket Offices v. Banton, 273 U.S. 418, 437–38 (1927). Goldblatt v. 
Town of Hempstead cited Mahon for the proposition that a regulation might 
“be so onerous as to constitute a taking which constitutionally requires com-
pensation” and that “a comparison of values before and after is relevant” to 
that determination, but Goldblatt went on to hold that such a comparison is 
“by no means conclusive” and that the question “narrow[ed]” to whether the 
challenged regulation was “a valid exercise of the police power.” See 369 U.S. 
590, 594 (1962). 
 186. Fifth Amendment due process challenges to federal regulations affect-
ing property were more common than Takings Clause-based “regulatory tak-
ings” cases in the pre-Penn Central era. See, e.g., N. Am. Co. v. SEC, 327 U.S. 
686 (1946) (holding an SEC regulation not unreasonable and not a “taking” of 
property without due process); Valvoline Oil Co. v. United States, 308 U.S. 141 
(1939) (upholding an ICC regulation against a claim that it “took” property 
without due process); Denver Union Stock Yard Co. v. United States, 304 U.S. 
470 (1938) (holding federally regulated stockyard rates not “confiscatory” and 
not a due process violation); Kuehner v. Irving Trust Co., 299 U.S. 445 (1937) 
(holding a Bankruptcy Act provision did not destroy property and not arbi-
trary or unreasonable, and consequently not a due process violation); R.R. Bd. 
v. Alton R.R. Co., 295 U.S. 330 (1935) (holding compulsory participation in an 
employee pension scheme arbitrarily deprived railroads of property without 
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of the several dozen Fifth Amendment Takings Clause cases 
that reached the Supreme Court in the pre-Penn Central era.187 
Then, like Chicago B & Q, Mahon was plucked from rela-
tive obscurity and anachronistically recast as a Fifth Amend-
ment Takings Clause precedent by Penn Central and its prog-
eny.188 In that guise, it came to serve as one of the pillars of 
contemporary regulatory takings jurisprudence.189 
That Mahon was a Fourteenth Amendment and not a Fifth 
Amendment case is apparent from the posture in which it 
reached the Court. Mahon involved the constitutionality of 
Pennsylvania’s Kohler Act, which prohibited the mining of coal 
pillars providing subjacent support to certain surface owners.190 
 
due process); Chi. Rock Island & Pac. Ry Co. v. United States, 284 U.S. 80 
(1931) (holding an ICC regulation of rail cars reasonable and not arbitrary or 
confiscatory, consequently not a due process violation); Tyler v. United States, 
281 U.S. 497 (1930) (holding a federal estate tax provision not arbitrary or 
confiscatory, consequently not a deprivation of property without due process); 
Bd. of Trade v. Olsen, 262 U.S. 1 (1923) (holding a federal regulation of the 
commodity futures market reasonable, and an incidental reduction in value 
did not deprive members of property without due process). Mahon, turning on 
the scope of the states’ police power, was irrelevant to the resolution of these 
federal cases, and was not cited. 
 187. The Supreme Court cited Mahon in only four Fifth Amendment Tak-
ings Clause cases prior to Penn Central, and it played a minor role in all of 
them. See Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 48 (1960) (citing Mahon as 
an example of the “difficulty of trying to draw the line” in takings cases); 
United States v. Cent. Eureka Mining Co., 357 U.S. 155, 168 (1958) (citing 
Mahon for the proposition that takings cases “turn[ ] upon the particular cir-
cumstances of each case”); United States v. Commodities Trading Corp., 339 
U.S. 121, 134 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (citing Mahon for the propo-
sition that “the question depends upon the particular facts”); Omnia Commer-
cial Co. v. United States, 261 U.S. 502, 508 (1923) (citing Mahon for the propo-
sition that a doctrine allowing uncompensated destruction of property to stop 
a fire “rest[s] on tradition”). 
 188. See Penn. Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 127 
(1978) (citing Mahon as “the leading case for the proposition that a state stat-
ute that substantially furthers important public policies may so frustrate dis-
tinct investment-backed expectations as to amount to a ‘taking’”). 
 189. See, e.g., Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 
535 U.S. 302, 325 (2002) (stating that Mahon “gave birth to our regulatory 
takings jurisprudence”); Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1014 
(1992) (stating that prior to Mahon, “it was generally thought that the Tak-
ings Clause reached only a ‘direct appropriation’ of property”); San Diego Gas 
& Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 648–49 (1981) (“The principle 
[that a regulation can effect a Fifth Amendment ‘taking’] . . . has its source in 
Justice Holmes’s opinion for the Court in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon.” 
(citation omitted)). 
 190. See Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 412–13 (1922); Mahon v. Pa. 
Coal Co., 118 A. 491, 492–93 (Pa. 1922) (setting forth provisions of the Kohler 
Act), rev’d, 260 U.S. 393 (1922). 
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Mahon held title to surface rights under a deed from the Penn-
sylvania Coal Company that had expressly reserved the Com-
pany’s right to mine all the subsurface coal without providing 
subjacent support.191 When the company continued to mine and 
gave notice of possible subsidence, Mahon sought an injunc-
tion.192 The Company argued that enforcement of the Kohler 
Act would deprive it of property without due process. The 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court upheld the Act on due process 
grounds as “a reasonable and valid exercise of the police 
power.”193 The Company filed a writ of error, seeking reversal. 
Thus the sole issue properly before the Court was, as Justice 
Holmes put it, “whether the police power can be stretched so 
far.”194 
As a conventional substantive due process case turning on 
the limits of the police power, Mahon broke no new conceptual 
ground. Holmes began his opinion with an elegant restatement 
of the difference between a valid police power regulation and an 
implied exercise of eminent domain: 
Government hardly could go on if to some extent values incident to 
property could not be diminished without paying for every such 
change in the general law. As long recognized, some values are en-
joyed under an implied limitation and must yield to the police power. 
But obviously the implied limitation must have its limits, or the con-
tract and due process clauses are gone. One fact for consideration in 
determining such limits is the extent of the diminution. When it 
reaches a certain magnitude, in most if not all cases there must be an 
exercise of eminent domain and compensation to sustain the act.195 
 
 
 191. Mahon, 260 U.S. at 412; Mahon v. Pa. Coal Co., 118 A. at 492 (“[S]o 
far as the contractual rights of the respective parties are concerned, as shown 
by the paper title to the properties involved, defendant is expressly authorized 
to mine the subjacent strata owned by it without any obligation to support the 
surface owned by plaintiffs.”). 
 192. See Mahon, 260 U.S. at 412; Mahon v. Pa. Coal Co., 118 A. at 492–93. 
 193. Mahon v. Pa. Coal Co., 118 A. at 492. The Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court stated the controlling legal principle: 
[T]he state, under its police power, may lawfully impose such restric-
tions upon private rights as, in the wisdom of the Legislature, may be 
deemed expedient; . . . for ‘all property in this country is held under 
the implied obligation that the owner’s use of it shall not be injurious 
to the community’ . . . [and] a statute enacted for the protection of 
public health, safety or morals, can be set aside by the courts only 
when it plainly has no real or substantial relation to these subjects, or 
is a palpable invasion of rights secured by the fundamental law. 
 Id. at 493 (quoting Nolan v. Jones, 263 Pa. 124, 127–28 (Pa. 1919)). 
 194. Mahon, 260 U.S. at 413. 
 195. Id. 
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To Holmes, then, no bright line demarcated the boundary 
between legitimate noncompensable exercises of the police 
power and implied compensable exercises of eminent domain. 
Instead, government actions are arrayed along a continuum 
and may fall into either category depending upon the facts and 
circumstances. “One fact for consideration”—presumably one of 
several196—is the “extent of the diminution.”197 
This latter statement is widely cited as Holmes’s enuncia-
tion of a “diminution of value” test for regulatory takings.198 If 
any doctrinal innovation is to be found in Mahon, it is surely 
this. Yet while Holmes flirts with the proposition that every 
regulation effecting diminution of a “certain magnitude” must 
fall outside the police power, Mahon never squarely so holds. 
Strictly speaking, the statement that when “diminu-
tion . . . reaches a certain magnitude . . . there must be an exer-
cise of eminent domain” is dictum.199 
At bottom, and on arguments that closely track the dis-
senting opinion in the Pennsylvania Supreme Court,200 Holmes 
 
 196. See Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594 (1962) (“There 
is no set formula to determine where regulation ends and taking begins. Al-
though a comparison of values before and after is relevant, see Pennsylvania 
Coal Co. v. Mahon, . . . it is by no means conclusive.”). 
 197. Mahon, 260 U.S. at 413. 
 198. See, e.g., Joseph L. Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 
36, 40–42 (1964). Sax emphasized Holmes’s statement in Interstate Consoli-
dated Street Railway Co. v. Massachusetts, 207 U.S. 79, 87 (1907) (upholding a 
statute mandating half-price streetcar fares for school children), that “the 
question narrows itself to the magnitude of the burden imposed.” See Sax, su-
pra, at 41. But that statement must be considered in context. Weighing 
whether the regulation went too far, Holmes first noted that Massachusetts 
regards education as a police power purpose of the first magnitude. See Inter-
state Colsol. St. Ry. Co., 207 U.S. at 87 (“Education is one of the purposes for 
which . . . the police power may be exercised. Massachusetts always has recog-
nized it as one of the first objects of public care. It does not follow that it would 
be equally in accord with the conceptions at the base of our constitutional law 
to confer equal favors upon doctors, or workingmen, or people who could afford 
to buy 1000-mile tickets.”). Only after placing great weight on the public inter-
est side of the ledger did Holmes consider the private economic burden, and at 
that point “the question narrow[ed] itself to the magnitude of the burden.” Id. 
Holmes concluded, however, that the public interest in education outweighed 
the private burden. Id. at 87–88. This was a balancing, not a diminution of 
value test. 
 199. See Mahon, 260 U.S. at 413. 
 200. See Mahon v. Pa. Coal Co., 118 A. 491, 497 (Pa. 1922) (Kephardt, J., 
dissenting) (deriding majority’s expansive conception under which “the exer-
cise of this [police] power becomes nothing more than the will of the Legisla-
ture” and “property may be transferred, by the Legislature from one person to 
another without compensation”); id. at 499 (arguing that if the intent were to 
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simply finds the police power justifications for the Kohler Act 
wanting. As Holmes sees it, the Act’s restrictions on subsurface 
mining protect the private interests of a narrow class of surface 
owners—those who had not bargained for subjacent support, as 
they clearly could have done under Pennsylvania law.201 These 
owners gain a windfall at the direct expense of subsurface min-
eral owners who had bargained—and paid for—the right to 
mine the coal. With regard to subsidence affecting this narrow 
class, Holmes says, “the damage is not common or public.”202 
The absence of any genuine public interest in preventing subsi-
dence is confirmed, Holmes says, by the fact that subsidence is 
permissible where the mining company owns the surface 
rights.203 Certainly, the legislature might proceed piecemeal to 
protect some property owners, and Holmes concedes that “there 
is a public interest even in this, as there is in every purchase 
and sale and in all that happens within the commonwealth.”204 
But the public interest here, Holmes concludes, is “limited,”205 
and is advanced only by stripping other property owners of  
 
 
protect safety the statute “could have required a notice” before mining); id. 
(arguing the purpose of the statute was “merely to augment property rights of 
the few” and “the public generally, as distinguished from this particular class, 
is not interested”); id. at 500–01 (characterizing the Kohler Act as “class” leg-
islation which does not “protect from all such subsidences” but operates “for 
the sole benefit of ” surface owners who had expressly waived their right to 
subjacent support, “confiscat[ing] defendant’s coal for plaintiff ’s benefit” and 
“forc[ing] the coal companies, who have already paid for this property right 
once, to pay for it again”). 
 201. Pennsylvania law required subjacent support unless the surface 
owner expressly waived that right by grant or reservation. See Penman v. 
Jones, 256 Pa. 416, 422 (Pa. 1917) (“The law is firmly established in Pennsyl-
vania that, in the absence of express waiver or the use of words from which 
the intention to waive clearly appears, the grantee of minerals takes the estate 
subject to the burden of surface support”). A waiver created a distinct interest 
or “estate” that could be separately assigned or conveyed. See id. at 427–29 
(holding that although the coal company had expressly reserved the support 
estate, that interest did not pass to the purchaser of mineral rights unless ex-
pressly assigned or conveyed). 
 202. Mahon, 260 U.S. at 413; cf. Mahon v. Pa. Coal Co., 118 A. at 510 (stat-
ing that the Act “transfers an independent property right to plaintiff, vesting 
the permanent use and perpetual enjoyment of this right in one who is not re-
quired to pay anything for what he so acquires, and which he may sell in sell-
ing his surface, with the increased value given it by this legislation”). 
 203. Mahon, 260 U.S. at 413–14 (“The extent of the public interest is 
shown by the statute to be limited, since the statute ordinarily does not apply 
to land when the surface is owned by the owner of the coal.”). 
 204. Id. at 413. 
 205. Id. at 414. 
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their rights. To Holmes, that smacks of naked redistribution, 
not any genuine “public interest.” 
By the time Mahon was decided, there was ample prece-
dent for striking down such redistributive regulations as im-
permissible “takings” of property under the Fourteenth 
Amendment Due Process Clause.206 Holmes later explained in a 
letter to Frederick Pollock: “My ground [for decision in Mahon] 
is that the public only got on this land by paying for it and that 
if they saw fit to pay only for the surface rights they can’t 
enlarge it.”207 
Holmes also concluded the statute could not be justified as 
a reasonable safety measure because for that purpose a simple 
notice requirement would suffice.208 In any event, Holmes 
notes, the mining company gave actual notice in this case, so 
there was no threat to Mahon’s safety.209 
The Mahon analysis, while proceeding within the standard 
police power framework, nonetheless evidences a characteristi-
cally Holmesian departure from the more formalistic treatment 
a similar case might have received at the hands of other judges. 
 
 206. See, e.g., St. Louis, Iron Mountain & S. Ry. Co. v. Wynne, 224 U.S. 
354, 360–61 (1912) (invalidating as “wanting in due process of law, and repug-
nant to the Fourteenth Amendment” a statute doubling a railroad’s liability 
for killing livestock, which “takes property from one and gives it to another”); 
Missouri Pac. II, 217 U.S. 196, 207–08 (1910) (invalidating an order compel-
ling construction of sidetracks to serve private grain elevators because it takes 
the railroad’s property without compensation); Louisville & Nashville Ry. Co. 
v. Cent. Stock Yards Co., 212 U.S. 132, 143–44 (1909) (invalidating a statute 
requiring a railroad to deliver cars to another railway line as an “unlawful 
taking of its property” violating due process); Missouri Pac. I, 164 U.S. 403, 
417 (1896) (invalidating an order authorizing construction of a private grain 
elevator on railroad right-of-way as “a taking of private property of the rail-
road corporation, for the private use of the petitioners” and “not due process of 
law”). In contrast, when the Court perceived a strong public interest at stake, 
it upheld redistributive regulations. See, e.g., Edgar A. Levy Leasing Co. v. 
Siegel, 258 U.S. 242, 250 (1922) (upholding state wartime rent control laws 
similar to those in Block v. Hirsh); Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135, 156 (1921) 
(“All the elements of a public interest justifying some degree of public control 
are present” in emergency wartime rent control legislation, and the regulation 
does not “go[ ] too far” to be sustained as a reasonable police power measure). 
 207. FRED BOSSELMAN ET AL., THE TAKING ISSUE 244 (1973) (quoting 
HOLMES-POLLOCK LETTERS 108–09 (Mark de Wolfe Howe, ed., 1941)). 
 208. Mahon, 260 U.S. at 414; cf. Mahon v. Pa. Coal Co., 118 A. 491, 512 
(1922) (Kephardt, J., dissenting) (“If the Legislature had desired to protect life 
and limb it could have required a notice . . . . [but] the real purpose of the Leg-
islature and the framers of the act was in the interest of property, and prop-
erty alone—not to prevent the ‘terrible menace to human life, public safety 
and morals.’”), rev’d, 260 U.S. 393 (1922). 
 209. See Mahon, 260 U.S. at 414. 
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For Holmes, the determination whether a police power justifi-
cation is sufficiently robust to support the challenged regula-
tion is not susceptible to a simple, categorical “yes or no” an-
swer. Instead, Holmes says, it is a “question of degree” and 
“cannot be disposed of by general propositions,”210 requiring a 
case-specific balancing of the “public interest” advanced by the 
regulation against the burden imposed on private parties. 
Weighing the relevant factors in Mahon, Holmes concludes that 
the public interest in protecting surface owners who lacked the 
foresight to protect themselves is slight and easily outweighed 
by the substantial burden on subsurface coal owners. Conse-
quently, the police power rationale fails Holmes’s balancing 
test.211 
Boiled to its core, the holding in Mahon was simply that 
the Kohler Act “cannot be sustained as an exercise of the police 
power”212 and violated the Fourteenth Amendment due process 
guarantee. Although the Act might be justified as an exercise of 
eminent domain,213 that would require just compensation.214 
Even with respect to its sliding-scale methodology, how-
ever, Mahon was no pathbreaker. Holmes had outlined this ap-
proach fifteen years earlier in Martin v. District of Columbia 
(1907): 
[T]here should not be extracted from the very general language of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, a system of delusive exactness and merely 
logical form . . . . Constitutional rights like others are matters of de-
gree. To illustrate: Under the police power, in its strict sense, a cer-
tain limit might be set to the height of buildings without compensa- 
 
 
 210. Id. at 416; see also BOSSELMAN ET AL., supra note 207, at 134 (“[I]n 
Justice Holmes’ view the difference between regulation and taking was one of 
degree not kind.”). 
 211. See BOSSELMAN ET AL., supra note 207, at 139 (describing Holmes’s 
approach as a “balancing test”); Treanor, supra note 25, at 857. 
 212. Mahon, 260 U.S. at 414 (“It is our opinion that the act cannot be sus-
tained as an exercise of the police power, so far as it affects the mining of coal 
under streets or cities in places where the right to mine such coal has been re-
served.”). 
 213. Id. at 416 (“We assume, of course, that the statute was passed upon 
the conviction that an exigency existed that would warrant it, and we assume 
that an exigency exists that would warrant the exercise of eminent domain.”). 
 214. Id. at 415 (“The protection of private property in the Fifth Amendment 
presupposes that it is wanted for public use, but provides that it shall not be 
taken for such use without compensation. A similar assumption is made in the 
decisions upon the Fourteenth Amendment.”); id. at 416 (“[A] strong public 
desire to improve the public condition is not enough to warrant achieving the 
desire by a shorter cut than the constitutional way of paying for the change.”). 
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tion; but to make that limit five feet would require compensation and 
a taking by eminent domain.215 
Amplifying his views in Hudson County Water Co. v. 
McCarter, Holmes argued that case-by-case balancing should 
be constrained not by abstract principles but by the incre-
mental accumulation of constitutional precedents which would 
provide benchmarks and guideposts in the manner of the com-
mon law: 
All rights tend to declare themselves absolute to their logical extreme. 
Yet all in fact are limited by the neighborhood of principles of policy 
which are other than those on which the particular right is founded, 
and which become strong enough to hold their own when a certain 
point is reached. The limits set to property by other public interests 
present themselves as a branch of what is called the police power of 
the state. The boundary at which the conflicting interests balance 
cannot be determined by any general formula in advance, but points 
in the line, or helping to establish it, are fixed by decisions that this 
or that concrete case falls on the nearer or farther side.216 
In Noble State Bank v. Haskell, Holmes stressed the anti-
formalism of his approach: 
[W]e must be cautious about pressing the broad words of the Four-
teenth Amendment to a drily logical extreme. Many laws which it 
would be vain to ask the court to overthrow could be shown, easily 
enough, to transgress a scholastic interpretation of one or another of 
the great guarantees in the Bill of Rights. They more or less limit the 
liberty of the individual or they diminish property to a certain extent. 
We have few scientifically certain criteria of legislation, and as it of-
ten is difficult to mark the line where what is called the police power 
of the States is limited by the Constitution of the United States, 
judges should be slow to read into the latter a nolumus mutare as 
against the law-making power.217 
 
 215. Martin v. District of Columbia, 205 U.S. 135, 139 (1907); see also In-
terstate Consol. St. Ry. v. Massachusetts, 207 U.S. 79, 86–87 (1907) (uphold-
ing a Massachusetts statute mandating half-price streetcar fares for school 
children). Bosselman, Callies, and Banta trace Holmes’s balancing approach to 
the 1889 Massachusetts case Rideout v. Knox, see BOSSELMAN ET AL., supra 
note 207, at 124–25, where Holmes wrote in upholding a regulation limiting 
the height of yard fences: 
It may be said that the difference is only one of degree; most differ-
ences are when nicely analyzed. At any rate, difference of degree is 
one of the distinctions by which the right of the legislature to exercise 
police power is determined. Some small limitations of previously ex-
isting rights incident to property may be imposed for the sake of pre-
venting manifest evil; larger ones could not be except by the exercise 
of the right of eminent domain. 
Rideout v. Knox, 19 N.E. 368, 372 (Mass. 1889). 
 216. 209 U.S. 349, 355 (1908) (upholding a New Jersey statute prohibiting 
exports of fresh water). 
 217. 219 U.S. 104, 110 (1911); see also Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312, 342 
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Holmes’s balancing approach to substantive due process 
adjudication had gained some traction in the Court in the years 
leading up to Mahon. In Eubank v. City of Richmond,218 for ex-
ample, Justice McKenna cited Holmes’s opinions in Noble State 
Bank and Hudson County Water Co. for the proposition that 
the police power “necessarily . . . has its limits and must stop 
when it encounters the prohibitions of the Constitution,” but 
the “point where particular interests or principles balance ‘can-
not be determined by any general formula in advance.’”219 Simi-
lar are Justice Brandeis’s dissent in Truax v. Corrigan220 and 
Justice Brown’s opinion for a unanimous court in Camfield v. 
United States.221 
Holmes himself later placed Mahon in this procession of 
substantive due process cases turning on the limits of the police 
power. Dissenting in Frost & Frost Trucking Co. v. Railroad 
Commission, Holmes wrote: 
The only valuable significance of the much abused phrase police 
power is this power of the State to limit what otherwise would be 
rights having a pecuniary value, when a predominant public interest 
requires the restraint. The power of the State is limited in its turn by 
the constitutional guaranties of private rights, and it often is a deli-
cate matter to decide which interest preponderates and how far the 
State may go without making compensation. The line cannot be 
drawn by generalities, but successive points in it must be fixed by 
weighing the particular facts. Extreme cases on the one side and on 
the other are Edgar A. Levy Leasing Co. v. Siegel and Pennsylvania 
Coal Co. v. Mahon.222 
 
(1921) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (warning of the “dangers of a delusive exact-
ness in the application of the Fourteenth Amendment”). 
 218. 226 U.S. 137 (1912). 
 219. Id. at 143 (invalidating an ordinance empowering two-thirds of prop-
erty owners to establish building setback lines). 
 220. Truax, 257 U.S. at 356–57 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“Whether a law 
enacted in the exercise of the police power is justly subject to the charge of be-
ing unreasonable or arbitrary, can ordinarily be determined only by a consid-
eration of contemporary conditions [and] involves a weighing of public needs 
as against private desires and likewise a weighing of relative social values.”). 
 221. Camfield v. United States, 167 U.S. 518, 524 (1897) (citing Holmes’s 
opinion in Rideout v. Knox for the proposition that “the police power is not sub-
ject to any definite limitations, but is co-extensive with the necessities of the 
case and the safeguard of the public interests”). 
 222. Frost & Frost Trucking Co. v. R.R. Comm’n, 271 U.S. 583, 601 (1926) 
(Holmes, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). Frost invalidated on substantive 
due process grounds a statute conditioning the right of private contract carri-
ers to use public highways on their submission to regulations applicable to 
common carriers. Id. at 599. Holmes found the statute “well within the legisla-
tive power,” id. at 601 (Holmes, J., dissenting), falling between the police 
power “extremes” of Mahon and Edgar A. Levy Leasing Co., 258 U.S. 242 
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What of Holmes’s famous epigram that “while property 
may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far 
it will be recognized as a taking”?223 Viewing Mahon in histori-
cal context, this statement merely reiterates, in Holmes’s color-
ful language, the principle Mugler had articulated decades ear-
lier: 
It belongs to . . . [the legislature] to exert what are known as the po-
lice powers of the State . . . . 
  It does not at all follow that every statute enacted ostensibly for 
the promotion of these ends is to be accepted as a legitimate exertion 
of the police powers of the State. There are, of necessity, limits beyond 
which legislation cannot rightfully go. While every possible presump-
tion is to be indulged in favor of the validity of a statute, the courts 
must obey the Constitution . . . and . . . determine whether, in any 
particular case, these limits have been passed.224 
Or, as the Court said in Lochner v. New York,  
[T]here is a limit to the valid exercise of the police power by the State 
. . . . Otherwise, the 14th Amendment would have no efficacy . . . . 
[T]he question necessarily arises: Is this a fair, reasonable and appro-
priate exercise of the police power of the State, or is it an unreason-
able, unnecessary, and arbitrary interference with the right of the in-
dividual . . . ?225 
Holmes made the same point in Block v. Hirsh—pre-dating 
Mahon by two years—when he said that under the police power 
“property rights may be cut down, and to that extent taken, 
without pay”226 but it is “open to debate . . . whether the statute 
goes too far. For just as there comes a point at which the police 
power ceases and leaves only that of eminent domain 
. . . regulations of the present sort [if] pressed to a certain 
height might amount to a taking without due process of law.”227 
Notwithstanding its latter-day reinterpreters, Mahon did 
not hold that a valid police power regulation was a compensable 
Fifth Amendment taking if it “went too far.” Instead, it used a 
balancing test to plumb the outer bounds of the police power it-
 
(1922), which upheld wartime emergency rent control laws.  
 223. Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922). 
 224. Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 661 (1887) (citation omitted) (empha-
sis added); see also Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133, 136–37 (1894) (“The legis-
lature may not, under the guise of protecting the public interests, arbitrarily 
interfere with private business, or impose unusual and unnecessary restric-
tions upon lawful occupations. In other words, its determination as to what is 
a proper exercise of its police powers is not final or conclusive, but is subject to 
the supervision of the courts.”). 
 225. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 56 (1905). 
 226. Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135, 155 (1921). 
 227. Id. at 156. 
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self—or as a contemporaneous commentator put it, to deter-
mine the “reasonableness” of the legislative enactment,228 a 
classic substantive due process inquiry. The principle that a 
valid police power regulation was not compensable clearly sur-
vived Mahon, as the Court quickly made plain in subsequent 
cases,229 and as lower federal courts230 and state courts231 con-
tinued to hold. 
It should not be surprising, then, that prior to Penn Cen-
tral, Mahon was understood neither to have launched a doc-
trinal revolution nor, as a Fourteenth Amendment due process 
case concerning the limits of the states’ police power, to have 
much relevance to the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause. 
 
 228. See Thomas Reed Powell, Reasoning, Reasonableness and the Pennsyl-
vania Surface Subsidence Case, 1 N.Y. L. REV. 242, 242–43 (1923) (character-
izing Holmes’s disagreement with Brandeis in Mahon as a “struggle between 
reasoning and reasonableness,” with Brandeis reasoning from abstract princi-
ples and Holmes viewing reasonableness as a “question . . . of degree”). 
 229. See, e.g., United States ex rel. TVA v. Powelson, 319 U.S. 266, 284 
(1943) (“A state may of course destroy or diminish values by an assertion of its 
police power without the necessity of making compensation for the loss.”); New 
Orleans Pub. Serv. v. City of New Orleans, 281 U.S. 682, 687 (1930) (“It is 
elementary that enforcement of uncompensated obedience to a regulation 
passed in the legitimate exertion of the police power is not a taking of property 
without due process of law.”). 
 230. See, e.g., Marrs v. City of Oxford, 32 F.2d 134, 138–39 (8th Cir. 1929) 
(reiterating that “uncompensated obedience to a legitimate regulation estab-
lished under the police power is not a taking of property without compensa-
tion, or without due process” but “[a]rbitrary and unreasonable regulations . . . 
will be stayed”); City of New York v. Davis, 7 F.2d 566, 572 (2d Cir. 1925) 
(stating that “where the property of any person is taken under the eminent 
domain power, whatever is taken must be paid for; but that doctrine is not ap-
plied to a taking under the police power” under which “property rights may be 
cut down, and to that extent taken, without compensation”). 
 231. See, e.g., Blancett v. Montgomery, 398 S.W.2d 877, 881 (Ky. 1966) 
(underscoring the proposition that “a valid exercise of the police power result-
ing in an expense or loss of property is not a taking of property without due 
process of law or without just compensation” under the federal constitution); 
N.M. Bd. of Exam’rs in Optometry v. Roberts, 370 P.2d 811, 816 (N.M. 1962) 
(“[P]roperty and property rights are held subject to the fair exercise of the po-
lice power and a reasonable regulation enacted [under that power] . . . is not 
[an] unconstitutional ‘taking of property’ . . . [under] the Federal Constitu-
tion.”); Lombardo v. City of Dallas, 73 S.W.2d 475, 478–79 (Tex. 1934) (ex-
plaining that “[a]ll property is held subject to the valid exercise of the police 
power” and “compensation is not required to be made for such loss as is occa-
sioned by the proper exercise of the police power” (quotations omitted)). 
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III.  PHANTOM INCORPORATION AND  
THE MAKING OF THE MUDDLE 
A. THE NONARGUMENT IN PENN CENTRAL 
Penn Central came to the Supreme Court as it was decided 
in the courts below: as a Fourteenth Amendment substantive 
due process case, determining how far the police power legiti-
mately allowed the state to go in adjusting the boundaries of 
property rights. While intimating that the case might be a close 
call, both the New York Appellate Division and the New York 
Court of Appeals had upheld New York City’s landmark pres-
ervation ordinance as a valid police power regulation, constitu-
tionally permissible under due process doctrine.232 On appeal to 
the U.S. Supreme Court, appellee New York City continued to 
argue the case on Fourteenth Amendment substantive due 
process grounds.233 
Appellant Penn Central took a different tack. Although 
stating that it sought injunctive relief and money damages to 
remedy a Fourteenth Amendment due process violation,234 
Penn Central relied heavily on Fifth Amendment Takings 
Clause precedents involving the federal government.235 Per-
haps recognizing the weakness of its position, Penn Central 
relegated its incorporation claim to a single brief footnote 
where it stated in conclusory fashion, without support or analy-
 
 232. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 366 N.E. 1271, 1273 
(N.Y. 1977) (“[T]he regulation does not deprive plaintiffs of property without 
due process of law, and should be upheld as a valid exercise of the police 
power.”); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 377 N.Y.S.2d 20, 27, 29 
(N.Y. App. Div. 1975) (stating that “the line between a compensable ‘taking’ 
and a noncompensable ‘regulation’ is sometimes difficult to discern” but “New 
York City’s Landmarks Preservation Law is a valid exercise of its police 
power”). 
 233. New York City’s brief argued that the Landmarks Ordinance was a 
valid police power regulation, therefore not compensable under due process 
precedents like Goldblatt, Hadacheck, Euclid, and Village of Belle Terre v. Bo-
raas. See Brief for Appellees at 20–40, Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New 
York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978) (No. 77-444), 1978 WL 206883. 
 234. See Brief for Appellants at 12 n.10, Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of 
New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978) (No. 74-444), 1978 WL 206882 (“Penn Central 
argues here that the City of New York’s action violates the Due Process Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment . . . .”); id. at 6 (stating that Penn Central 
sought “equitable relief and monetary damages, alleging, inter alia, that the 
actions of the Landmarks Commission . . . constituted a taking of private 
property without just compensation in violation of due process and equal pro-
tection of the laws”). 
 235. Id. at 12–43. 
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sis, that Chicago B & Q had established that “the constitu-
tional protections” of the Due Process and Takings Clauses “are 
the same.”236 
In the alternative, Penn Central argued in the same foot-
note that the “same result”—the identity of the Fourteenth 
Amendment Due Process and Fifth Amendment Takings 
Clauses—“is reached under the ‘incorporation doctrine.’”237 For 
this proposition it cited not Chicago B & Q, but Gideon v. 
Wainwright, the 1963 case that extended the constitutional 
right to counsel to state criminal proceedings.238 Gideon had 
indeed made a passing reference to Chicago B & Q as a rough 
prototype for expansion of due process to include other “funda-
mental” rights guaranteed by the Bill of Rights.239 But the 
precedent that the Penn Central brief mustered for its incorpo-
ration argument was meager and indirect, and discussion of the 
broader implications of such a holding entirely absent. 
Neither New York City nor the states of New York and 
California as amici mounted a serious response to the railroad’s 
incorporation argument,240 which must have seemed far-
fetched under established property doctrines. At times, the city 
and state briefs professed astonishment at Penn Central’s bra-
zen disregard of applicable Fourteenth Amendment due process 
precedents241 and its seemingly misplaced reliance on Fifth 
 
 236. Id. at 12 & n.10. 
 237. Id. 
 238. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). 
 239. Id. at 341–42 (“[T]hough not always in precisely the same terminol-
ogy, the Court has made obligatory on the States the Fifth Amendment’s 
command that private property shall not be taken for public use without just 
compensation . . . .”). 
 240. See Brief for Appellees, supra note 233, at 20–39 (arguing that the 
City’s action “did not deprive the owner of due process” because the Land-
marks Ordinance was a legitimate police power exercise); Brief of the State of 
New York as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellees, Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. 
City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978) (No. 77-444), 1978 WL 206891; Brief of 
Amicus State of California as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellees, Penn 
Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978) (No. 77-444), 1978 
WL 206888. 
 241. See Brief for Appellees, supra note 233, at 22 (“This Court has estab-
lished a substantial body of precedent setting forth the appropriate criteria for 
determining whether a land use regulation is a valid exercise of the police 
power.”); Brief for the State of New York as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appel-
lees, supra note 240, at 17 (“Recognizing the extreme nature of their position, 
appellants seek to paint this case as one in which a different rule for land-
marks [than for other police power regulations] is established. But that is not 
the case. The City’s law is valid under the traditional police power rules 
within which this Court has steered for decades.”). 
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Amendment Takings Clause precedents, dismissing Penn Cen-
tral’s arguments as “confused,” “unwarranted,” “misleading,” 
“blatantly ignor[ing]” relevant precedent, constructed on a 
“faulty . . . premise,” and “irrelevan[t].”242 In the main, how-
ever, the city and states relied on standard Fourteenth 
Amendment arguments and canonical due process precedents 
to argue that the landmarks ordinance was a valid police power 
measure.243 None of the parties or amici discussed the larger 
implications of the sweeping incorporation holding the Penn 
Central Court ultimately would make. 
What is perhaps most puzzling about the Penn Central de-
cision is how casually it swept away a century of Fourteenth 
Amendment due process jurisprudence, seeming not to enter-
tain seriously the possibility that the case should be decided—
as it was decided in the courts below, and as the parties had 
argued it—on Fourteenth Amendment due process grounds. 
Nor did the Court pause to consider the possibility that what 
counted as a “taking” of property by a state without due process 
under the Fourteenth Amendment might differ from what 
counted as a “taking” of property by the federal government 
under the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause, as had long been 
assumed. 
Instead, almost sua sponte—without briefing on the incor-
poration question or prior adjudication of that issue in the 
lower courts—Penn Central collapsed a century of substantive 
due process precedent into Fifth Amendment Takings Clause 
doctrine, indiscriminately lifting concepts and principles from 
both lines of cases and weaving them into a new, unified “regu-
 
 242. See, e.g., Brief for Appellees, supra note 233, at 21 (“[A]ppellants have 
improperly confused the principles of eminent domain . . . with principles gov-
erning a lawful exercise of the police power.”); Brief for the State of New York 
as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellees, supra note 240, at 17 (“[A]ppellants’ 
portrayal of this as a ‘taking’ case, as if it were eminent domain, is unwar-
ranted and misleading.”); id. at 21 (“The last-ditch attempt to portray this as 
an eminent domain case blatantly ignores the factual findings below and forty 
years of decisions broadening the police power of the municipalities . . . .”); 
Brief for the State of California as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellees, supra 
note 240, at 4 (“Penn Central’s legal analysis flows from the premise that the 
actions of New York City . . . constituted a taking of private property for public 
use. . . . Once the faulty nature of that premise is recognized, the irrelevance of 
much of Penn Central’s argument becomes apparent.”). 
 243. See Brief for Appellees, supra note 233, at 16 (“The appellants, with-
out any analysis, have argued that the City of New York . . . has taken their 
property and must pay the appellants compensation . . . . It is our position that 
the designation of Grand Central Terminal as a landmark was a proper exer-
cise of the police power.”). 
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latory takings” doctrine applicable to the states and the federal 
government alike.244 Henceforth, all takings adjudication would 
apply the text of the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause to the 
facts at hand, requiring endless judicial parsing of the opaque 
constitutional terms “take” and “taking.” Lost in the shuffle 
was the notion, well understood by the courts of the substantive 
due process era, that as a logically prior question, before one 
could decide whether a claimant’s property was “taken,” it was 
necessary to ascertain whether the claimant’s property rights 
extended as far as claimed; and that depended crucially upon 
state law and the state’s reserved police power to alter such law 
within reasonable limits. 
B. THE LONG MARCH TO INCORPORATION 
How could the Penn Central Court have made such an 
egregious blunder? Had Chicago B & Q already been transub-
stantiated into an incorporation case before Penn Central was 
decided? 
Eight decades of incorporation jurisprudence had passed 
between Chicago B & Q and Penn Central, and in the latter 
stages of that progression, Chicago B & Q came to be cited 
regularly as a harbinger, progenitor, and early prototype of se-
lective incorporation. But no Supreme Court decision prior to 
Penn Central had actually held the Fifth Amendment Takings 
Clause applicable to the states. Nor had any majority Supreme 
Court opinion ever squarely attributed that holding to Chicago 
B & Q. Penn Central was wrong in its history. Penn Central, 
not Chicago B & Q, was the defining moment when the Fifth 
Amendment Takings Clause was extended to the states. 
The incorporation saga began at the turn of the twentieth 
century with the first Justice John Marshall Harlan, who ar-
gued that all the rights citizens held against the federal gov-
ernment under the Bill of Rights had been fully incorporated 
against the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, either 
as “privileges and immunities”245 or as “liberties” which may 
 
 244. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 123–28 
(1978) (citing nine Fifth Amendment and nineteen Fourteenth Amendment 
cases in deriving a takings balancing test applicable to both state and federal 
governments). 
 245. Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581, 606 (1900) (Harlan, J., dissenting) 
(“[P]rivileges and immunities embrace at least those expressly recognized by 
the Constitution of the United States and placed beyond the power of Congress 
to take away or impair.”). Justice Harlan advanced similar arguments in other 
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not be “deprived” without due process.246 Harlan lost that de-
bate.247 The incorporation idea would then lie dormant for four 
decades, although the scope of Fourteenth Amendment due 
process gradually expanded during this period to embrace prin-
ciples cognate to some provisions of the Bill of Rights.248 
The incorporation debate reemerged with full force in 
Palko v. Connecticut, deciding whether due process barred a 
state from subjecting a criminal defendant to double jeop-
ardy.249 Palko stoutly reaffirmed that the Fifth Amendment “is 
not directed to the states, but solely to the federal govern-
ment,”250 rejecting the petitioner’s effort to revive Harlan’s 
blanket incorporation thesis.251 Justice Cardozo’s majority opin-
ion acknowledged, however, that certain “immunities that are 
valid as against the federal government by force of the specific 
pledges of particular amendments” had independently “been 
found to be implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, and thus, 
through the Fourteenth Amendment, become valid as against 
the states.”252 
Palko thus echoed the view expressed earlier in Twining v. 
New Jersey that if provisions of the Bill of Rights found paral-
lels in Fourteenth Amendment due process, it was not because 
the original amendments had been extended, but because the 
 
cases. See, e.g., Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 124–27 (1908) (Harlan, J., 
dissenting). 
 246. Maxwell, 176 U.S. at 614 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (“When . . . the Four-
teenth Amendment forbade the deprivation by any State of life, liberty or 
property without due process of law, the intention was to prevent any State 
from infringing the guaranties for the protection of life and liberty that had 
already been guarded against infringement by the National Government.”). 
 247. See e.g., Twining, 211 U.S. at 113–14 (holding that neither the Privi-
leges and Immunities Clause nor the Due Process Clause incorporate the Fifth 
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination against the states); Maxwell, 
176 U.S. at 604–05 (holding the Fifth Amendment Clauses guaranteeing in-
dictment by a grand jury and trial by jury are not applicable to the states ei-
ther as “privileges and immunities” or as “due process of law”). 
 248. See, e.g., Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olsen, 283 U.S. 697 (1931) (freedom 
of press); Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U.S. 380 (1927) (freedom of speech); Meyer v. 
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (free exercise of religion). 
 249. 302 U.S. 319, 323 (1937). 
 250. Id. at 322. 
 251. Id. at 323 (rejecting petitioner’s contention that “[w]hatever would be 
a violation of the original bill of rights . . . if done by the federal government is 
now equally unlawful by force of the Fourteenth Amendment if done by a 
state” by stating that “[t]here is no such general rule”). 
 252. Id. at 324–25. 
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concept of due process so required.253 The Palko Court specifi-
cally included among these parallel but independent due proc-
ess protections the Chicago B & Q principle that compensation 
was required in eminent domain.254 
A decade later, Justice Hugo Black tried unsuccessfully to 
revive Harlan’s blanket incorporation theory. By a 5–4 majority 
in Adamson v. California, the Court rejected blanket incorpora-
tion, holding that the “due process clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment . . . does not draw all the rights of the federal Bill 
of Rights under its protection.”255 In an influential concurrence, 
Justice Frankfurter argued that the Fourteenth Amendment 
“neither comprehends the specific provisions by which the 
founders deemed it appropriate to restrict the federal govern-
ment nor is it confined to them.”256 Instead, Frankfurter 
stressed, the Fourteenth Amendment has “independent po-
tency” and an “independent function,”257 and is not merely “a 
shorthand summary of the first eight amendments” for it 
“would be extraordinarily strange for a Constitution to convey 
such specific commands in such a roundabout and inexplicit 
way.”258 
By the 1960s, when the Court’s pro-incorporation wing be-
gan to gain the upper hand, their success was not predicated 
upon blanket incorporation. Instead, they pressed for patient, 
piecemeal expansion of the list of “fundamental rights” pro-
tected by Fourteenth Amendment due process, coupling those 
incremental victories with a rhetorical turn to the original Bill 
of Rights to inform their understanding of the specific content 
of the new Fourteenth Amendment rights. This approach came 
to be known as “selective incorporation.”259 
 
 253. See Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 99 (1908) (stating that if 
“some of the personal rights” guaranteed against federal action by the first 
eight amendments were also protected against state action by due process, “it 
is not because those rights are enumerated in the first eight Amendments, but 
because they are of such a nature that they are included in the conception of 
due process of law”). 
 254. 302 U.S. at 326 & n.4 (quoting Twining, 211 U.S. at 99). 
 255. 332 U.S. 46, 53 (1947); cf. id. at 71–72 (Black, J., dissenting) (arguing 
that “one of the chief objects” of the Fourteenth Amendment was to overturn 
Barron and “make the Bill of Rights applicable to the states”). 
 256. 332 U.S. at 66 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
 257. Id. at 66–67 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
 258. Id. at 62–63 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
 259. See, e.g., Louis Henkin, “Selective Incorporation” in the Fourteenth 
Amendment, 73 YALE L.J. 74 (1963) (outlining the origins and implications of 
selective incorporation). 
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With the rise of selective incorporation, citations to Chi-
cago B & Q became almost obligatory. In every case, win or 
lose, pro-incorporation justices would recite the growing list of 
“fundamental rights” protected by due process and their cog-
nates in the Bill of Rights; the right to just compensation was 
prominent on every such list by virtue of its durable years of 
service.260 These rote citations to Chicago B & Q were, how-
ever, merely dicta. 
Most references to Chicago B & Q during this period dis-
play a profound (and perhaps intentional) ambiguity as to ex-
actly what that case meant, and what it implied about the rela-
tion of the Fifth Amendment to the Fourteenth. Duncan v. 
Louisiana, for example, said that the Court “increasingly 
looked to the Bill of Rights for guidance” to determine “the 
meaning” of Fourteenth Amendment due process, and that 
“many of the rights guaranteed by the first eight Amendments 
to the Constitution have been held to be protected against state 
action by the Due Process Clause,” including “the right to com-
pensation for property taken by the State.”261 That proposition 
is decidedly ambiguous, however, as to whether the Takings 
Clause now literally applied to the states (as Penn Central 
would later hold), or whether the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendment requirements were still understood as separate, 
independent, parallel, and cognate, but possibly nonidentical 
guarantees, as per earlier understandings.262 
 
 260. See, e.g., Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 148 (1968); Pointer v. 
Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 412 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring); City of El Paso v. 
Simmons, 379 U.S. 497, 534 (1965) (Black, J. dissenting); Malloy v. Hogan, 
378 U.S. 1, 4 (1964); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342 (1963); Cohen v. 
Hurley, 366 U.S. 117, 155 (1961) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 261. 391 U.S. at 148. The citation to Chicago B & Q was curious in this 
context, for at no point had the Chicago B & Q Court “looked . . . to the Bill of 
Rights for guidance.” See id. 
 262. A similar ambiguity enshrouds characterizations of Chicago B & Q in, 
for example, Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 488 (1965) (stating that 
“the Fourteenth Amendment absorbs and applies to the States those specifics 
of the first eight amendments which express fundamental personal rights”) 
and Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 341–42 (1963) (stating that “the 
Court ha[d] made obligatory on the States the Fifth Amendment’s command 
that private property shall not be taken without just compensation”). Less 
ambiguous was Justice Black’s opinion, expressing his views alone in an-
nouncing the judgment of a fractured Court in Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 
112 (1970). Justice Black, citing Chicago B & Q, placed the Takings Clause 
among “those protections of the Bill of Rights which we have held the Four-
teenth Amendment made applicable to the States.” Id. at 129. However, that 
citation represented the views of a single justice in a long string cite with no 
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Pro-incorporation Justices occasionally made bolder claims 
about Chicago B & Q ’s meaning and effect in separate concur-
rences and dissents, but these had limited precedential value. 
In Martin v. Creasy, Justice Douglas cited Chicago B & Q in his 
dissent from the Court’s dismissal of a due process property 
deprivation claim for failure to exhaust state remedies, arguing 
that “these property owners are entitled to a declaratory judg-
ment” determining whether they had suffered a property depri-
vation “compensable under the Fifth Amendment (and made 
applicable to the States through the Fourteenth).”263 Other Jus-
tices took similar positions in other cases.264 
Then along came Penn Central. Justice Brennan, writing 
for the Court, led off his opinion with a flat pro-incorporation 
holding, buttressing it with the usual citation to Chicago B & 
Q. No dissent pointed out the import of that holding; indeed, 
the dissenters agreed with the majority on the incorporation 
question.265 It is not clear whether by this time the Court had 
come to believe its own rhetoric under the steady drumbeat of 
nearly two decades of dissents and concurrences hailing Chi-
cago B & Q as an incorporation case, or whether instead Jus-
tice Brennan’s one-line disposition of the heretofore unresolved 
incorporation issue represented a sly piece of doctrinal leger-
demain. Perhaps in the end it does not matter. What does mat-
ter is that the Penn Central Court squarely held for the first 
time that “the Fifth Amendment . . . is made applicable to the 
States through the Fourteenth Amendment,”266 citing Chicago 
B & Q as its sole support. 
 
analysis to support its interpretation. See id. It was also pure dicta, a clue to 
the Court’s emerging mode of analysis, but nonetheless unnecessary to the 
disposition of a case concerning the constitutionality of a federal statute estab-
lishing a national voting age of eighteen. 
 263. Martin v. Creasy, 360 U.S. 219, 226 (1959) (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
 264. See, e.g., Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 411–12 (1965) (Goldberg, J., 
concurring) (“Thus the Court has held that the Fourteenth Amendment guar-
antees against infringement by the States the liberties of . . . the Just Com-
pensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment.”); Cohen v. Hurley, 366 U.S. 117, 
155 (1961) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (stating that Chicago B & Q “in fact if not 
in terms, applied the Fifth Amendment’s just-compensation requirement to 
the States”). 
 265. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 141 n.3 
(1978) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (stating that the Fifth Amendment Takings 
Clause is “applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment”). 
 266. Id. at 122 (majority opinion). 
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C. MUDDLE ON ALL FRONTS 
Conflation of substantive due process and Takings Clause 
doctrine muddled the “takings” issue in multiple ways. First, it 
introduced confusion as to what counts as precedent in Fifth 
Amendment Takings Clause cases. Recently in Lingle v. Chev-
ron, the Court admitted that its Takings Clause jurisprudence 
had gone astray in Agins v. Tiburon, when it said that a chal-
lenged regulation would be a Fifth Amendment taking if it did 
not “substantially advance [a] legitimate [governmental] in-
teres[t].”267 That test, Lingle explained, is more appropriate to 
a substantive due process inquiry, and was derived from mis-
placed reliance on two early twentieth-century substantive due 
process precedents, Nectow v. City of Cambridge268 and Village 
of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.269 
The dirty little secret that Lingle did not address, however, 
is that the Court had relied on Nectow and Village of Euclid, 
together with their now-discredited derivative Agins, in most of 
the foundational Fifth Amendment takings cases of the modern 
era, from Penn Central270 through Loretto,271 Nollan,272 Lu-
cas,273 Dolan,274 and Tahoe-Sierra,275 as well as numerous less 
celebrated cases.276 For its part, the errant Agins “substantially 
advances” formula has profoundly influenced the course of tak-
ings jurisprudence, having been cited in hundreds of federal 
and state cases over the last twenty-five years.277 
 
 267. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 125 S. Ct. 2074, 2087 (2005) (quoting 
Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980)). 
 268. 277 U.S. 183 (1928). 
 269. 272 U.S. 365 (1926). 
 270. See Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 125, 131. 
 271. See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 
447 (1982). 
 272. See Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 834–35 (1987). 
 273. See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1016, 1024 (1992). 
 274. See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 384–85, 387, 391 n.8 (1994). 
 275. See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 
U.S. 302, 323, 334 (2002). 
 276. See, e.g., Brown v. Legal Found. of Wash., 538 U.S. 216, 234 (2003); E. 
Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 544, 545 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring); Con-
crete Pipe & Prods. v. Constr. Laborers Pension Trust, 508 U.S. 602, 645 
(1993); Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 488 
(1987); United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 126 
(1985); Kirby Forest Indus., Inc. v. United States, 467 U.S. 1, 15 (1984). 
 277. Westlaw’s KeyCite service lists 923 court citations to Agins before it 
was overruled by Lingle on May 23, 2005. Search of WESTLAW, Keycite service 
(Jan. 25, 2006). 
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Nor does the problem of misplaced reliance on substantive 
due process precedents end with Nectow, Village of Euclid, and 
their bastard child Agins. Other notable Fourteenth Amend-
ment substantive due process cases like Mugler,278 Reinman,279 
Hadacheck,280 and Miller v. Schoene281 make frequent cameo 
appearances in modern takings adjudication, cast as Fifth 
Amendment Takings Clause precedents. 
Not all substantive due process precedents are afforded 
this privileged treatment, however. The Court selectively cites 
language that, stripped from its proper Fourteenth Amendment 
substantive due process context, appears to support elements of 
current Takings Clause doctrine, while ignoring the language 
and holdings of other substantive due process cases, or other 
parts of the very same cases the Court cites. Chicago B & Q, for 
example, is routinely misappropriated to stand for the proposi-
tion that the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause was made ap-
plicable to the states, but never for the companion holding, 
equally important in its day, that a valid police power regula-
tion never gives rise to a compensable taking.282 Pennsylvania 
Coal Co. v. Mahon is regularly—and erroneously—invoked to 
support the assertion that a valid police power regulation may 
constitute a compensable taking,283 but more recent substan-
 
 278. Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887), was cited as a Fifth Amend-
ment Takings Clause precedent in, inter alia, Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1023, 1026 
n.13; Keystone Bituminous, 480 U.S. at 489, 492; and Penn Cent. Transp. Co. 
v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 126 (1978). 
 279. Reinman v. Little Rock, 237 U.S. 171 (1915), was cited as a Fifth 
Amendment Takings Clause precedent in, inter alia, Lucas, 505 U.S. at 102 
n.13; Keystone Bituminous, 480 U.S. at 489–90; and Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 
126. 
 280. Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915), was cited as a Fifth 
Amendment precedent in, inter alia, Concrete Pipe, 508 U.S. at 645; Lucas, 
505 U.S. at 1023, 1026 n.13; and Keystone Bituminous, 480 U.S. at 489–90. 
 281. Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928), was cited as a Fifth Amend-
ment Takings Clause precedent in, inter alia, Texaco, Inc v. Short, 454 U.S. 
516, 530 n.23 (1982); and Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 125–26. 
 282. Chi., Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 
251–52 (1897) (stating that “[t]he requirement that compensation be made for 
private property taken for public use imposes no restriction upon the inherent 
power of the State by reasonable regulations to protect the lives and secure 
the safety of the people” and that any property damaged or diminished in 
value by such regulations “is not, within the meaning of the Constitution, 
taken for public use, nor is the owner deprived of it without due process of 
law”). 
 283. See, e.g., Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 853 (1987) 
(“The fact that the Commission’s action is a legitimate exercise of the police 
power does not, of course, insulate it from a takings challenge.” (citing Pa. 
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tive due process cases expressly holding to the contrary are ig-
nored.284 
Misplaced reliance on substantive due process precedent 
pervasively infects contemporary Fifth Amendment regulatory 
takings doctrine with substantive due process concepts and 
principles. Again, the problem extends well beyond Agins. Penn 
Central relied on no fewer than twenty substantive due process 
precedents, including Nectow and Village of Euclid, to conclude 
that “a use restriction on real property may constitute a ‘taking’ 
if not reasonably necessary to effectuation of a substantial pub-
lic purpose.”285 That standard, like the repudiated prong of 
Agins, sounds in substantive due process,286 and is almost in-
distinguishable from the Agins “substantially advances” formu-
lation.287 Taking root as part of the “character of the govern-
ment action” element of the Penn Central balancing test—a test 
the Court applies in all but a few exceptional categories of tak-
ings inquiries288—this formulation has become a touchstone of 
 
Coal v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922))); Corn v. City of Lauderdale Lakes, 
904 F.2d 585, 587 (11th Cir. 1990) (“[R]egulation may meet the standards nec-
essary for exercise of police power but still result in a compensable taking.” 
(citing Mahon, 260 U.S. at 414)). 
 284. See supra note 229. 
 285. Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 127. The Court cited Nectow v. City of Cam-
bridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928), Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 
(1977), and Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962) in immediate 
support of the quoted proposition, and Atchison Topeka & Santa Fe Railroad 
Co. v. Public Utility Commission, 346 U.S. 346 (1953), Chicago Burlington & 
Quincy Railroad Co. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897), Demorest v. City 
Bank Farmers Trust Co., 321 U.S. 36 (1944), City of Eastlake v. Forest City 
Enterprises, Inc., 426 U.S. 668 (1976), Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 
272 U.S. 365 (1926), Gorieb v. Fox, 274 U.S. 603 (1927), Griggs v. Allegheny 
County, 369 U.S. 84 (1962), Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915), 
Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349 (1908), Miller v. Schoene, 
276 U.S. 272 (1928), Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887), Muhlker v. New 
York & Harlem Railroad Co., 197 U.S. 544 (1905), Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. 
Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922), Reinman v. City of Little Rock, 237 U.S. 171 
(1915), Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974), Walls v. Midland 
Carbon Co., 254 U.S. 300 (1920), and Welch v. Swasey, 214 U.S. 91 (1909), in 
close proximity. 
 286. The Penn Central court cited no Fifth Amendment Takings Clause 
precedents in support of the quoted proposition, which had no history in Tak-
ings Clause doctrine. 
 287. See Nollan, 483 U.S. at 843–44 n.1 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (equating 
the Agins “substantially advances” test to the Penn Central “reasonably neces-
sary” standard, stating that although “[o]ur phraseology may differ slightly 
from case to case,” the “inquiry in each case is the same”). 
 288. See Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 125 S. Ct. 2074, 2081 (2005) (stat-
ing that the Penn Central balancing test applies in all regulatory takings cases 
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modern Fifth Amendment Takings Clause jurisprudence.289 
Indeed, the Penn Central balancing test itself, cobbled 
largely out of substantive due process precedents, bears an un-
canny resemblance to Holmes’s sliding-scale balancing test in 
substantive due process analysis. Penn Central instructs courts 
to weigh the “character of the government action”—the “public 
interest,” in Holmes’s formulation290—against the economic 
burden on the property owner, taking into account “distinct in-
vestment-backed expectations”—or the “private interest,” in 
Holmesian language.291 On either test, a regulation that “goes 
too far” as measured in the balance will run afoul of one or an-
other constitutional property guarantee; for the modern Court 
it is a Fifth Amendment regulatory taking, while for Holmes it 
was an “unreasonable” regulation beyond the legitimate scope 
of the police power.292 
The modern Court’s misplaced reliance on Pennsylvania 
Coal Co. v. Mahon as precedent for a “diminution of value” test 
in Fifth Amendment takings doctrine has produced further doc-
trinal confusion.293 This misreading of Mahon led the Penn 
Central court to incorporate the diminution of value standard 
into its balancing test for Fifth Amendment takings: both the 
“burden” and “investment-backed expectations” prongs of the 
three-part Penn Central balance reflect “diminution of value” 
concepts.294 
 
except the “relatively narrow categories” of Loretto-type permanent physical 
occupations and Lucas-type “total regulatory takings,” and the “special con-
text” of land use exactions governed by Nollan and Dolan). 
 289. See, e.g., Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 633–34 (2001) 
(O’Connor, J., concurring) (incorporating a “reasonably necessary” test into the 
“character of the governmental action” prong of Penn Central balancing); ac-
cord Rose Acre Farms, Inc. v. United States, 55 Fed. Cl. 643, 659 (2003); 
Qwest Corp. v. United States, 48 Fed. Cl. 672, 688–89 (2001); see also Dodd v. 
Hood River County, 136 F.3d 1219, 1228 (9th Cir. 1998) (incorporating the 
Agins “substantially advances” test into the “character of the governmental 
action” prong of Penn Central balancing); Ga. Outdoor Adver., Inc. v. City of 
Waynesville, 900 F.2d 783 (4th Cir. 1990) (same). 
 290. See supra notes 202–11 and accompanying text. 
 291. See id. 
 292. See supra notes 223–24 and accompanying text. 
 293. See supra Part II.E (arguing that Mahon employed a balancing test, 
not a simple diminution-of-value test, and was a substantive due process case 
turning on the legitimate scope of the police power, not a Fifth Amendment 
Takings Clause case). 
 294. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 127 
(1978) (citing Mahon as the “leading case” establishing that frustration of “dis-
tinct investment-backed expectations” is relevant to a takings inquiry); id. at 
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The Mahon-misbegotten “diminution of value” test was 
also foundational to the second (and presumptively still valid) 
prong of Agins, holding that a regulation that “denies an owner 
economically viable use of his land” is a taking.295 Mahon and 
Agins, in turn, provided the conceptual and doctrinal founda-
tions for the Lucas “total taking” test, a test based purely on 
diminution of value without regard to the character or impor-
tance of the governmental action.296 
Finally, misplaced reliance on substantive due process 
precedents led to the importation of substantive due process 
standards into the Nollan “essential nexus” and Dolan “rough 
proportionality” tests for exactions. Nollan’s “essential nexus” 
holding—requiring that a “permit condition serves the same 
governmental purpose as the development ban” it is designed to 
avoid297—was derived directly from the discredited Agins’s 
“substantially advances” test and its Penn Central “reasonably 
necessary” counterpart.298 Similarly, Dolan’s “rough propor-
tionality” test was derived from the defective “substantially ad-
vances” prong of Agins,299 the parallel “reasonably necessary” 
language in Penn Central,300 and the Dolan Court’s own syn-
 
124 (attributing “economic impact of the regulation on the claimant” and “in-
terfer[ence] with distinct investment-backed expectations” standards to a pas-
sage in Goldblatt that cites Mahon (citing Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 
369 U.S. 590, 594 (1962))). The “diminution of value” test had no precedent in 
Fifth Amendment Takings Clause doctrine. 
 295. See Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980). 
 296. See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1014–16 (1992) (cit-
ing Mahon for the proposition that diminution of value can lead to a taking, 
and Agins for the proposition that “where regulation denies all economically 
beneficial or productive use of land” it will be deemed a categorical taking). 
 297. Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 837 (1987). 
 298. Id. at 834–35 (citing Agins’s “substantially advances” and Penn Cen-
tral’s “reasonably necessary” formulations for the proposition that the Takings 
Clause demands means-end rationality, but stating that “[o]ur cases have not 
elaborated on the standards for determining what constitutes a ‘legitimate 
state interest’ or what type of connection between the regulation and the state 
interest satisfies the requirement that the former ‘substantially advance’ the 
latter”); id. at 837 (concluding that “the lack of nexus” between the permit 
condition and the original purpose of the regulation “converts that purpose to 
something other than it was” and therefore falls beyond the “outer limits of 
‘legitimate state interests’”). 
 299. See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 384–85 (1994) (citing 
Agins’s “substantially advances” test along with Euclid and Mahon). 
 300. Id. at 388 (citing Nollan’s and Penn Central’s “reasonably necessary” 
formulation for the proposition that takings analysis “requires us to determine 
whether the degree of the exactions demanded bears the required relationship 
to the projected impact of petitioner’s proposed development”). 
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thesis of state court precedents, most based on state constitu-
tional provisions301 and many sounding in substantive due 
process.302 At the end of the day, both the Nollan “essential 
nexus” and Dolan “rough proportionality” inquiries demand a 
tight means-end “fit” in exactions, echoing the heightened sub-
stantive due process standards of an earlier era from which 
these modern standards are derived. 
Thus it fairly may be said that every major element in the 
Court’s modern Fifth Amendment regulatory takings jurispru-
dence, with the possible exception of Loretto,303 was founded in 
whole or in part on Fourteenth Amendment substantive due 
process precedents, and reflects substantive due process con-
cepts and principles. Penn Central’s phantom incorporation of 
the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause against the states ef-
fected, in fact though not in name, a “reverse incorporation” of 
Lochner-era substantive due process jurisprudence into modern 
Fifth Amendment takings law. 
The reverse incorporation was a selective one, however. 
Even as it imported heightened substantive due process review 
of economic regulations affecting property into modern Fifth 
Amendment takings doctrine, the doctrinal merger stripped 
states of what had been their most important defense in the 
substantive due process era. The police power, operating as an 
inherent limitation on property rights, gave states ample room 
 
 301. See id. at 388–91 (citing thirteen state court precedents to support the 
holding that the “city must make some sort of individualized determination 
that the required dedication is related both in nature and extent to the impact 
of the proposed development,” a test it denominated “rough proportionality”); 
Simpson v. City of N. Platte, 292 N.W.2d 297, 302 (Neb. 1980) (citing to state 
constitution); Jenad, Inc. v. Vill. of Scarsdale, 218 N.E.2d 673 (N.Y. 1966) 
(holding that a development impact fee was permissible under the state con-
stitution). 
 302. See, e.g., McKain v. Toledo Planning Comm’n, 270 N.E.2d 370, 373–74 
(Ohio Ct. App. 1971) (finding that a required dedication for highway improve-
ments unrelated to the proposed development is not a reasonable police power 
measure, and violates the state constitution); Billings Props., Inc. v. Yellow-
stone County, 394 P.2d 182, 188 (Mont. 1964) (ruling that a statute requiring 
dedicated park land was a reasonable and constitutionally permissible exer-
cise of police power); Pioneer Trust & Sav. Bank v. Vill. of Mount Prospect, 
176 N.E.2d 799, 802 (Ill. 1961) (finding that a dedication where the impact is 
not “specifically and uniquely attributable” to a developer is not a reasonable 
exercise of police power). 
 303. Loretto cited primarily Fifth Amendment precedents but also relied 
heavily on Pumpelly v. Green Bay Company, an 1871 dam flooding case de-
cided on state constitutional grounds. See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan 
CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 427 (1982) (citing Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 80 
U.S. (13 Wall.) 166 (1871)). 
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to assert that new regulatory enactments had not deprived 
claimants of their property because private property rights 
simply ended where the states’ police power began. Misconstru-
ing Mahon to have reversed that historic understanding, the 
modern Court from Penn Central forward has insisted that 
valid police power regulations could effect Fifth Amendment 
regulatory takings, so the fact that a regulatory enactment is a 
legitimate exercise of the state’s police power is no longer a de-
fense.304 For states, then, “reverse incorporation” of substantive 
due process into Fifth Amendment takings doctrine is a double 
bind: it subjects regulatory enactments affecting property (but 
no others) to heightened scrutiny akin to, and derived from, 
Lochner-era substantive due process, but denies states their 
most potent defense against such challenges. 
The mischief does not end there. By collapsing the Four-
teenth Amendment substantive due process and Fifth Amend-
ment Takings Clause branches of just compensation law into a 
single doctrine revolving principally around concepts of diminu-
tion of value (Penn Central, Lucas, Agins prong two) and 
means-end rationality (Penn Central, Agins prong one, Nollan, 
Dolan), the modern Court has largely squeezed the law of prop-
erty—and particularly the role of state law in defining, limit-
ing, and modifying property rights over time—out of the equa-
tion. As Part II.D showed, prior to Penn Central courts 
adjudicating Fifth Amendment takings claims against the fed-
eral government looked first to state law to determine the scope 
and limits of the claimant’s property rights, as a logically nec-
essary predicate for determining whether a challenged federal 
action had so truncated a state-defined property right as to 
 
 304. See, e.g., Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1028–29 (1992) 
(stating that Loretto held a permanent physical occupation compensable “no 
matter how weighty the asserted ‘public interests’” and “similar treatment 
must be accorded . . . regulations that prohibit all economically beneficial use 
of land”); Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 853 (1987) (Brennan, 
J., dissenting) (citing Mahon for the proposition that “[t]he fact that the Com-
mission’s action is a legitimate exercise of the police power does not . . . insu-
late it from a takings challenge”); Loretto, 458 U.S. at 425 (stating that even if 
a statute is a valid police power measure, it is “a separate question . . . 
whether an otherwise valid regulation so frustrates property rights that com-
pensation must be paid”); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 
U.S. 104, 127 (1978) (citing Mahon as “the leading case for the proposition 
that a state statute that substantially furthers important public policies may 
so frustrate distinct investment-backed expectations as to amount to a ‘tak-
ing’”). 
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constitute a taking.305 State law was also central to Fourteenth 
Amendment substantive due process analyses, through a dif-
ferent route: the state’s usual defense was that because the 
claimant’s property rights under state law were subject to the 
police power limitation, the measure did not “take” any prop-
erty.306 Through this mechanism, the precise boundaries of 
state-recognized property rights would evolve over time. 
In the modern era, state property law has all but disap-
peared from the inquiry. The analysis of a regulatory takings 
claim typically begins by assuming that the claimant’s consti-
tutionally protectable rights include the right to capture the 
full fair market value of her economic expectations ex ante the 
challenged regulatory enactment—though why such expecta-
tions should be deemed “property” is never made clear.307 
Diminution of value measured against ex ante expectations be-
comes the gauge to determine whether the regulation “goes too 
far” and is a compensable taking. On this approach, what is 
“taken” need not even be “property” in a legal sense. 
An example is Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel.308 Eastern En-
terprises challenged a federal statute imposing retroactive li-
ability on current coal operators to fund employee pension, 
medical, and survivor benefits that were “orphaned” by previ-
ous industry closures and reorganizations.309 Applying a Penn 
Central balancing analysis, Justice O’Connor’s plurality opin-
ion found the economic impact on Eastern Enterprises both 
substantial310 and disproportionate to what the company could 
have reasonably expected given its history as employer and 
participant in previous benefit plans.311 Moreover, the plurality 
said, the governmental action was suspect because it “singles 
out certain employers” to bear a heavy economic burden for 
“conduct far in the past” and “unrelated to any commitment the 
employers made or any injury they caused.”312 On balance, the 
 
 305. See supra Part II.D. 
 306. See id. 
 307. Cf. BOSSELMAN ET AL., supra note 207, at 240 (“The idea that a regu-
lation of the use of land which prevents the owner from making money can 
amount to a taking assumes that a landowner has a constitutional right to use 
and develop his land for some purpose which will result in personal profit, re-
gardless of the effect that such development will have on the public.”). 
 308. 524 U.S. 498 (1994). 
 309. Id. 
 310. Id. at 529. 
 311. Id. at 530–31. 
 312. Id. at 537. 
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plurality said, the statute was a Fifth Amendment taking.313 
Justice Kennedy, concurring in the judgment, said he 
would reach the same result on substantive due process 
grounds, pointing out that the plurality’s reasoning sounded 
more like a substantive due process than a takings holding.314 
Kennedy noted that although the statute imposed a “staggering 
financial burden” on Eastern Enterprises, it “does not operate 
upon or alter an identified property interest, and it is not appli-
cable to or measured by a property interest”; instead, it merely 
placed a financial obligation on the company which remained 
free to meet that obligation by any means it chose.315 In short, 
the only thing “taken” from Eastern Enterprises was some frac-
tion of its total economic value, not any identifiable “property” 
interest as defined by state law or any other law.  
In other cases, the court issues solemn pronouncements on 
the nature and content of “property,” but rarely are these 
grounded in state law. Notwithstanding Erie v. Tompkins, the 
court sometimes appears to rely on general federal common law 
to inform its decisions. The Lucas Court’s suggestion that an-
cient background common law principles of public and private 
nuisance stand as a singular exception to its otherwise cate-
gorical “total takings” rule is the best known example,316 but 
other examples abound. Phillips v. Washington Legal Founda-
tion held that for purposes of takings analysis, interest earned 
on Interest on Lawyers Trust Account (IOLTA) funds is the 
property of the clients whose money is held in trust, making a 
Texas statute assigning such interest to fund low-income legal 
services a Fifth Amendment taking.317 The Court based this 
holding on the background common law rule that “interest fol-
lows principal” which the Court dated to English law of the 
mid-1700s, and which “has become firmly embedded in the 
common law of the various States”—including Texas, the Court 
 
 313. Id. 
 314. Id. at 545 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting). A 
strikingly similar case decided on substantive due process grounds is Railroad 
Retirement Board v. Alton Railroad Co., 295 U.S. 330, 374 (1935) (holding that 
a mandatory industry-wide pension scheme making present employers liable 
for employees of defunct carriers is arbitrary and unreasonable, violating Fifth 
Amendment due process). 
 315. E. Enters., 524 U.S. at 540; see also id. at 554 ( Breyer, J., dissenting) 
(“This case involves not an interest in physical or intellectual property, but an 
ordinary liability to pay money.”). 
 316. See supra notes 55–57 and accompanying text. 
 317. 524 U.S. 156 (1998). 
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said, notwithstanding that state’s specific statutory exception 
for IOLTA funds.318 The Court acknowledged that the common 
law rule was not absolute in Texas, which recognized excep-
tions for income-only trusts and marital community property; 
but these exceptions, the Court said, “ha[ve] a firm basis in 
traditional property law principles”319—that is to say, they had 
passed into general common law by long practice. The IOLTA 
exception, without an ancient pedigree in general property law, 
was a Fifth Amendment taking.320 
In another class of cases, the Court resorts to metaphysical 
arguments concerning the essential characteristics of property 
in general. An example is Palazzolo v. Rhode Island.321 When 
Palazzolo took title to a seaside parcel, it was already subject to 
state wetlands regulations that effectively barred most devel-
opment.322 After repeated denials of development permits, Pa-
lazzolo brought a Fifth Amendment takings claim.323 The State 
argued that Palazzolo should be precluded from challenging 
regulations to which the parcel was already subject when he 
acquired it, reasoning that he had not suffered any property 
deprivation.324 The Court rejected the State’s defense, stating 
that “some regulations are unreasonable and do not become 
less so through passage of time or title.”325 The State’s proposed 
rule, the Court reasoned, “would work a critical alteration to 
the nature of property, as the newly regulated landowner is 
stripped of the ability to transfer the interest which was pos-
sessed prior to the regulation,” and the “State may not by this 
means secure a windfall to itself.”326 The Court, in short, im-
plied that some changes in the law of property—including 
modifications to the general rule that an owner of a fee simple 
estate is entitled to transfer all of her present and future inter-
est to another—so interfere with the essential nature of prop-
erty itself that they are beyond the power of the state to make. 
 
 
 318. Id. at 165–66. 
 319. Id. at 167. 
 320. Id. at 168. 
 321. 533 U.S. 606 (2001). 
 322. Id. at 614. 
 323. Id. at 614–15. 
 324. Id. at 626. 
 325. Id. at 627. 
 326. Id. at 627–28 (citing, inter alia, Robert Ellickson, Property in Land, 
102 YALE L.J. 1315, 1368–69 (1993), for the proposition that the “right to 
transfer interest in land is a defining characteristic of the fee simple estate”). 
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More commonly, the court cites the “right to exclude” as 
the defining, essential sine qua non of property. In Kaiser Aetna 
v. United States, the Court held that imposition of a federal 
navigational servitude on a privately owned pond effected a 
compensable “taking” because it invaded the “right to exclude” 
which is “so universally held . . . a fundamental element of the 
property right” that it “falls within this category of interests 
that the Government cannot take without compensation.”327 
That view was echoed in Loretto, Nollan, and Dolan, all of 
which rest substantially on the asserted “essentiality” of the 
right to exclude as an irreducible core element of property 
rights upon which the state is not permitted to intrude.328 
IV.  THE RISE AND FALL OF THE POLICE POWER: 
WHAT WE’VE LOST 
The police power was always a spongy, indefinite concept; 
courts readily acknowledged that its uncertain contours could 
never be fully specified. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co. 
offered a typical account: “The line which in this field separates 
the illegitimate assumption of power is not capable of precise 
delimitation. It varies with circumstances and conditions.”329 
Indeterminacy was both the police power’s greatest virtue 
and its greatest vice. It left ample room for the law of property 
to evolve in response to changing social needs, conditions, and 
understandings. Ernst Freund explained that the police power 
should be understood “not as a fixed quantity, but as the ex-
pression of social, economic and political conditions. As long as 
these conditions vary, the police power must continue to be 
elastic, i.e., capable of development.”330 
More worryingly, indeterminacy left legislatures and prop-
erty owners with ex ante uncertainty as to the ultimate scope of 
property rights and the constitutionally permissible bounds of 
the state’s reserved power to regulate. Legal uncertainty in-
vited litigation,331 and left discretionary power in the hands of 
 
 327. 444 U.S. 164, 179–80 (1979) (citations omitted). 
 328. The right to exclude was described as “one of the most essential sticks 
in the bundle of rights that are commonly characterized as property” in Dolan 
v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 384 (1994) (quoting Kaiser Aetna, 444 U.S. at 
176). Accord Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm., 483 U.S. 825, 830 (1987); Loretto 
v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 433 (1982). 
 329. 272 U.S. 365, 387 (1926). 
 330. FREUND, supra note 148, at 3. 
 331. Cf. id. at 65 (“[T]here is hardly any important police legislation which 
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judges to determine—on a case-by-case basis, without the aid of 
clear rules or guiding principles—when a regulation “went too 
far” and overstepped the bounds. 
These problems were compounded by the conceptual trajec-
tory of the police power itself. Early formulations narrowly em-
phasized the state’s power to supplement the retrospective doc-
trines of public and private nuisance with prophylactic 
regulation to prevent nuisance-like injuries to other property 
owners or the public generally, reflecting the common law 
maxim sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedes.332 Chancellor Kent 
urged in his Commentaries: 
The government may, by general regulations, interdict such uses of 
property as would create nuisances and become dangerous to the 
lives, or health, or peace, or comfort of the citizens. Unwholesome 
trades, slaughter-houses, operations offensive to the senses, the de-
posit of powder, the application of steam-power to propel cars, the 
building with combustible materials, and the burial of the dead, may 
all be interdicted by law, in the midst of dense masses of population, 
on the general and rational principle that every person ought so to use 
his property as not to injure his neighbors, and that private interests 
must be made subservient to the general interests of the community.333 
Kent’s view gained general adherence in antebellum prop-
erty jurisprudence.334 Consequently, when the police power was 
 
is not questioned in the Supreme Court as violating the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.”). 
 332. See, e.g., Richmond, Frederickburg & Potomac R.R. Co. v. City of 
Richmond, 96 U.S. 521, 528 (1877) (stating that prohibitions on the use of lo-
comotives in the public streets “clearly rest upon the maxim sic utere tuo ut 
alienum non laedas, which lies at the foundation of the police power”); Munn 
v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 124–25 (1876) (“[T]he establishment of laws requiring 
each citizen to so conduct himself, and so use his property, as not unnecessar-
ily to injure another. . . . is the very essence of government, and has found ex-
pression in the maxim sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedes. From this source 
come the police powers . . . .”). 
 333. 2 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 534 (John M. 
Gould ed., 14th ed. 1896); see also THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE 
CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 595–96 (1868) (listing examples of legitimate 
police power exercises including restrictions on “[t]he keeping of gunpowder in 
unsafe quantities in cities and villages, the sale of poisonous drugs, unless la-
beled [sic]; allowing unmuzzled dogs to be at large when danger of hydropho-
bia is apprehended; or the keeping for sale unwholesome provisions”). 
 334. See, e.g., Dorman v. State, 34 Ala. 216, 240 (1859) (holding that the 
police power “is derived . . . from a principle of the common law older than 
constitutions, and coeval with the earliest civilized ideas of property, namely, 
that every man shall so use his own as not to injure another”); Baker v. City of 
Boston, 29 Mass. (12 Pick.) 184, 194 (1831) (stating that the “[p]olice regula-
tions to direct the use of private property so as to prevent its proving perni-
cious to the citizens at large, are not void, although they may in some measure 
interfere with private rights without providing for compensation, [because] 
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later absorbed into Fourteenth Amendment substantive due 
process doctrine, it arrived not as an artificially contrived “ex-
ception” to a general law of takings, but as part of a common 
understanding that it was foundational to every state’s prop-
erty law, central to the definition of property itself, and conse-
quently was of central importance in the adjudication of claims 
of unconstitutional interference with property rights.335 
Over time, a catch-all category of “general welfare” was 
added to “public health, safety, and morals” in the standard list 
of legitimate police power purposes, and courts and commenta-
tors came to regard the police power as exceeding the narrow 
bounds of nuisance prevention. Ernst Freund explained in 
1904: 
[M]ost of the self-evident limitations upon liberty and property in the 
interest of peace, safety, health, order and morals are punishable at 
common law as nuisances . . . . But no community confines its care of 
the public welfare to the enforcement of the principles of the common 
law. The state . . . exercises its compulsory powers for the prevention 
and anticipation of wrong by narrowing common law rights through 
conventional restraints and positive regulations which are not con-
fined to the prohibition of wrongful acts. It is this latter kind of state 
control which constitutes the essence of the police power.336 
In the heyday of substantive due process, however, the 
term “general welfare” was construed narrowly to mean “for the 
mutual benefit of property owners generally”337 or “for the 
 
every citizen holds his property subject to such regulations”); Coates v. Mayor 
of New York, 7 Cow. 585, 585 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1827) (upholding an ordinance 
prohibiting interment of the dead in a portion of the city because it “stands on 
the ground of being an authority to make police regulations in respect to nui-
sances,” and “[e]very right, from absolute ownership in property down to a 
mere easement, is purchased and holden subject to the restriction that it shall 
be so exercised as not to injure others”). 
 335. See, e.g., Cal. Reduction Co. v. Sanitary Reduction Works, 199 U.S. 
306, 318 (1905) (stating that it is “firmly established in the jurisprudence of 
this court that the States possess, because they have never surrendered, the 
power . . . to prescribe such regulations as may be reasonable, necessary, and 
appropriate for the protection of the public health, safety, and comfort” and 
“persons and property are subject to all kinds of restraints and burdens, in or-
der to secure the general comfort, health, and general prosperity of the State”); 
Fertilizing Co. v. Hyde Park, 97 U.S. 659, 667 (1878) (stating that the police 
power “belonged to the States when the Federal Constitution was adopted. 
They did not surrender it, and they all have it now. It extends to the entire 
property and business within their local jurisdiction.”). 
 336. FREUND, supra note 148, at 6. 
 337. See, e.g., Fallbrook Irrigation Dist. v. Bradley, 164 U.S. 112, 163 
(1896) (“Statutes authorizing drainage of swamp lands have frequently been 
upheld independently of any effect upon the public health, as reasonable regu-
lations for the general advantage of those who are treated for this purpose as 
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benefit of the entire public.”338 Importantly, the “general wel-
fare” excluded “class legislation” redistributing rights or bene-
fits from one person or class to another. The Court explained in 
Barbier v. Connolly: “Class legislation, discriminating against 
some and favoring others, is prohibited, but legislation which, 
in carrying out a public purpose, is limited in its application, if 
within the sphere of its operation it affects alike all persons 
similarly situated” is constitutionally permissible.339 A decade 
later in Lawton v. Steele, the Court elaborated: 
To justify the State in thus interposing its [police power] authority in 
behalf of the public, it must appear,—first, that the interests of the 
public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, re-
quire such interference; and, second, that the means are reasonably 
necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose, and not unduly op-
pressive upon individuals.340 
Later courts offered additional tests for determining the 
legitimacy of an asserted police power measure. A regulation 
would be presumed valid unless “arbitrary” or “unreasonable,” 
or the means chosen bore no substantial relation to the end 
sought.341 Under these restrictions, the police power, although  
 
 
 
owners of a common property.”). 
 338. See, e.g., Noble State Bank v. Haskell, 219 U.S. 104, 111 (1911) (ruling 
that the police power “extends to all the great public needs. It may be put forth 
in aid of what is sanctioned by usage, or held by the prevailing morality or 
strong and preponderant opinion to be greatly and immediately necessary to 
the public welfare,” such as “enforcing the primary conditions of successful 
commerce” (citations omitted)); Bacon v. Walker, 204 U.S. 311, 318 (1907) 
(holding that the police power is not confined “to the suppression of what is 
offensive, disorderly or unsanitary,” but “extends to so dealing with the condi-
tions which exist in the State as to bring out of them the greatest welfare of its 
people”); Chi., Burlington & Quincy Ry. Co. v. Illinois ex rel Drainage 
Comm’rs, 200 U.S. 561, 592 (1906) (“We hold that the police power of a State 
embraces regulations designed to promote the public convenience or the gen-
eral prosperity, as well as regulations designed to promote the public health, 
the public morals or the public safety.”). 
 339. Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27, 32 (1885). 
 340. Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133, 137 (1894). 
 341. See, e.g., Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 385 (1926) 
(“[I]t must be said before the ordinance can be declared unconstitutional, that 
such provisions are clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, having no substantial 
relation to the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare.”); Truax v. 
Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312, 355 (1921) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). (“[T]he statute 
will not be declared a violation of the due process clause, unless the court finds 
that the interference is arbitrary or unreasonable or that, considered as a 
means, the measure has no real or substantial relation of cause to a permissi-
ble end.”). 
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operating as an inherent limitation on property rights, also 
“had its limits.”342 
As the primary rubric under which due process claims of 
alleged regulatory deprivations of property were analyzed, the 
police power had real analytical bite. It both empowered the 
state to regulate to achieve broad public-regarding purposes, 
and simultaneously limited the scope of that power. A surpris-
ingly large number and variety of regulations passed constitu-
tional muster, even if they placed substantial economic burdens 
on property owners.343 Yet the state could not assume that reci-
tation of a police power justification would shield a regulatory 
enactment from due process challenge. Many regulations were 
held impermissible, either because the means did not exhibit a 
sufficiently close “fit” with the alleged legislative purpose,344 or 
because the scheme drew “arbitrary” distinctions,345 or bur-
dened some for the private benefit of others,346 or because 
courts deemed the police power justifications unreasonable, in-
adequate, irrational, or pretextual.347 
 
 342. Cf. Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922) (“[O]bviously the 
implied limitation must have its limits or the contract and due process clauses 
are gone.”); Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 661 (1887) (“There are, of neces-
sity, limits beyond which legislation cannot rightfully go.”). 
 343. See, e.g., Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 596 (1962) 
(upholding a prohibition on sand and gravel mining); Miller v. Schoene, 276 
U.S. 272, 279 (1928) (upholding a statute requiring the destruction of disease-
carrying trees); Gorieb v. Fox, 274 U.S. 603, 609 (1927) (upholding building 
setback requirements); Vill. of Euclid, 272 U.S. at 395 (upholding a municipal 
zoning ordinance); Erie R.R. Co. v. Bd. of Pub. Utils. Comm’rs, 254 U.S. 394, 
410 (1921) (upholding a regulation requiring railroads to install costly grade 
crossing improvements); Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394, 408–09 (1915) 
(upholding an ordinance prohibiting brickyards in residential zones, destroy-
ing much of the value of petitioner’s property); Welch v. Swasey, 214 U.S. 91, 
107 (1909) (upholding building height restrictions); Mugler, 123 U.S. at 661–
64 (upholding state prohibition on alcoholic beverages, making breweries vir-
tually worthless). 
 344. Cf. Tyson & Bro.-United Theatre Ticket Offices, Inc. v. Banton, 273 
U.S. 418, 442 (1927) (invalidating a regulation of ticket brokers as “arbitrary 
and unreasonable” because it was overinclusive). 
 345. See, e.g., Dobbins v. City of Los Angeles, 195 U.S. 223, 241 (1904) 
(striking down municipal regulation of gasworks as “arbitrary and discrimina-
tory”). 
 346. See, e.g., Truax, 257 U.S. at 333 (invalidating a statute immunizing 
labor picketers against injunction as impermissible “class legislation” impair-
ing business owners’ property rights for the benefit of striking workers). 
 347. See, e.g., Frost & Frost Trucking Co. v. R.R. Comm’n, 271 U.S. 583, 
591 (1926) (striking down regulation of private motor carriers because it “is in 
no real sense a regulation of the use of the public highways” but a disguised 
protectionist measure subjecting competitors to the same rules that govern 
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Throughout this period, the term “taking” was routinely 
invoked as a casual synonym for a prohibited “deprivation” of 
property without due process.348 But the substantive due proc-
ess branch of “takings” law did not turn on judicial parsing of 
“take” or “taking.” Instead, the analysis centered on the extent 
of the claimant’s legitimate property entitlements in light of 
the state’s reserved power to regulate. To delineate that bound-
ary required careful, case-by-case scrutiny of the nature of, and 
justification for, the governmental action, and whether that ac-
tion was fairly embraced within the police power. 
The spotlight thus shone directly on questions of central 
importance in property law: how are we to understand the na-
ture and limits of property rights in this case and in general, 
and what are the nature and proper limits of the state’s power 
to alter and amend property rights over time in response to im-
portant and changing social needs? Substantive due process 
courts confronted these questions squarely and candidly. This 
is in marked contrast to today’s regulatory takings jurispru-
dence, which answers the same questions obliquely through oc-
casional delphic utterances on the deep interior meaning of “to 
take” and “taking,” ahistorical forays into alleged “background” 
principles of general common law, or metaphysical pronounce-
ments on the essential attributes of “property.” Direct attention 
to the central issues in property regulation within a framework 
that expressly acknowledged and accommodated the need for 
dynamic change in the law of property as a vital social institu-
tion in a complex and ever-changing world should be regarded 
a singular virtue of substantive due process-era property juris-
prudence. 
But there was also a darker side. Because terms like “arbi-
trary” and “unreasonable” are indefinite and malleable, they 
are susceptible to inconsistent application, manipulation, and 
conscious or unconscious interposition of the policy preferences 
of the reviewing court. Placing broad discretionary power in re-
viewing courts, substantive due process review led to the 
abuses of the Lochner era, not least the tendency of courts to 
second-guess the political branches on basic questions of social 
policy. Lochner-ization led to the New Deal reaction repudiat-
ing substantive due process as the occasion for searching re-
 
common carriers). 
 348. See supra note 27. 
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view of economic and social regulation.349 
The New Deal reaction, however, only compounded the po-
lice power’s difficulties. As both cause and consequence of the 
courts’ extreme deference to legislative enactments, the concept 
of the “general welfare” swelled to include almost any legisla-
tive finding of a “public interest,” whether or not the benefit 
was confined to a particular class.350 With unchecked expansion 
of one of its core components, the police power became increas-
ingly bloated and lost its analytical bite. Inflation of the police 
power would reach its apex in Berman v. Parker,351 an influen-
tial 1954 Supreme Court case in which that quintessential New 
Dealer, Justice William O. Douglas, pronounced the police 
power virtually without limits.352 
Ironically, Berman need not have been a police power case 
at all; its utterances on that subject were unnecessary to the 
outcome of the case. The question in Berman was whether an 
urban renewal scheme to condemn and redevelop a blighted 
area of the District of Columbia embraced a valid “public use” 
satisfying the Takings Clause.353 Justice Douglas’s opinion be-
gan by equating the “public use” requirement with the police 
power,354 obliterating the traditional understanding of the po-
 
 349. See, e.g., W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 400 (1937) (up-
holding a Washington statute setting a minimum wage for women over the 
dissent of four Justices who argued that the legislation arbitrarily interfered 
with the liberty of contract in violation of substantive due process); Nebbia v. 
New York, 291 U.S. 502, 537 (1934) (upholding a New York statute setting 
minimum prices for milk, stating that “[i]f the laws passed are seen to have a 
reasonable relation to a proper legislative purpose, and are neither arbitrary 
nor discriminatory, the requirements of due process are satisfied”); see also 
Lincoln Fed. Labor Union v. Nw. Iron & Metal Co., 335 U.S. 525, 536–37 
(1949) (construing Nebbia and West Coast Hotel as repudiations of Lochner, 
and stating that “the due process clause is no longer to be so broadly construed 
that the Congress and state legislatures are put in a straight jacket when they 
attempt to suppress business and industrial conditions which they regard as 
offensive to the public welfare”). 
 350. See, e.g., Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421, 424–25 
(1952) (upholding a statute entitling employees to four hours of paid release 
time on election day, reasoning that “the public welfare is a broad and inclu-
sive concept,” and that the legislature might reasonably decide to protect the 
community’s interest and encourage voting by shifting costs to employers). 
 351. 348 U.S. 26 (1954). 
 352. See id. at 32 (defining the outer limits of the police power as “essen-
tially the product of legislative determinations addressed to the purposes of 
government” and “when the legislature has spoken, the public interest has 
been declared in terms well-nigh conclusive”). 
 353. Id. at 28–31. 
 354. Id. at 32 (stating that the principle that the legislature and not the 
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lice and eminent domain powers as complementary rather than 
coextensive categories—a valid police power measure being not 
compensable, and an eminent domain exercise not requiring a 
police power justification.355 Berman then proceeded to rechar-
acterize both the police power and “public use” in an unprece-
dentedly expansive way, stating that “[s]ubject to specific con-
stitutional limitations, when the legislature has spoken, the 
public interest has been declared in terms well-nigh conclu-
sive.”356 In short, Berman held that the police power is pretty 
much whatever the legislature deems to be in the public inter-
est, because “the concept of the public welfare is broad and in-
clusive,”357 “[t]he values it expresses are spiritual as well as 
physical, aesthetic as well as monetary,”358 and “[i]t is within 
the power of the legislature to determine that a community 
should be beautiful as well as healthy, spacious as well as 
clean, well-balanced as well as carefully patrolled.”359 
With no apparent judicially enforceable limit to the “gen-
eral welfare,” expansion of the police power was complete. 
Without meaningful limits, the police power could no longer 
serve a useful purpose in delineating the boundaries of legiti-
mate governmental assertions of authority. The project of judi-
cial policing of the bounds of the police power, long the knife 
edge in the Court’s substantive due process jurisprudence, was 
a spent doctrinal force. 
In a 1964 law review article that profoundly influenced 
subsequent takings scholarship and doctrine, Joseph Sax ar-
gued that the police power defense in “takings” cases should be 
eliminated because its indefinite contours left it vulnerable to 
 
courts should determine the proper boundaries of the police power “admits of 
no exception merely because the eminent domain power is involved” and that 
“[t]he role of the judiciary in determining whether that power is being exer-
cised for a public purpose is an extremely narrow one”). 
 355. The peculiar facts may have contributed to the confusion: Congress 
had offered a police power-like justification for the urban renewal statute, la-
beling substandard housing and blighted areas “injurious to the public health, 
safety, morals, and welfare,” id. at 28, and simultaneously declared acquisition 
of property in these areas a “public use” justifying exercise of eminent domain. 
Id. at 29. For a trenchant critique of Douglas’s reasoning, see Costonis, supra 
note 179, at 1036–37 (“Taken literally the opinion makes little sense.”). 
 356. Berman, 348 U.S. at 32. 
 357. Id. at 33 (citing Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421, 424 
(1952)) 
 358. Id. 
 359. Id. 
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manipulation and inconsistent application.360 Sax’s critique is 
powerfully argued and in many respects persuasive, and was 
an important contribution to the late New Deal repudiation of 
Lochner-ization and legal formalism.361 
Sax’s account was also deeply ahistorical, however. He be-
gan by assuming a unified law of “takings,” attributing incorpo-
ration of the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause to Chicago 
B & Q,362 echoing the argument then being advanced by the 
Supreme Court’s pro-incorporation wing. As Part III.B docu-
mented, however, the Takings Clause’s applicability to the 
states was not yet the law of the land by the mid-1960s, and as 
Part II showed it certainly was not part of the understanding of 
late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century courts. Sax’s ret-
rospective readings of substantive due process cases from this 
era as a gloss on the meaning of the Takings Clause is there-
fore decidedly anachronistic. 
Sax traced what he called the police power “exception” to 
takings law to a series of conceptual distinctions drawn by Jus-
tice Harlan in Mugler v. Kansas363 and subsequent cases. On 
Sax’s retelling, Harlan’s view was that if a challenged govern-
mental action merely regulates the use of property, it is a non-
compensable exercise of the police power; but if it results in 
physical occupation or appropriation of a proprietary interest, 
it is a compensable taking.364 In a later variant on Harlan’s 
 
 360. See Sax, supra note 198, passim. 
 361. See id. at 37 (stating that “Harlan’s theory reduces the constitutional 
issue to a formalistic quibble” and has not “proved able to produce satisfactory 
results”). 
 362. See id. at 36 n.2 (stating that the Takings Clause “has traditionally 
been viewed as incorporated into the fourteenth amendment” (citing Chi., Bur-
lington & Quincy R.R. Co. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897))). An equally 
provocative and influential article by Frank Michelman soon repeated Sax’s 
error of conflating the substantive due process and Takings Clause branches of 
just compensation law. See Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fair-
ness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of “Just Compensation” Law, 80 
HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1168–70 (1967) (citing both substantive due process and 
Takings Clause precedents to illustrate that takings doctrine is “liberally 
salted with paradox”). Michelman’s article, however, was more theoretical, 
less doctrinal, and less historical, disavowing any intention to “reformulate 
doctrine, redirect it, or overhaul it,” instead urging “deemphasis of reliance on 
judicial action as a method of dealing with the problem of compensation.” Id. 
at 1167. 
 363. 123 U.S. 623 (1887). 
 364. See Sax, supra note 198, at 38 (stating that Mugler held that a regula-
tion of use “was not in any sense a ‘taking’ because it involved no appropria-
tion of property for the public benefit but merely a limitation upon use by the 
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theory, Sax said, takings analysis turned on the character of 
the property owner’s activity: a regulation to abate a “noxious 
use” was noncompensable, while regulatory interference with 
“unoffending property” was compensable.365 Sax argued that 
Harlan’s categorical approach reduced takings law to a “formal-
istic quibble,”366 but he conceded this approach remained more 
or less workable so long as regulation had only a minor eco-
nomic impact.367 
By the early twentieth century, Sax said, the economic im-
pact of regulation had grown dramatically, necessitating a doc-
trinal shift. Justice Holmes responded by introducing an eco-
nomic calculus meant to ensure minimal fairness in the 
inevitable battle between established property interests and 
changing social demands.368 Sax read Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. 
Mahon and previous and subsequent Holmes opinions to reduce 
takings law to a simple quantitative test based strictly on 
diminution of economic value.369 Not only was this approach 
atextual and ahistorical, Sax argued, but it failed to recognize 
that expectations of economic gain or economic value do not 
necessarily rise to the constitutionally protected status of prop-
erty interests. Consequently, it is not obvious where we should 
begin our calculation of diminution of value.370 
 
owner for certain purposes declared to be injurious to the community,” a “the-
ory Harlan apparently derived from the literal language of the fifth amend-
ment, which deals only with the ‘taking’ of property (citing Mugler, 123 U.S. 
623 (1887))). Sax’s account is wrong on several counts: Mugler was a Four-
teenth Amendment due process case, made no mention of the Fifth Amend-
ment Takings Clause, and pre-dated Chicago B & Q, when Sax says incorpora-
tion occurred. Mugler also acknowledged that some regulations of the “use” of 
property would not pass constitutional muster. See Mugler, 123 U.S. at 661 
(“It does not at all follow that every statute enacted ostensibly for the promo-
tion of these [police power] ends, is to be accepted as a legitimate exertion of 
the police powers of the State. There are, of necessity, limits beyond which leg-
islation cannot rightfully go.”). 
 365. See Sax, supra note 198, at 39 (“Harlan distinguished innocent from 
noxious uses. . . . [He held that] abatement of a noxious use is not a taking of 
property, since uses in contravention of the public interest are not property.”). 
 366. See id. at 37. 
 367. See id. at 39–40 (“Within a relatively narrow area Harlan’s conceptual 
approach produces not only clear-cut distinctions, but also satisfactory re-
sults.”). 
 368. See id. at 40–41. 
 369. See id. at 41 (“While he never flatly stated that degree of economic 
harm was the critical factor in his theory, a reading of his opinions leaves little 
doubt that this was indeed the theory he devised.”). 
 370. See id. at 50–60 (criticizing the diminution of value theory and sug-
gesting the need for a novel theory). 
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Sax’s critique of the “diminution of value” test is devastat-
ing, and it applies with equal force to the many uses of that 
standard in contemporary regulatory takings law.371 His his-
torical account has several problems, however. First, Sax mis-
takenly characterizes the police power as a categorical “excep-
tion” to Fifth Amendment takings doctrine.372 This stands the 
police power inquiry on its head. As Part II demonstrated, 
nineteenth- and early twentieth-century courts understood the 
police power to operate as an inherent limitation on state-
recognized property rights; its doctrinal significance was not as 
an “exception” to takings law, but rather as an aid to determin-
ing whether the claimant had a constitutionally protectible 
property interest, a necessary antecedent to determining 
whether property had been “taken.”373 The police power, in 
other words, operated as a constitutive rule of the law of prop-
erty whose function in Fourteenth Amendment adjudication 
was to address the very question Sax says is missing from the 
equation: does the claimant have a constitutionally protectible 
property entitlement, or not? 
Second, Sax’s account does justice neither to Harlan’s nor 
to Holmes’s version of the police power inquiry, which were 
subtler and more nuanced than Sax allows. The Harlan-era ap-
proach was conceptual and categorical, but the categories were 
far more numerous and richer than those Sax describes. Sub-
stantive due process courts continually probed and teased out 
the implications not only of “nuisance,” “noxious use,” and 
“regulation,” but also the critical subunits that made up the po-
lice power: “public health,” “safety,” “morals,” and “general wel-
fare.”374 Sax wholly ignores the rich debate over how to distin-
guish the “general welfare” from “class legislation,” and he is 
similarly inattentive to the courts’ insistence on weeding out 
“arbitrary” and “unreasonable” property regulations that did 
 
 371. See supra part III.C. 
 372. See Sax, supra note 198, at 37, 39 (arguing that “Harlan’s theory re-
duces the constitutional issue to a formalistic quibble”and “distinguish[es] tak-
ings from exercises of the police power by artful definition of the terms ‘taking’ 
and ‘property’”). 
 373. See supra Parts II.A and II.D. 
 374. See Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 661 (1887) (stating that “[i]f . . . a 
statute purporting to have been enacted to protect the public health, the pub-
lic morals, or the public safety, has no real or substantial relation to those ob-
jects,” it will be deemed invalid as an invasion of constitutionally protected 
rights). 
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not substantially advance a legitimate police power objective.375 
To be sure, these debates were formalistic, and the categories 
indeterminate. But within those limitations, they were real de-
bates over central issues in property law, going to the nature 
and limits of private property rights in a democratic polity and 
the legitimacy and limits of public-regarding legislation, with 
which courts of the substantive due process era grappled 
thoughtfully and intelligently. 
Holmes introduced new subtleties and refinements, moving 
the discussion beyond formal categorization to recognize that 
quantitative values might also play a role.376 Holmes thought 
some quantum of “public interest” could be found even in redis-
tributive laws that might previously have been held impermis-
sible “class legislation,” and that the weight of the public inter-
est served ought to count in determining whether a regulation 
passes constitutional muster.377 Holmes introduced the notion 
that it was not the mere fact that a private party had incurred 
a loss, but the weight of that loss measured against the public 
interest served by the regulation that should count toward its 
reasonableness.378 
At the end of the day, however, Sax was right. Substantive 
due process and the police power, hatched in the days of nine-
teenth-century formalism, had trouble adapting. Holmes’s doc-
trinal innovations could not salvage these concepts which be-
came more indeterminate than ever on his sliding-scale 
calculus, consequently subject to as much Lochner-like manipu-
lation as Harlan’s formal categories.379 
 
 375. See supra notes 339–41 and accompanying text. 
 376. See William Michael Treanor, Understanding Mahon in Historical 
Context, 86 GEO. L.J. 933, 933–34 (1998) (arguing that in Mahon and other 
cases Holmes was “breaking from the traditional categorical rules used by the 
Court” and developing a “balancing test in which diminution in value was the 
factor on the property owner’s side of the balance”). 
 377. See, e.g., Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135, 156 (1921) (“Housing is a neces-
sary of life. All the elements of a public interest justifying some degree of pub-
lic control are present.”). 
 378. See supra notes 210–17 and accompanying text (describing Holmes’s 
balancing test). 
 379. Holmes is justly famous for his dissents in Lochner and other substan-
tive due process cases turning on the scope of “liberty,” but his views on the 
“property” branch of due process were within the Lochner-era mainstream. 
Reversals of economic and social regulation increased sharply during Holmes’s 
tenure on the Court. See Brown, supra note 179, at 944 (stating that the Court 
reversed more social and economic legislation between 1920 and 1927 than in 
the previous 52 years). Holmes joined nine of the twelve reversals during this 
period decided primarily on property grounds. See Yu Cong Eng v. Trinidad, 
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Indeterminacy would lead to the near-total collapse of 
meaningful judicial review of police power claims in the defer-
ential post-New Deal, post-Berman era. Once the pendulum 
swung that far, perhaps it was inevitable that Penn Central 
would arise to bring it back, albeit now disguised in the bor-
rowed doctrinal garb of a Takings Clause previously thought 
inapplicable to the states. 
By simply abandoning the police power defense and sub-
stantive due process review as a separate category of takings 
law, however, we have also lost something. We have lost the 
notion, central to substantive due process-era police power ju-
risprudence, that any regulatory “takings” inquiry must logi-
cally begin with a baseline assessment of the nature, extent, 
and limits of the constitutionally protectible property rights 
that the claimant is legitimately entitled to assert. We have 
lost sight of the idea that such an inquiry must be informed 
first and foremost by the applicable law of property—state law 
in the main, and variable by jurisdiction. We have lost sight of 
the notion that the state law of property might include, if the 
state so asserts, the “background principle” that all property is 
held subject to an inherent limitation consisting of the state’s 
ongoing power to regulate for the public good. And we have lost 
sight of the notion, so clearly understood by substantive due 
process-era courts, that if a system of private property within a 
democratic polity is to have ongoing vitality, this reserved regu-
latory power cannot be wholly without limits, yet it must also 
be sufficiently flexible and dynamic to evolve over time, 
through an ongoing dialogue among courts, legislatures, pri-
vate rights-holders, and the public at large. 
Lacking these concepts, contemporary regulatory takings 
jurisprudence has lost its way. 
 
 
271 U.S. 500 (1926); Mich. Pub. Utils. Comm’n v. Duke, 266 U.S. 570 (1925); 
Chastleton Corp. v. Sinclair, 264 U.S. 543 (1924); Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon 260 
U.S. 393 (1922); Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917); Chi., Milwaukee & 
St. Paul Ry. Co. v. Polt, 232 U.S. 165 (1914); Eubank v. Richmond, 226 U.S. 
137 (1912); St. Louis, Iron Mountain & Southern Ry. Co. v. Wynne, 224 U.S. 
354 (1912); Dobbins v. City of Los Angeles, 195 U.S. 223 (1904). Holmes wrote 
the majority opinions in three of these cases (Polt, Chastleton, and Mahon), 
and dissented in only three others. See Tyson & Bros.-United Theatre Ticket 
Offices v. Banton, 273 U.S. 418, 445–47 (1927) (Holmes, J., dissenting); Frost 
& Frost Trucking Co. v. R.R. Comm‘n, 271 U.S. 583, 600–02 (1926) (Holmes, 
J., dissenting); Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312, 342–44 (1921) (Holmes, J., 
dissenting). 
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V.  REHISTORICIZING JUST COMPENSATION LAW 
It is too late in the day to question the applicability of the 
Fifth Amendment Takings Clause to the states. After Penn 
Central, that is established constitutional doctrine, unlikely 
ever to be reversed. Nor is such a reversal normatively desir-
able; stare decisis and consistency with the overall thrust of se-
lective incorporation, which has now “selectively” made most of 
the guarantees of the original Bill of Rights applicable to the 
states, counsel otherwise.380 
It is not too late, however, to come to grips with the fact 
that incorporation of the Takings Clause against the states is a 
latter-day development whose appearance coincides precisely 
with the emergence of the Supreme Court’s modern regulatory 
takings jurisprudence in all its muddled grandeur. It is not too 
late to recognize that much of the confusion stems from phan-
tom incorporation, emerging full-grown from Penn Central 
without benefit of the normal gestation of briefing, informed 
argument, and adjudication in the courts below, which might 
have produced a more thoughtful synthesis of the merged doc-
trines and careful consideration of the implications of incorpo-
ration. 
Where, then, do we go from here? At the outset this Article 
disclaimed any ambition to provide a comprehensive resolution 
to the takings muddle. Its principal contribution is to diagnose 
the malady, not to prescribe a cure—that is a future project. 
The remainder of the Article will only begin to sketch out some 
tentative directions that further inquiry might take. 
First, the history of just compensation law suggests that 
state lawmakers—legislatures as well as courts—traditionally 
enjoyed broad latitude to define, interpret, and adjust the 
boundaries of property law in response to changing conditions, 
social needs, and evolving understandings of the appropriate 
role of property as a social institution. Nothing in the text, his-
tory, or pre-Penn Central doctrine of the Fifth Amendment Tak-
ings Clause requires that state lawmakers be deprived of that 
power. Nor is the post-Penn Central trend toward increasingly 
rigid and straightjacketing interpretations of the Takings 
Clause consistent with fundamental tenets of federalism in 
 
 380. See Kevin K. Washburn, Tribal Courts and Federal Sentencing, 36 
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 403, 423 (2004) (stating that the Supreme Court “spent several 
decades in the mid-Twentieth Century gradually incorporating most of the 
relevant Bill of Rights provisions”). 
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property law. Nor, finally, is such a straightjacketing advisable 
on policy grounds if property is to continue to adapt and thrive 
as a dynamic social institution. From that perspective, the last 
three decades of Takings Clause jurisprudence represent a 
great historical aberration, one that must be corrected by doc-
trinal adjustments that restore substantial discretion to state 
lawmakers. 
This is not to say, however, that state revisions to property 
law should enjoy blanket immunity from federal judicial scru-
tiny. Giving state judges and legislators carte blanche to re-
write the rules of property free from federal judicial oversight is 
an open invitation to abuse. Prior to the Reconstruction era 
amendments, any such abuse perpetrated by the states was no 
concern of federal law; prevailing doctrine held that the people 
themselves had power to correct the abuses of their own state 
governments through ordinary political means.381 But the Civil 
War and the Reconstruction amendments forever changed the 
relation of federal to state power, and with it, the nature of 
“Our Federalism.”382 
From shortly after the Civil War until Penn Central, fed-
eral courts found in the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process 
Clause all the means they needed to provide a meaningful 
check on excessive, unfair, or unscrupulous exercises of state 
power to readjust property law, reviewing claims that some 
state measures “went too far” and fell outside the legitimate 
bounds of the police power.383 That line was uncertain and 
shifted over time. Courts declined even to try to articulate a 
fixed standard for what counted as “too far.” On the whole they 
exhibited considerably more deference toward the states even 
at the height of the Lochner era than has the post-Penn Central 
Court under its turbocharged, incorporated, and restrictive tak-
ings doctrine, but they did not hesitate to overturn state legis-
lative enactments that appeared to reflect abuse or excess. 
 
 381. See Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 249–50 (1833) (opining 
that if the people had “required additional safeguards to liberty from the ap-
prehended encroachments of their particular [state] governments: the remedy 
was in their own hands,” but they directed the Bill of Rights “against the ap-
prehended encroachments of the general government”). 
 382. See Louis Henkin, Shelley v. Kraemer: Notes for a Revised Opinion, 
110 U. PA. L. REV. 473, 480 n.12 (1962) (arguing that the Fourteenth Amend-
ment “intended a radical change in our federalism by subjecting to the control 
of the Federal Constitution and of a federal congress and judiciary large areas 
of state action and responsibility”). 
 383. See supra Part II.D. 
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One way to set takings doctrine back on a sounder course, 
then, might be to revive substantive due process as the appro-
priate doctrinal category for review of state adjustments to 
property law. That approach is unlikely, however, and probably 
unwise. The language and categories of substantive due process 
and the police power now seem hopelessly antiquated, and the 
concepts excessively malleable and subject to judicial abuse. At 
first blush, this might seem to invite a return to the worst ex-
cesses of the Lochner era. The Court’s post-Penn Central tak-
ings jurisprudence has been widely criticized on grounds that it 
bears a disturbingly close resemblance to Lochner-era substan-
tive due process review, albeit dressed in new doctrinal garb 
that disguises its true character.384 While an explicit return to 
substantive due process would at least bring some candor and 
transparency to this development, such a move might tend to 
entrench and re-legitimate a takings law that has gone seri-
ously awry by refurbishing it with a new, rehistoricized doc-
trinal pedigree. 
But substantive due process and the police power have also 
undergone a metamorphosis since their Lochner-era heyday. 
After Nebbia,385 West Coast Hotel,386 and Carolene Products,387 
the Court’s standard approach to substantive due process re-
view of economic regulation is the highly deferential “rational 
basis” test: if the enactment is rationally related to any legiti-
mate public purpose the Court can imagine, it passes constitu-
tional muster.388 Additionally, as Part IV pointed out, since 
Berman v. Parker the police power has grown so broad as to be 
almost meaningless: any objective deemed by the legislature to 
be “in the public interest” is a legitimate police power justifica-
tion. Under these highly deferential standards, a return to sub-
stantive due process is less likely to lead to re-Lochner-ization 
 
 384. See, e.g., Echeverria & Dennis, supra note 1, at 699 (characterizing 
takings doctrine as “importing due process thinking into the takings issue”). 
 385. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934). 
 386. W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937). 
 387. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938). The Court 
stated that in a facial due process challenge “where the legislative judgment is 
drawn in question, [the inquiry] must be restricted to the issue whether any 
state of facts either known or which could reasonably be assumed affords sup-
port for it.” Id. at 154.  
 388. See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483, 491 (1955) (specu-
lating on possible legislative purposes and concluding that because “[w]e can-
not say that the regulation has no rational relation to that objective [it cannot 
be ruled] beyond constitutional bounds”). 
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than to a threadbare doctrine affording little opportunity for 
meaningful judicial review. 
But if rational basis review is too deferential and Lochner-
style substantive due process—whether forthrightly so labeled, 
or disguised as Takings Clause doctrine—is too stringent, 
where is the middle ground? 
The famous Carolene Products Footnote Four389 provides a 
clue. Carolene Products drew two important distinctions: first, 
there “may be a narrower scope for operation of the presump-
tion of constitutionality when legislation appears on its face to 
be within a specific prohibition of the Constitution”; and sec-
ond, “prejudice against discrete and insular minorities” who are 
insufficiently protected by ordinary political processes “may call 
for a correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry.”390 
The first Carolene Products distinction offers little help. Al-
though protection of property under the due process and tak-
ings guarantees is a robust constitutional norm arguably call-
ing for a less deferential standard of review than the ordinary 
“rational basis” test, it would be deeply ahistorical and doctri-
nally problematic to deem every adjustment to property law 
presumptively unconstitutional, even as the starting point in 
the analysis. 
The second Carolene Products distinction is more promis-
ing, for it goes to the heart of what has historically motivated 
takings law. 
Rhetorically defending the necessity of a vital takings ju-
risprudence, the Supreme Court regularly invokes Armstrong v. 
United States, which stated that takings law seeks to prevent 
government from “forcing some people alone to bear public bur-
dens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the 
public as a whole.”391 This concern about the “singling out” of 
some property owners for exceptionally harsh treatment has 
strong normative resonance. The animating force behind the 
 
 389. Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. at 152 n.4. 
 390. Id. 
 391. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960). Scarcely a major 
Takings Clause case has been decided in the post-Penn Central era without 
citation to Armstrong. See, e.g., Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 125 S. Ct. 2074, 
2080 (2005); Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 
535 U.S. 302, 304 (2002); Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 633 (2001) 
(O’Connor, J., concurring); Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 384 (1994); 
Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1071 (1992); Nollan v. Cal. 
Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 836 n.4 (1987); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City 
of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 123 (1978). 
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Takings Clause itself was the antifederalist fear that a distant 
national government would be tempted to “single out” some lo-
cal property owners to bear unfair and unreasonable burdens 
which would be of little concern to national majorities.392 The 
“singling out” principle has found echoes throughout the his-
tory of takings doctrine.393 It is also, at a deep level, the princi-
ple that animated the substantive due process era’s concern 
with the legitimate bounds of the police power, which although 
malleable could extend neither to “arbitrary and unreasonable” 
deprivations of property, nor to “taking from A to give to B.” 
More recently, such thoughtful scholars as William Fischel, 
Saul Levmore, Susan Rose-Ackerman, and Dan Farber have 
advanced their own formulations of the “singling out” issue as 
the central problem of takings law.394 Despite the Court’s re-
current invocation of Armstrong as rhetorical backdrop, how-
ever, that principle is not adequately reflected at an opera-
tional level in contemporary takings doctrine. None of the 
major takings tests—Penn Central, Loretto, Lucas, Nollan, or 
Dolan—squarely addresses the comparative question of how 
this owner (or class of owners) is treated relative to others simi-
larly situated, the quintessential “singling out” inquiry. 395 
 
 392. See supra notes 91–93 and accompanying text. 
 393. See Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312, 325 
(1893) (stating that takings law “prevents the public from loading upon one 
individual more than his just share of the burdens of government, and says 
that when he surrenders to the public something more and different from that 
which is exacted from other members of the public, a full and just equivalent 
shall be returned to him”). 
 394. See WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, REGULATORY TAKINGS: LAW, ECONOMICS, 
AND POLITICS 6 (1995) (describing takings law as “the product of democratic 
constitution-making in which citizens wanted to promote development without 
unfairly distributing its burdens”); Daniel A. Farber, Public Choice and Just 
Compensation, 9 CONST. COMMENT. 279, 307–08 (1992) (advancing a “uniform-
ity theory” of takings law as prophylaxis against discrimination, recognizing 
that the politically disadvantaged need the protection of a formal rule); Saul 
Levmore, Just Compensation and Just Politics, 22 CONN. L. REV. 285, 306–07 
(1990) (arguing that the Takings Clause protects “occasional individuals” be-
cause it is “unlikely that such individuals can compete effectively in the politi-
cal arena”); Susan Rose-Ackerman, Against Ad Hocery: A Comment on 
Michelman, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1697, 1708 (1988) (“[T]he problem for takings 
jurisprudence is to decide when an individual has borne more than his or her 
‘just share of the burdens of government.’”). 
 395. See Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., A Critical Reexamination of the Takings Ju-
risprudence, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1892, 1927 (1992) (stating that the Court “has 
not . . . used this articulated purpose to identify the takings factors,” and cur-
rent doctrine “does not prevent the government from unfairly ‘forcing some 
people alone to bear public burdens’”); Andrea L. Peterson, The Takings 
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The Armstrong “singling out” problem can be understood 
as an instance of the Carolene Products “discrete and insular 
minorities” caveat. Both Carolene Products and Armstrong fo-
cus on defects in the political process, in particular the non-self-
correcting problems of political majorities trampling on minor-
ity rights.396 While Carolene Products contemplated that read-
ily identifiable racial, ethnic, or religious minorities would be 
most vulnerable,397 the problem of majoritarian excess extends 
well beyond those groups. In the property context, unreason-
able impositions on a majority of property owners are likely to 
generate strong political backlash, and stand a fair chance of 
being corrected through ordinary political means. But when 
majorities indulge the temptation to place special burdens on 
minorities of property owners—for example, nonresident (and 
nonvoting) property owners in a local municipality—ordinary 
political processes offer little meaningful recourse. It is as a 
safeguard against that sort of abuse that a judicially adminis-
tered constitutional takings law, operating as a check on ordi-
nary legislation, can play a legitimate and constructive role. A 
Carolene Products-like heightened scrutiny in cases that in-
volve the “singling out” of some identifiable class of property 
owners owing to defects in the political process offers a promis-
ing middle ground between a too-stringent re-Lochner-ization 
on the one hand, and an excessively deferential “rational basis” 
standard on the other. 
At the end of the day, however, a revival of substantive due 
process in any form as the basis for review of takings claims 
against the states appears unlikely. Nor is it necessary, for it 
may be possible to rehabilitate Takings Clause doctrine di-
rectly, following the broad outlines just suggested. 
First, the Court must recognize that every takings case 
necessarily turns on the question: “Has a taking of property oc-
curred in this case?” To answer that question, the Court must 
 
Clause: In Search of Underlying Principles Part II—Takings as Intentional 
Deprivations of Property Without Moral Justification, 78 CAL. L. REV. 53, 56 
(1990) (stating that despite rhetorical appeals to Armstrong, “the Court has 
made little effort to develop a principled basis for determining when fairness 
requires the payment of compensation”). 
 396. Cf. FISCHEL, supra note 394, at 206–07 (arguing that government does 
not always consider aggregate social welfare in allocating the costs of govern-
mental decisions, and may force disproportionate costs onto some property 
owners for others’ benefit). 
 397. See 304 U.S. 144, 152–53 n.4 (1938) (listing “religious” and “racial mi-
norities” as especially vulnerable). 
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advert to the relevant law of property—principally state law—
to determine the legitimate extent of claimants’ property 
rights, and in particular, what (if any) limits to those rights 
“inhere in the title” as a matter of state law. Not only must the 
Court begin to take the law of property seriously in its Takings 
Clause jurisprudence, but it must also take seriously the prin-
ciple articulated in Lucas, that an exercise of state lawmaking 
authority expressing a “limitation that “inhere[s] in the title” as 
a matter of “background principles of the State’s law of prop-
erty and nuisance” can never count as a regulatory “taking,” for 
the simple reason that such action takes no property.398 
Next, the Court must take seriously the history of our law 
of property. History teaches that states have always claimed, as 
a “background principle of the state’s law of property,” the re-
served police power to alter the law of property at the margins 
for purposes of protecting the public health, safety, morals, and 
general welfare; and further that under their law of property, 
all property is always held subject to this inherent limitation.399 
That does not mean, however, that states have free rein to 
alter property rules as they will, without restraint. For here the 
Court can usefully interject, and for once take seriously, the 
Armstrong principle. If the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause 
does apply to the states, then it must be interpreted to stand as 
a safeguard against just the kinds of abuses of governmental 
power that led to its being appended to the Constitution in the 
first place—defects in the political process that lead to the arbi-
trary “singling out” of individuals or “discrete and insular” 
classes of property owners for harsher treatment than the rest, 
whether to benefit other identifiable individuals or classes, or 
to benefit of the public generally. The question then becomes 
not simply how much is “taken” from the claimant as measured 
against ex ante expectations of market value; for mere expecta-
tions, without more, are not “property” under anyone’s law. The 
question is, has the state abused its claimed police power by 
arbitrarily imposing burdens on the few that ought legitimately 
be borne by the many, owing to defects in the political process? 
This four-part readjustment of Takings Clause doctrine—
in which the Court takes seriously what counts as “property,” 
what counts as an “inherent limitation,” the legitimacy of 
states’ historic claim to an inherent and dynamic police power 
 
 398. See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1028–29 (1992). 
 399. See supra Part II. 
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limitation on property rights, and a robust and operational ver-
sion of the Armstrong “singling out” principle as a judicial 
check on arbitrary exercises of state authority—could begin to 
chart the path out of the takings muddle.  
CONCLUSION 
For all its faults, Fourteenth Amendment substantive due 
process review in “takings” cases had some singular virtues. 
This jurisprudence kept its eye trained squarely on the princi-
ple that all property, everywhere, is always and inescapably 
subject to the “inherent limitation” that followed from the 
state’s reserved power to adjust the precise boundaries and 
meaning of property rights over time in response to changing 
conditions and altered social understandings. The appropriate 
extent of that inherent limitation on property rights, and the 
corresponding outer constitutional limits to the state’s reserved 
power, were the subject of continuous dialogue among the 
courts, the legislatures, and private property claimants. That 
dialogue was shrouded in the language and categorical distinc-
tions of the police power, concepts that sound quaint to the con-
temporary ear. Although these concepts grew unsustainably 
leaky over time, at least they provided some underlying coher-
ency to the Court’s just compensation jurisprudence, founded 
on principles of property federalism and recognition that prop-
erty is necessarily a dynamic institution that must respond and 
adapt to changing times. As Justice Sutherland eloquently put 
it in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty, upholding the then-
novel regulatory technique of land use zoning: 
Regulations, the wisdom, necessity and validity of which, as applied 
to existing conditions, are so apparent that they are now uniformly 
sustained, a century ago, or even half a century ago, probably would 
have been rejected as arbitrary and oppressive. Such regulations are 
sustained, under the complex conditions of our day, for reasons 
analogous to those which justify traffic regulations, which, before the 
advent of automobiles and rapid transit street railways, would have 
been condemned as fatally arbitrary and unreasonable. And in this 
there is no inconsistency, for while the meaning of constitutional 
guaranties never varies, the scope of their application must expand or 
contract to meet the new and different conditions which are con-
stantly coming within the field of their operation. In a changing 
world, it is impossible that it should be otherwise.400 
May we be so wise as to rediscover that principle in the 
takings doctrine of the coming century. 
 
 400. Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 387 (1926). 
